
Class Jl:^^Sa 



EUROPE 

IN THE XIX CENTURY 

(1815-1878) 



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

C. F. CLAY, Manager 

EontJon: FETTER LANE, E.G. 

EHiniJurgi) : loo PRINCES STREET 




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EUROPE 

IN THE XIX CENTURY 

(1815-1878) 



by , 
JOHN E. MORRIS 

D.Litt. (Oxford), Litt.D, (Manchester), Assistant Master 
in Bedford Grammar School 



Cambridge : 

at the University Press 

1916 



•'9 






CONTENTS 



CHAP. 

I. Europe after Waterloo 

II. The Independence of Greece 

III. France under Louis Philippe 

IV. The Year of Revolutions 

V. Napoleon Ill's First Decade 
VI. ,, ,, Second Decade 

VII. The Franco-German War 

VIII. The Eastern Question 

Index .... 



PAGE 

I 

34 
60 

82 
106 
149 
198 
232 

271 



MAPS 

Details of the Campaigns of 1848 and 1859 . 90 
The Crimean War . . . . . .119 

North Italy to illustrate the Campaigns of 1848 

and 1859 132 

South Italy and Sicily to illustrate Garibaldi's 

Campaigns. ...... 141 

The Campaign of i860 . . . . .184 

Germany to show the growth of Prussia in the 

nineteenth century . . . . .188 

The Franco-German War 211 

The Shipka Pass . . . . . '. 255 



PEDIGREES 

The Bourbon Crowns 

The House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 

The House of Lorraine-Hapsburg 



30 

64 



CHAPTER I 

EUROPE AFTER WATERLOO 

After Napoleon's first collapse in 1814 the Powers of 
Europe sent their representatives to a Congress at Vienna 
to rearrange the map. The Waterloo campaign did not 
materially influence the final settlement. The Congress 
expressed the right of the Great Powers to exercise a 
general control and inaugurated the Concert of Europe. 

It will be useful first to see what the Republic and the 
Empire had done, so as to understand what the AlHes 
considered should be undone. In 1792 Louis XVI, still 
king in name, was forced to declare war against Austria; 
then in the same year when Austrians and Prussians 
poured into France, when the Duke of Brunswick issued 
a manifesto denouncing the French who had made their 
king a slave and driven the nobles into exile, the country 
roused itself, back to the wall, and the invaders recoiled 
from the position at Valmy. The RepubHc was established, 
and the war-cry was for the defence of lyiberty. Fraternity, 
and EquaHty. Almost at once a new cry was raised ; the 
Republic would retaliate by invading countries under 
monarchical rule so as to give them the blessings of re- 
publicanism and the rights of man. It was a propagandist 
Republic in arms to force its gospel upon Europe. And 
a third cry was heard very soon ; the Republic wanted the 

M. I 



2 EUROPE AFTER WATERLOO [ch. 

natural boundaries of France to be hers, namely the Rhine 
and the Alps. Prussia, deserting the AUies, recognised the 
Rhine frontier in 1795, for the French armies had actually 
won it. 

Bonaparte's campaigns of 1796 and 1797 in north Italy 
took the French arms far beyond the natural boundaries. 
His tremendous victories in 1805-07 laid all central Europe 
at his feet. He, as Emperor, was heir to the Republic in 
so far as he broke down all out-of-date medieval survivals 
and feudal inequaUties. Where he annexed lands to 
France, the north-west coast of Germany, north Itaty, and 
the Dalmatian coast, an element of personal freedom was 
introduced for the first time on a wide scale such as would 
satisfy republican ideals. Saxony and Poland may be 
quoted as ardently attached to him. But whether the 
Belgians and Dutch, the Bavarians and Westphalians, or 
the Italians, were so ardent, it would be hard to say. The 
burden of Conscription was laid upon them. They were 
unable, under his Continental System, to obtain British 
manufactured goods. In fact they were treated in the 
Napoleonic scheme as victims to the honour and glory of 
French mihtary might, compelled to fight the battles of 
France and to abstain from trade, rather than as peoples 
liberated from monarchies by a generous and chivalrous 
race of crusaders. The glitter of Napoleon's imperial 
court, and of the minor kingly and ducal courts which 
mimicked it, did not bhnd them to the truth. 

Two countries in particular, Prussia and Spain, saw that 
even in theory they were not invaded for their own good. 
The Spaniards were the first to show that peoples as well 
as kings were the enemies of France. The Tyrolese were 
not far behind them in patriotism, but were few in numbers 
and, being far from the coast, had no assistance from 



I] EUROPE AND NAPOI.EON 3 

Britain. Then, after the retreat from Moscow, the Prussians 
as a people led the uprising of Germany, forcing their king 
in the early days of 18 13 to league himself with the Russians ; 
and indeed the Moscow disaster was brought about by the 
Russian peasants co-operating with their Tsar, destro3dng 
their property, and retreating before the French so as to 
starve them out. 

Thus various problems were placed before the Congress 
at Vienna in 1814, while Napoleon was at Elba. Was he 
alone to be punished, or France as well? Were the old 
dynasties to be restored to the old positions, or were popular 
rights to be acknowledged? How were the countries most 
Uable to be invaded by the French to be saved from future 
invasion ? In answer to the first question the AlHes treated 
France generously; she was not to suffer. But after the 
Waterloo campaign a certain amount of humihation was 
inflicted, for, if she had not unanimously welcomed Napoleon 
back from Elba, at least a great many of her sons had 
welcomed him. As to the others, the chief and immediate 
need was to strengthen Europe against any possibihty of 
renewed war. The various monarchs wanted compensation 
after the hardships they had suffered from Napoleon. 
The Congress could not formulate schemes of self-govern- 
ment for each nation saved from France; it could only 
restore dynasties, or award to them new lands left kingless. 
Monarch and people in each case had to settle popular 
questions at home. The result was disappointment and 
-brooding over wrongs up to the year 1848. In fact 1792-94 
were too near to 1814-15. All that the Spaniards and 
Tyrolese had done, all that the Prussians had suffered, 
could not make rulers forget that the crisis through which 
Europe had passed had its origin in the repubhcan fury 
twenty-two years back. lyiberty seemed to be synonymous 



4 EUROPE AFTER WATERLOO [ch. 

with Jacobinical excess. And, even had such a thought 
not been natural, one can hardly picture any statesman at 
Vienna solemnly proposing the creation of a ParHament 
and popular franchise for each country. It is a hard truth 
that a nation must win its own salvation. 

The crown of France was restored to Louis XVIII, 
brother of the guillotined Louis XVI; "Louis XVII" was 
reserved for the young dauphin who had perished during 
the early days of the Republic. At one time there was 
a possibility that the French ex-Marshal Bernadotte, 
adopted heir of the King of Sweden and Regent for him, 
and declared enemy of Napoleon after the Moscow disaster, 
might be chosen. There was some feeling that the Bourbons 
should not be restored, and it may be that Tsar Alexander, 
who for a time supported Bernadotte, wanted to show 
thai the Powers in crushing Napoleon had no wish to 
humiliate France and therefore ought not to force upon 
her the old dynasty. But, as at the time of our own 
Restoration, it must have been clear that the king de jure 
should have his chance; should the Bourbons, like the 
Stuarts, misuse it, then the French nation would take 
matters into its own hands and none would pity them. 
In the meanwhile la legitimite would stand for peace, 
whereas Bernadotte might prove to be ambitious and 
restless. France needed peace such as the true king, 
restored by the Allies, would find it to his interest to 
maintain. Moreover it was a new France over which 
Louis XVIII was to preside; a France of peasant pro- 
prietors and small estates, where the law of succession was 
as laid down in the Code Napoleon ; a France to which the 
Revolution had given liberty and to which, though curtaiUng 
the liberty which had become licence and brought anarchy 
and bankruptc3^ in its train. Napoleon had given stabiHty ; 



I] RESTORATION OF LOUIS XVIII 5 

a France which, in spite of conscription and absence of 
self-government, enjoyed personal freedom. The emigres, 
those nobles and royalists who had fled in 1789 and subse- 
quent years, some of whom were irreconcileables and had 
hounded on the Austrians and Prussians in 1792, and some 
of whom were less bitter and returned to France on 
Napoleon's invitation, did not regain their old privileges; 
they might hope to secure remission from taxation, as in 
the good old days before 1789, and to occupy all the highest 
positions in Church and State, but they had against them 
the solid weight of a peasantry that had become free and 
prosperous. The Bourbon dynasty without a privileged 
nobility was not really dangerous. 

Whether the men of 1814 consciously argued in this 
manner, or whether we with a century's experience attribute 
to them our thoughts, is immaterial. Something of this 
kind, a confidence in the legitimist dynasty as the best 
shield against civil war and a new revolution which would 
bring in again a military despot, and as the best guarantee 
of peace for a France drained of men by long wars, must 
have been in the mind of the wily Talleyrand who repre- 
sented la legitimiti to the Powers. 

In 1814 the Allies looked upon Napoleon rather than 
upon France as the enemy. But, after "the hundred days " 
of 1815, it was necessary to punish the country that had 
welcomed Napoleon back from Elba. A fine of forty 
millions of our money was imposed. An allied army of 
150,000 men, under Wellington's chief command, was to 
occupy certain positions. Works of art carried off from 
conquered countries to adorn the Louvre were to be 
restored^. Blucher and the Prussians, who indeed had 

^ For instance the bronze horses of St Mark, the restoration of 
which to Venice caused much excitement; yet the Venetians had 



6 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

suffered more than any other nation from Napoleon's 
severity, wanted to plunder in revenge, and in particular 
to blow up the "Jena" bridge in Paris; their bitterness 
was shown also in much destruction and wanton defilement 
of private property on their march after Waterloo into 
France. But WelHngton set his face steadily against the 
reprisals of mere revenge, and our own soldiers, behaving 
decently in France, certainly set a good example. 

It was Wellington also who protested strongly against 
the re-annexation of Alsace and lyorraine to Germany, 
lyouis, he argued, would not be safe on the French throne 
if the provinces won by his ancestors were given up. They 
had been recognised as belonging to France by international 
treaties^. The inhabitants, from whose ranks had come 
many famous Frenchmen, wished to be French, for they 
had learnt under France the meaning of freedom and the 
Revolution had created a large class of peasant proprietors, 
who might lose their advantages if handed back to Germany. 
The Tsar supported WelHngton, and Austria did not care 
to make this a vital question. The Prussian desire for 
annexation was not pressed, although the argument that 



carried them off as loot from Constantinople at the time of the 
Fourth Crusade. The French bitterly resented the loss, and 
probably the modern Huns justify their thieving instinct because 
the French of Napoleon were fond of loot. 

1 The French first obtained Alsace, less a few patches of land, 
in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia; Louis XIV seized Strasburg, 
hitherto a free German city, in 1681 by a mixture of fraud and 
force, but the Treaty of Rastadt in 17 14 recognised it as his. Three 
bishoprics of Lorraine, Metz, Verdun, Toul, became French by the 
Treaty of Cateau Cambresis in 1559; the last Duke of Lorraine, 
Francis, gave up the rest of the duchy in 1737 when he married 
Maria Theresa, and received Tuscany in exchange; it then fell to 
a dethroned King of Poland, and on his death to France, 



I] AIvSACB AND LORRAINK 7 

German lands ought to form part of German^^ appealed 
to Prussian minds most of all; for Prussia was directly- 
aiming at obtaining the lead in Germany, and it was a 
sentimental ambition, as well as a military need in view 
of any future war against France, that demanded restora- 
tion, and how could the British and Russians who lived far 
away from Strasburg and Metz understand German senti- 
ment? However France retained her old boundaries as in 
1789. Indeed she had one actual gain, for the little papal 
state of Avignon, joined to her early in the Revolution, 
remained French. Just a scrap of Lorraine and a scrap of 
Savoy, recognised as French in 18 14, were taken away in 
1815. 

Napoleon's Europe was as follows. Belgium, Holland — 
except for a short time when Louis Bonaparte was king, — 
all Germany west of the Rhine, a piece of north Germany 
touching the North Sea and extending to a point on the 
Baltic at Lubeck, Savoy, north-west Italy extending down 
the coast to Rome, and the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, 
were parts of France. North-east Italy was the Kingdom 
of Italy with Napoleon himself as king, wearing the old 
iron crown of Lombardy, and his stepson Eugene as 
viceroy. Murat, his brother-in-law, was King of Naples. 
Central Germany, composed of four kingdoms, Westphalia 
under his brother Jerome, Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtem- 
berg under German kings created by him and allied to 
him, and several duchies, formed the Confederation of 
the Rhine. Poland, reconstituted as the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw, was under the King of Saxony. Austria, stripped 
of the Tyrol and neighbouring territory which he gave to 
Bavaria, and of the land behind Trieste incorporated with 
France, was nominally independent. Prussia was reduced 
to little more than East and West Prussia, Brandenburg, 



8 KUROPB AI^TBR WATBRI.00 [ch. 

and Silesia, but a French garrison held Dantzig. Denmark 
was his ally. One point is clear ; by abolishing the medieval 
survivals in Germany, the Holy Roman Empire, the 
electorates, the secular power of archbishops and bishops, 
the lay bishoprics in those parts of Germany where the 
Protestant Reformation had given church lands to prince- 
bishops, and by creating the Confederation of the Rhine, 
he gave a great impetus to the German ideal of union; 
similarly in Italy, by creating three main divisions and 
abolishing all foreign rule except his own, he first suggested 
a possible unity. 

Of the immediate neighbours of France the question of 
Belgium was the most important and touched the EngUsh 
most nearly. The Austrians had been in occupation from 
1714 to 1793, the French from 1793 to 1814. To our 
statesmen it was a fixed idea that no strong Power should 
hold Antwerp so as to create there during peace a naval 
base from which it could menace our shores ;— Napoleon 
had wished to do so, and our ill-fated expedition of 1809 
which occupied the island of Walcheren was aimed against 
the shipping of Antwerp, but throughout the long war our 
naval blockade of the mouth of the Scheldt made Antwerp 
useless to him. Now the Austrians had no ambition to 
regain a country so far from them; they coveted rather 
access to the sea by way of Venice and Trieste. No one 
thought of a free and independent Belgium as coming 
within practical politics ; the mixed races, the Flemings of 
the western part, the French-speaking Walloons of the 
east, the lyiegeois who used to be governed by prince- 
bishops, the Brabanters and Hainaulters lying between, 
had no bond of union, except an affection for France. 
Now this affection, which speaks volumes for her decency 
and ability to secure the loyalty of even those whom she 



i] HOI,I.AND AND BBIvGlUM 9 

had conquered, was quite sufficient in itself to make the 
AlHes callous towards Belgian feeling. At Vienna the 
statesmen of the moment cared only to promote the interests 
of their own countries, not those of the people concerned, 
least of all those of small states. So the Roman Catholic 
Belgians were handed over to and incorporated with the 
Calvinistic Dutch under the House of Orange to form the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Such a strange union seemed 
to be the only solution then possible. 

Holland had been practically part of France between 
1794 and 1814. Napoleon had indeed made his brother 
I/Ouis king for a short time, but he had enrolled both 
Belgians and Dutchmen in his armies as if they had been 
Frenchmen. The House of Orange was restored in 1814. 
But after a French regime old and now meaningless titles 
were dropped. "Stadholder" disappears, and a "king" of 
the Netherlands appears for the first time in history. In 
18 15 Belgian and Dutch regiments fought against France 
under the Prince of Orange, the new king's son and heir, 
and at Quatre Bras they held their ground in a way which 
materially helped WeUington's plans. Yet the union was 
unnatural. Not only was there a reHgious difficulty, but 
also, ever since the days of Philip II and Parma, the Dutch 
had been free, the Belgians in turn under the yoke of 
Spain and of Austria ; the Dutch were sailors and merchants, 
the Belgians in pre-Spanish days had been manufacturers 
and bankers ; the Dutch had held both banks at the mouth 
of the Scheldt, and had killed the commerce of Antwerp. 
Of course the twenty years of connection with France 
would do something to bring the two races together. Also, 
when under the same crown, the Belgians would be able to 
navigate the Scheldt freely, which meant that Antwerp 
would enjoy a commercial prosperity that she had never 



10 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

known since 1585^. But all the traditions of Belgium were 
opposed to Dutch traditions. 

At the other end of the French frontier the House of 
Savoy was restored to its old dominions as in 1792, namely 
the Duchy of Savoy, which lay south of the Lake of Geneva 
and west of the Alps; Piedmont, lying around the upper 
Po and enclosed on two sides by Alps and on the third 
by Apennines; the territory of Nice; and the island of 
Sardinia, from which the Duke took the title of King of 
Sardinia. To these were added the old rich republic of 
Genoa, and the strip of coast known as the Italian Riviera 
which had been conquered by Genoa^. It was a compact 
little kingdom, strong out of proportion to its size because 
it contained the Alpine passes between France and Italy, 
and now stronger than of old because of the addition of 
Genoa. The object of the Allies was to erect a strong 
barrier against any future attempt of France to reconquer 
Italy, either by the inland passes or the coast road. As a 
matter of fact the Riviera is a very difficult country for 
an army on the march ; the mountains in places fall sheer to 
the sea, and landsHdes are frequent, so that even to-day 
both the road and the single-track railway have to be often 
repaired. But Napoleon had invaded Italy in 1796 along 
this coast. Genoa had repubhcan sympathy with France. 
Therefore the land had to be annexed to Savoy and 
Sardinia. 

The restored dynasty had no leaning towards con- 
stitutional government. But the Savoyards and north- 
western ItaHans had enjoyed personal freedom, as had the 

^ The year when Alexander of Parma besieged and took Antwerp. 

2 Many a Riviera town has to-day an old fort erected by the 
Genoese to overawe, not to protect it; the old "freedom" of 
Genoa carried with it freedom to enslave. 



I] SARDINIA; AND AUSTRIAN ITAI,Y ii 

Belgians, during the score of years of French regime; 
probably also, like the Belgians, they felt that the burden 
of conscription imposed by Napoleon had been balanced 
by their share of military glory. Thus a yearning for 
popular government was openly shown. Genoa lamented 
her lost repubUc, and from her came Mazzini the ardent 
conspirator and dreamer. Nice was the birthplace of 
Garibaldi. And ultimately the dynasty, by no means 
liberal in 1814, caught the ideas of democracy from their 
subjects and became the champions of a Hberal monarchy. 
The Emperor of Austria, Francis II, looked to Italy 
and the Adriatic for his reward after years of war against 
France and Napoleon. It has been the fate of Austria to 
expand towards non-German lands, for France was her 
hereditary enemy in the west, Bavaria supported by 
France tried constantly to undermine her ascendancy in 
south Germany, and Prussia was her youngest and strongest 
rival in north Germany. For centuries she was the bulwark 
of Europe against the Turks, gaining Hungary and much 
Slavonic land in consequence. In 1814 she recovered the 
Tyrol, which Napoleon had given to Bavaria, and thereby 
held the Brenner Pass and the Adige route into Italy. 
She recovered lyombardy, which the Spaniards had ceded 
to her in 1714 and Napoleon had conquered in 1796. She 
obtained Venetia, both the late repubhc of Venice^ and all 

^ It is interesting to compare modern Venice with, modern 
Genoa. The one has a magnificent hinterland for trade, the Po 
valley, and access to the transalpine routes to Germany; but the 
shallow water of the lagoon prevents the approach of the large 
ships of commerce which the conditions of modern trade demand. 
The other is shut in by a triple amphitheatre of m.ountains ; but the 
deep-sea harbour can admit large ships. The art of the engineer 
has been unable to deepen the lagoon, but has been able to drive 
roads and railways over the Apennines. Hence the trade of Genoa 



12 EUROPE AFTER WATERIyOO [ch. 

the hinterland that Venice had conquered, and the 
Dalmatian coast downwards from Trieste to Ragusa and 
Cattaro. Thus Austria, by way of compensation for the 
loss of Belgium which, indeed, she never cared to hold, 
secured the string of harbours and inlets on the flank of 
Turkey where she was able to create a navy ; the effect of 
this we feel to-day. lyower down, the protectorate over 
the Ionian Islands was entrusted to us, and Malta was 
definitely acknowledged as ours. 

South of the Po the Duchy of Parma was allotted to 
Marie I^ouise, Napoleon's Austrian wife, for her Hfe; a 
new Duchy of lyucca was created for the Bourbon Duke of 
Parma, who, when Marie died, was to have Parma back 
again, and then lyucca was to go to Tuscany. The Duchy 
of Modena was restored to a junior Hapsburg line. The 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany, which since the extinction of 
the famous Medici family in 1737 had been held by a 
Hapsburg, was restored to the Emperor's brother. The 
Pope regained not only full authority over Rome and the 
Patrimony of St Peter, but also the Marches which stretched 
from the Apennines to the Adriatic, and the I^egations of 
Bologna and Ferrara which touched the lower Po. The 
Bourbon king of Naples recovered Naples, and Sicily, owing 
to British aid, he had never lost. Thus the overthrow of 
Napoleon simply meant the re-establishment, and in the 
cases of Genoa and Venice the establishment, of foreign 
rulers whose one idea was to be despots and who had no 

is great, and that of Venice, whether under Austrian rule or as a 
city of free Italy, cannot be compared with what it was in her glorious 
medieval days. Genoa before 1914 was being rebuilt and laid out 
as a modern city with wide and prosaic streets, only a few of her 
quaint narrow ways remaining and still flanked by her old palaces, 
and her citizens had largely forgotten the past in their more recent 
prosperity. Venice is substantially unaltered. 



I] OTHER PARTS OF ITAI.Y 13 

consideration for national feeling. Austrian white-coated 
soldiers garrisoned the territories actually governed by 
Austria, and were ready at a moment's notice to march 
over the borders into the Roman or Neapohtan territories 
to maintain pope or king. This was done to prevent any 
possibihty of a new French occupation. LiberaHsm was 
to be suppressed because it meant sympathy with French 
ideals. Of course there was no bond of union between 
Milanese, Tuscans, Romans, Sicihans, and the others. 
Italy was "a geographical expression." But all Itahans 
must have had a feeHng of community as long as the 
French regime lasted. Napoleon had broken up the 
artificial kingdoms and duchies of old days, the Alhes had 
restored them, and educated Itahans could not but grieve 
that they were handed over to the tender mercies of those 
who cared nothing for them. 

Napoleon had destroyed the medieval Germany of 1792, 
a bundle of two or three hundred states, great and small, 
lay and clerical. Francis II was no longer Holy Roman 
Emperor but Emperor of Austria. There was no thought of 
reviving the electorates in 18 14. Napoleon's example was 
followed, and the Germany of 18 14 as constituted by the 
Congress of Vienna was in less than forty pieces. 

The general position of the Emperor of Austria has 
already been indicated. He was King of Hungary and of 
Bohemia, he ruled over a considerable stretch of Slavonic 
country, he recovered the Tyrol which Napoleon had cut 
off from him, and he had no regret in giving up any claim 
to the Belgian Netherlands. He held comparatively httle 
German land, and his ambition was to dominate Italy. 

In strong contrast the ambitious dynasty of the Hohen- 
zoUerns aspired to dominate Germany. It was in 1701 
that the ** Markgraf " and Elector of Brandenburg first took 



14 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

the title of King of Prussia, as ruler of the non-German 
Prussians^. Many small pieces of central and western 
Germany were absorbed by the dynasty. The reigning 
HohenzoUern in 1795 made peace with the French RepubHc 
and deserted the AlHes ; in 1805 he made no effort to help 
the Austrians against Napoleon; and in 1806 he reaped 
the reward of his base selfishness, and was goaded into war 
by Napoleon and overwhelmed in the double defeat of 
Jena — Auerstadt. Napoleon crushed Prussia ruthlessly. 
Her resurrection dates from the early part of 1813, when 
she forced her king to make alhance with the victorious 
Russians and took the chief lead in the uprising of Germany. 
Prussian statesmen demanded a large reward for her 
devotion and services, the entire annexation of Saxony 
which had been Napoleon's warmest ally; but to this 
Great Britain and Austria could not agree, and indeed 
there was even some danger that the Allies might split 
into two parties and fight each other on the Saxon question. 
Finally Prussia obtained about half of Saxony and a good 
part of central Germany, including the great cities of 
Magdeburg and Halberstadt; likewise Westphaha, and a 
large stretch of land on the left bank of the Rhine, including 
Koln and Trier 2. This was more than a mere gain of 
many square miles and much population. It was a recogni- 
tion that Prussia, not Austria, was the leading German 
power, worthy to hold and defend against any new French 
aggression that Rhineland which was so dear to the German 

^ We are apt to forget that the genuine Prussians, not the 
Brandenburgers, are Slavs. Hence modern talk of German Kultur 
as a bulwark of civilisation against Russian Slavism is more than 
a little illogical. 

2 That is the archbishopric-electorates of Koln (Cologne) and 
Trier (Treves). The third archbishopric-electorate of Mainz 
(Mayence) was added to Hesse Darmstadt. 



I] PRUSSIA AND POLAND 15 

heart, which France coveted and had held so long, and 
over which a watch had to be kept^. Westphalia and 
Rhineland were Roman CathoHc, and Lutheran Prussia 
was deputed to guard them. Thus the future of the 
Hohenzollerns was assured; they would be the champions 
of all Germany, Catholic or Protestant, west or east, if in 
course of time they kept up their military strength. 

Prussian ambition also aimed at securing a good portion 
of Poland. In the old pre-Napoleonic partitions of Poland 
they had gained most of the Vistula and Warsaw with it; 
Napoleon had restored Poland, not as a kingdom, but as 
a Grand Duchy, and the Poles fought very well under him, 
especially as cavalry. But as Prussia received so much 
new land in Germany, the largest portion of Poland was 
now awarded to Russia, Warsaw included; Prussia's gain 
was the strip of West Prussia, filling the gap between 
Brandenburg and East Prussia, with the old free German 
city of Dantzig, and the fortresses Thorn and Posen; 
Austria obtained Galicia, including Lemberg, but Cracow 
was made an independent repubhc. 

Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, had been Napoleon's 
allies; but whereas Saxony remained true to him to the 
end, the Bavarians turned against him, and he even had to 
fight against them as he retired from the great battle of 
Leipzig. Therefore it was thought that v^hilst the Allies 
should punish Saxony they should leave the other two 
intact. The Allies finally accepted the King of Saxony as 
king, but only in command of half of his old dominions, 
that is, the present Saxony Ijdng around Dresden and 
Leipzig. The Kings of Bavaria — minus the Tyrol — and of 
Wurtemberg retained their lands and titles. Hanover was 
entirely restored to George III of England, no longer as 
1 See p. 74. 



i6 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

Elector but as King of Hanover. The Grand Duchies of 
Baden, Hesse Darmstadt, Hesse Cassel^, and the two 
Mecklenburgs, were constituted; and several Duchies, 
such as vSaxe Weimar and Saxe Coburg^, still remained to 
represent the Httle states which had formerly been a chief 
feature of Germany. Four only of the old free cities of 
Germany remained, Frankfort on the Main, Hamburg, 
Bremen, and Lubeck. Bavaria held a piece of the old 
Palatinate on the west bank of the Rhine. The old 
archbishopric-electorate of Mainz was added to Hesse 
Darmstadt. 

A spirit of unity was abroad in Germany, yet the time 
had not come for a settlement of a definite union. The old 
jealousy between Austria and Prussia was quite sufficient 
in itself to prevent the scheme, and the question of as- 
cendancy had first to be fought out between them. But 
a Bund or Confederation was formed : it embraced thirty- 
nine states, German Austria, Prussia, the four lesser 
kingdoms, five grand duchies, many duchies, four free 
cities, together with the King of the Netherlands by virtue 
of his position as Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and the 
King of Denmark who held the Duchy of Holstein. It 
was by no means an ideal confederation. In general 
terms one can say that the kings and dukes and others 

1 But, curiously enough, the Grand Duke was popularly styled 
"Elector." 

2 A former Elector of Saxony had two sons, Ernest and Albert. 
Luther's protector was of the Ernestine branch, but his nephew 
lost the electorate in 1547; the lands of their part of Saxony were 
split into fragments and shared by members of the family, such as 
Coburg, Gotha, Altenburg, Weimar, Meiningen. The Albertine 
branch got the electorate and the "march" of Meissen, which 
Napoleon formed into the Kingdom of Saxony, and of which the 
Congress awarded a large share to Prussia. 



I] GERMAN CONFEDERATION 17 

were members of it, rather than the countries over which 
they ruled. They nominated representatives who should 
attend the Diets. The presidency belonged to Austria, 
but neither Austria nor Prussia had more than one vote, 
and the pettiest duke had one. It would be impossible 
for the Diet to enforce its wishes upon its stronger members. 
Still it accustomed the German mind to entertain an idea, of 
unity which might lead to something better later on. As in 
Italy, there had been hitherto no real bond between states 
as far apart as Mecklenburg and Baden, but Napoleon had 
forced all Germans to consider themselves in some sense as 
one nation, and therefore the new Confederation had in it 
greater possibiHties than the old Holy Roman Empire. 

In the old days the one great power of the Holy Roman 
Empire had been Austria. Jealousy of Austria had always 
prevented any scheme of reform which would tend to 
produce unity. The many second-rate states, Brandenburg 
before the creation of the Kingdom of Prussia, Saxony, 
Bavaria, the three Archbishop-Electors, were none of them 
strong enough alone to counterbalance Austria, and France 
had only to offer her aid to one of these to find a ready ally, 
through whom she could weaken Austria. But now there 
were two rivals for ascendancy; the one, which would 
prove herself within the next half-century strong enough 
to lead and detach from the other the minor states which 
held the balance of power, would win the unity of Germany. 
Meanwhile the mere fact that Prussia had obtained such 
a large portion of Roman Catholic Rhineland, whereas 
Austria had only gained accessions of territory in Italy, 
was a forecast of what would happen. Finally fear of 
France would produce the desired result when Prussian 
statesmen would be clever enough to exploit this feeling in 
her own favour. 

M. 2 



i8 EUROPE AMER WATERLOO [ch. 

As regards smaller nations, the King of Sweden lost 
both Finland and the small Swedish remnant of Pomerania : 
in return the Allies awarded to him Norway, compelling 
the Norwegians to submit by threat of armed force. Den- 
mark lost Norway by her resolute devotion to Napoleon, 
whereas Bernadotte, the adopted crown prince of Sweden, 
had been clever enough to attach himself to the cause of 
the Alhes in 1813. 

Switzerland obtained the constitution which she enjoys 
now, except that the central government is to-day stronger 
in proportion to the governments of the cantons, and the 
bonds which unite the cantons have been tightened by the 
necessities of modern life. 

Castlereagh obtained from the Congress a general con- 
demnation of the slave-trade. France agreed to aboUsh 
it. But Portugal and Spain, in spite of all our services 
to them, refused and argued as if this was an instance of 
English hypocrisy. We did not abohsh slavery till 1833. 

Throughout the whole of Europe there were high hopes 
that some constitutional form of government would be 
adopted in each country, that popular rights would in some 
way be recognised. Tsar Alexander, proclaiming himself 
King of Poland, was going to introduce constitutional and 
national freedom. One of the clauses of the instrument 
which created the German Confederation assumed that 
each of the members would have a Constitution. But 
while the peoples had under French influence absorbed the 
idea of popular liberty, the restored monarchs could only 
remember that in France republicanism had produced 
licence and excess, that republican excitement had begun 
a long series of wars and led directly to Napoleonism. 
Even in England the fear that any much-desired reform 
would only prove the thin end of the wedge of revolutionary 



I] I.IBERAI.ISM IN THE AIR 19 

radicalism had effectually checked redress of abuses; 
between 1789 and 18 15 the only remedial legislation that 
was carried in the face of a strong reaction against reform 
was the aboUtion of the slave-trade in 1807, and that was 
only possible after Pitt's • death ; also Sir Samuel Romilly 
by persistent "effort was beginning to reform the criminal 
law, and brought about the abolition of hanging as a 
penalty for certain small offences. Therefore, if in our 
island Reform of ParHament had not yet been effected, 
there is Httle reason for surprise that continental nations 
which had never had a true parliament would receive one. 
" lyiberalism " was in the air, but the word was used to 
imply an unjustifiable yearning after Hberty and was used 
scornfully. 

A great deal depended upon the personal influence of 
Alexander. He had high ideals and a generous nature, 
but he was ready to fall under the influence of whoever 
was the most masterful at the moment. Thus in 1805-07 
he was Napoleon's enemy ; in 1807, disappointed in receiving 
no direct help from the British, he met at Tilsit the master 
mind and became Napoleon's ardent ally; he accepted the 
continental blockade against British trade, but soon, finding 
that Russia could not get on without it, also insulted by 
Napoleon's proposal for his sister's hand and subsequent 
rejection of her for Marie I^ouise, he once more defied 
France and precipitated the great Moscow campaign of 
1812; thereafter he was the warm friend of the British, 
and was the most popular of the allied sovereigns who 
visited George III in 1814. A man of moods, inchned to 
generosity and enthusiasm, then passionately resentful of 
real or imaginary insults, he was apt to run to one extreme 
and then to the opposite. In 18 15 he suggested a Holy 
Alliance in defence of religion as against the excesses of 



20 EUROPE AFTER WATERIvOO [ch. 

the Jacobin atheism of the early days of the French 
Repubhc and the cynical toleration of the CathoHc Church 
by Napoleon. "Holy AUiance" meant nothing, but the 
phrase is popularly used to express the pohtical association 
of the sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, when the 
clever Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, obtained 
influence over them one by one and persuaded them to 
crush lyiberaHsm. 

Metternich moulded to his will the three potentates by 
warnings, and then by triumphantly pointing to a certain 
scene at Wartburg^ in 1817 as a sure sign of the wickedness 
of unrestrained Hberty. Students from the hberal university 
of Jena and elsewhere — under the Duke of Saxe Weimar 
freedom was real and Jena was the centre of liberal 
propaganda — met to celebrate the third centenary of 
I/Uther and the anniversary of the battle of I/cipzig ; they 
celebrated in good German style with religious services, 
and v/ith feasting after service ; a bonfire was lit, and into 
it were thrown, in imitation of I^uther's burning of the 
pope's bull, writings which were in praise of despotism and 
various emblems of military brutality. Because of youthful 
rowdiness and the destruction of a pamphlet and a cane, 
Metternich condemned the Germans as a nation to forfeit 
all their rights to free speech and a free press. For the 
strongest as well as the noisiest freedom-lovers were, 
naturally enough, not the nobles who thought that they 
had a divine right to administer Germany under their 

^ In the castle of Wartburg Luther was sheltered by the Elector 
of Saxony in 1520; it stands above Eisenach in a detached fragment 
of Saxe Weimar some miles west of Weimar itself. Eisleben, 
Luther's birthplace, and Wittenberg, where he nailed up his theses 
in 151 7, being in Prussian Saxony, were not so suitable for a centenary 
celebration. 



I] MBTTBRNICH AGAINST IvIBHRTY 21 

respective princes, nor the dull and lately all but slavish 
peasants, but the keen student class. 

Englishmen may find it difficult to understand why 
such an outburst of high spirits should be so bitterly 
punished, yet a very httle reflection reminds us that the 
present war is after all the result of assiduous teaching in 
the universities and schools of Germany; only in 1914 
the Imperial campaign for the glorification of the German 
nation as supermen fit to govern the whole world was 
dictated from head-quarters; in 1817 the spontaneous 
outburst of a few Hberal young men set the governments in 
alarm lest the ideas of freedom preached in the universities 
should penetrate through the nation. 

There was also definite crime in honour of liberty; a 
student who had been at Wartburg was, in a fit of devout 
excitement, led in 18 19 to murder a certain Russian 
journaHst in Germany who was thought to have influence 
over the Tsar in the policy of tyranny, but this murder was 
done after the Tsar as well as the King of Prussia had 
already become reactionary. Alexander ha& already taken 
fright, and the high promises which he had made to the 
Poles that he would give them a free government, as well 
as his more vague aspirations towards the abolition of 
serfdom in Russia itself, had been abandoned. 

The first of various conferences between the ministers 
of the Great Powers met at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) in 
1818. As regards France it was agreed to withdraw the 
AlHed army of occupation, and even to consider lyouis 
XVIII as a free sovereign and member of the Concert of 
Europe. Now it was that Metternich first began to 
exercise a real influence, bringing over Alexander to his 
view that the Concert should regulate the affairs of the 
other countries and repress liberty. Britain, represented 



22 EUROPE AFTER WATERLOO [ch. 

by Castlereagh and Wellington, was not a consenting party ; 
certainl}^ at home our Tory government favoured repression 
and considered every form of rioting and disturbance as 
a crime : the massacre of Peterloo at Manchester took place 
in 1818 ; yet ours was nominally a free country and there 
was a strong Radical minority in the Commons, so that not 
even Tories could face Parliament if they should bind 
themselves to a union of European tyranny. Our ministers, 
however, were content to disapprove of Metternich's ideal ; 
they did not actively oppose him, and their mere non- 
compHance was quite counterbalanced by Alexander's 
change of front. "Metternich has fairly enchanted them." 
In Prussia there was no attempt to give a free parlia- 
ment, and a vague idea expressed in the Congress of Vienna 
that the new German Confederation should imply some sort 
of constitutional freedom in each of the federated states 
never came to fulfilment. Metternich pointed out that 
the Prussian kingdom, composed of seven provinces new 
and old, had no common point of union ; the Crown should 
govern, and allow merely provincial diets to meet for local 
business and assent to what the Crown proposed ; as these 
diets were composed of local magnates, they were not 
centres of Liberalism. Thus the HohenzoUern ideal of 
doing everything for Prussians and nothing by Prussians 
was carried out. The Crown arranged a system of national 
education and watched over the material prosperity of the 
country as in the days of Frederick the Great. The Crown 
introduced the Prussian drill-sergeant into the annexed 
provinces of Saxony and Westphalia. Among lesser 
princes the "Elector" of Hesse Cassel was a conspicuous 
rough despot ; on the other hand the King of Bavaria, the 
Grand Duke of Baden, and the Duke of Saxe Weimar, were 
liberals and granted Constitutions. In 18 19 Metternich 



I] SUPPRESSION OF I.IBBRTY, 1822 23 

assembled at Carlsbad the ministers of eight German states 
to secure a rigid censorship of the press throughout Germany, 
and to enforce the Federal Diet to extend it to every state 
in the Confederation; and in 1820 another meeting at 
Vienna openly laid down the doctrine of the sovereigns' 
supreme rights, which, if need were, should be enforced by 
the Diet. 

Outside Germany the state of affairs in Spain and the 
Kingdom of Naples called for the intervention of the 
Powers. In Naples the restored Bourbon, Ferdinand I, 
refused to allow any Hberty or a Constitution; he even 
cancelled what he had done, or promised to do under 
British pressure, in Sicily ; for when he had been maintained 
in the island simply and solely by British help, he had in 
18 1 2 granted a Constitution. But it was dangerous to 
treat the Neapolitans as slaves, for under French rule they 
had enjoyed at least justice and a fair administration. 
The celebrated secret Society of the Carbonari, the Charcoal- 
burners, had been formed before the expulsion of the 
French, and was now enormously popular. Neapolitans 
who had served as soldiers of France either joined the 
society, or came over to it when there was a rising. General 
Pepe put himself at the head of the movement ; Ferdinand 
was compelled to grant a Constitution and took a public 
oath to observe it. Now Metternich would have liked to 
march Austrian troops at once to Naples, yet he preferred 
to have the moral support of Russia and Prussia. The 
three sovereigns met towards the end of 1820 at Troppau 
in Moravia. Their Concert was popularly but wrongly 
known as the Holy Alliance, being confused with the union 
which Alexander had proposed, five years earlier, for the 
maintenance of religion against republicanism. There was 
nothing religious in the meeting at Troppau, but only 



24 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

a decision to take steps in concert against Naples. Britain 
and France stood outside, but it must be added that 
Castlereagh protested. Ferdinand was summoned to meet 
the sovereigns at Laibach in the south of Austria; he 
escaped from Naples after swearing to uphold the Constitu- 
tion, openly declared after his escape that his oath was 
void, and arrived at Laibach. An Austrian army marched 
south and entered Naples in March 182 1 without any 
trouble ; unluckily for Liberalism, Neapolitans and Sicihans 
were quarrelling and even fighting in Sicily instead of 
making a united front; despotism was restored and the 
horrible prisons of Naples were filled. Austria was revealed 
to Europe as the power which imposed itself upon Italy 
by the fright fulness of its revenge. 

Meanwhile there was a popular movement in Piedmont, 
and some conspirators against the Austrian yoke were 
plotting in Milan and hoped to obtain aid from Piedmont ; 
both movements collapsed and the House of Savoy did not 
put itself forward to champion Liberalism or Italian 
nationality. The fortress-prison of Spielberg in Moravia, 
where the Lombard ringleaders were immured, has become 
in Itahan literature a synonym for horrors worse because 
more refined than those of Naples. 

Similarly there was a revolution in Spain, and as a fact 
it began in Spain before the outbreak in Naples. The 
restored Bourbon king was Ferdinand VII, who had been 
deposed by Napoleon, and he was a bigot and tyrant. 
It is wonderful to us that Spain should have submitted to 
him at all after all the heroic deeds of the nation in the 
war against the French, but Ferdinand was a good CathoHc 
and the mass of the illiterate Spaniards were Catholics. 
His chief ambition was to conquer the rebel Spanish colonies 
of South America, but it was a task too great for him. 



I] THE I^RBNCH IN SPAIN, 1823 25 

Conspiracy was first hatched at Cadiz among soldiers told 
off to sail to America, the movement spread, and Ferdinand, 
like his namesake in Naples, granted a Constitution under 
compulsion. But the Powers did not act against Spain so 
quickly as against Naples. The European Concert was 
assembled at Verona late in 1822 ; Alexander wanted to 
send a Russian army to Spain ; WelUngton, who repre- 
sented England — Castlereagh who committed suicide this 
year, and Canning who succeeded him as Foreign Secretar>% 
were at one upon this point — resolutely opposed a joint 
expedition against Spain. Then I^ouis XVIII, who 
strongly disliked the idea of allowing Russians to march 
across French soil, took the task upon himself. Neither 
Canning nor WelHngton felt it to be Britain's duty to use 
armed force in Spain's defence. Left to themselves, the 
Spanish priests and peasants welcomed the French royal 
armies, though they had fought Napoleon in a war to the 
knife. Ferdinand was restored in 1823. The Constitution, 
extorted from him by soldiers and townsmen, was cancelled. 
Any discussion on the rival merits of Castlereagh and 
Canning may seem to be out of place in a history of Europe ; 
it is enough to say that Castlereagh was a man of decision 
and coolness when once he was embarked upon a definite 
poHcy, whether he made up his mind to resist Napoleon's 
Peninsular ambitions to the bitter end, or opposed reform 
at home. Canning was much more Liberal, yet he too was 
a Tory in domestic politics. Whatever praise or blame is 
due to Castlereagh during the years 1816-20 must be 
shared by Canning, for during those years he was in the 
Cabinet. Had Castlereagh Hved he might have taken a 
step forward from mere disapproval of Metternich. Had 
Canning been Foreign Secretary at the earlier date he 
might have confined himself also to mere disapproval. 



26 EUROPE AFTER WATERIvOO [ch. 

before he took up the Hne of active opposition. But 
Castlereagh was reserved, though he seems often to have 
hidden behind a cold manner more generous thoughts, for 
otherwise his consciousness of his unpopularity in England 
would not have driven him to suicide. Canning took up 
any policy hotly and spoke eloquently, but had at least 
a reputation for behttling other politicians so as to surround 
himself with a halo of glory. Yet even if we allow that 
there was this element of meanness in Canning, that he 
had not previously been more high-minded than Castlereagh, 
and that now he was not more clever and liberally generous 
in taking a next step, it remains that he, and not Castle- 
reagh, took the next step. He acknowledged the revolted 
colonies of Spain to be sovereign states. Spain herself 
being overrun by French troops, he made the balance true 
by a policy which made Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Peru, 
and Mexico for ever independent. 

The after history of Spain is exceedingly dreary. 
Ferdinand died in 1833, leaving his widow Christina to 
be regent for his daughter Isabella. His brother Charles, 
known as Don Carlos, claimed the throne and waged a war 
of "Carlists" against "Christinos" for many years; he was 
a reactionary against any form of liberaHsm, and at one 
time interfered on the reactionary and clerical side in 
Portugal; his strength was greatest in the northern pro- 
vinces, especially Navarre. Isabella was deposed in 1868. 
In 1870 the offer of the crown to a Prussian precipitated 
the Franco-German War. For a time a son of Victor 
Emmanuel was King of Spain, but he soon resigned. 
A second Carhst war, fomented by the grandson of the 
previous Don Carlos, lasted from 1873 to 1876. A repubUc 
was found to be impossible, for the extremists of the cities, 
especially Carthagena, were communists after the example 



I] SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 27 

of the mob of Paris. At last in 1874 Alfonso XII, son of 
Isabella, was restored. In 1898 the United States interfered 
to stop the long war between the Spaniards and the rebels 
of Cuba; they annexed Porto Rico and the PhiHppines, 
and made Cuba nominally free but practically dependent 
on them. In recent years it has seemed that Spain, 
previously torn asunder by ultra-democrats and ultra- 
royahsts, has adapted herself to a sane form of Parhamentary 
government; yet there are still extremists in the cities, 
and anarchists tried to kill with a bomb Alfonso XIII 's 
BngHsh wife. 

In 1807 the royal family of Portugal, fleeing from 
Napoleon's army, went to Brazil, and throughout the 
Peninsular War a Council of Regency ruled. In 1816 King 
John governed Portugal, and his son Peter governed 
Brazil. In 1826 on the father's death Peter granted a 
Constitution to Portugal, himself abdicating in favour of 
his infant daughter Maria da Gloria, and returning to Brazil 
as Emperor. A rebelHon was set on foot by Dom Miguel, 
Peter's brother, who represented the ultra-royaUst and 
clerical party and received help from Spain. Canning, 
in defiance of the sovereigns of Europe, sent armed help 
in 1826 to the party in favour of the child and Constitu- 
tionalism so as to save England's old ally from civil war 
and anarchy. But the death of Canning, just as we shall 
see in the next chapter that it caused British aid to be 
withdrawn from Greece, led to a withdrawal in Portugal. 
WelHngton simply allowed Dom Miguel to seize the throne 
in 1828, which was a triumph for anti-liberalism. He 
governed badly and tyrannically. At last Peter came over 
from Brazil, enhsted volunteers from England with Pal- 
merston's connivance, destroyed with their help Dom 
Miguel's navy, and after a formal treaty with England 



28 EUROPE AI^TER WATERI.00 [ch. 

and France drove him out. Maria then reigned constitu- 
tionally, and her two sons and a grandson after her down 
to the murder of the latter in 1908. 

Ivouis XVIII commenced his reign with the supple 
Talleyrand, ex-republican and ex-Bonapartist, as his 
minister. With him was Fouche, chief of police and secret 
service under both repubhc and empire. It was Talley- 
rand's chief work for France that he had persuaded the 
Powers to restore the legitimist dynasty. But it was 
impossible to retain such men when the royalists were 
restored a second time after Waterloo. I^ouis as early as 
July 18 15 issued an amnesty with certain exceptions to be 
afterwards made; Fouche made a long list of exceptions 
to gratify his grudges against his old colleagues and enemies, 
and lyouis got rid of the scoundrel. Then he called to his 
service the royahst Duke of RicheHeu, who enjoyed the 
favour of the Tsar and had been, while in exile, engaged in 
the administration of South Russia. Moderation was the 
new minister's programme. But a ro5^alist reign of terror 
broke out, the terreur blanche, so called as it was done in 
favour of the white Bourbon flag, and it was worst in the 
south of France; this was an excitable country and had 
seen many horrible deeds of bloodshed on both sides, 
especially in 1793 when Marseilles and Toulon declared 
against the Republic. Several Bonapartist generals and 
others were murdered. At Nimes vengeance fell largely 
upon Protestants. Mostly the atrocities were due to mobs, 
but there were government prosecutions also and summary 
sentences. The execution of Marshal Ney was ordered by 
the Chamber of Peers; certainl}^ a word from Welhngton 
would have saved him, and the sentence seemed to be due 
to petty spite and a somewhat weird popular idea that 
there must be a scape-goat, like the feeling after 1660 in 



I] RULE OF I,OUIS XVIII, 1814-24 29 

England which sacrificed Sir Harry Vane; but it is clear 
that Ney, put into a position of trust and then deserting 
to Napoleon, had materially helped in bringing the latter 
to power again. Argument in such a case is, however, 
useless, and the verdict of feeHng after Ney's execution was 
that he was unjustly killed. 

lyouis in 18 14 issued a Charter. He alone was, by 
divine right, the source of law and head of the administra- 
tion. But he acknowledged, what the revolutionists had 
persistently refused to acknowledge^, that something could 
be learnt from England; he granted responsibility of 
ministers to ParHament. He created two Chambers; the 
Peers, nominated by him, some to be hereditary, some for 
hfe onl}^ ; and the Representatives, chosen from the eligihles 
who paid 1000 francs a year in direct taxes, by eledeurs 
who paid 300 francs. His first ParHament thus elected 
was ultra-royahst and inclined to persecution. His younger 
brother, Charles, Count of Artois, a very violent man who 
had been the head of the emigres and instigator of foreign 
countries to destroy the revolutionists in 1789-92, was the 
acknowledged chief of the ultras, and thought lyouis too 
backward. But the Tsar gave Artois a hint to be cautious 
and not stir up a civil war in France. lyOuis and Richelieu 
as moderate men saved the country from the white terror 
after the first fury was abated, dissolved the Assembly, and 
obtained a more moderate one in 1817. They had their 
reward in 18 18 when at Aachen the Powers admitted 
France as a sovereign state to the Concert, and agreed to 
withdraw the army of occupation. 

Moderation, indeed, did not last very long. As Metter- 

1 In answer to Mirabeau in 1 790, when he offered to the National 
Assembly a pamphlet on English Parliamentary methods, they 
said "We are not English and want nothing English." 



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CH. I] CHARLES X AND THE ULTRAS, 1824 31 

nich's influence prevailed and the Tsar swung round to 
intolerance, the ultras raised their heads again in France. 
In 1820 a fanatic murdered the Duke of Berry, the second 
son of Artois; both Louis himself and Artois' elder son 
were childless, and the object of the murder was to destroy 
the royal family. Murder is always stupid, as it gives to 
tyrants an excuse to tyrannise, witness the Serbian- Austrian 
crisis of 1914. Louis was ageing and could no longer resist 
the uljtras. RicheHeu resigned in 1822. When the Powers 
were holding conferences to suppress liberties in Naples 
and Spain, French king and ministers alike seized the 
opportunity to pose as anti-liberals worthy of Metternich, 
and, to prevent the Russian armies from having an excuse 
to march into western Europe, sent 100,000 French to 
restore Ferdinand VII. Louis died in 1824, knowing that 
ultra-royalism was dangerous and fearing for the future. 
On his deathbed he said of the baby born after Berry's 
murder: "May Charles X preserve this child's crown!" 

Thus Artois, the no-surrender reactionary, came to the 
throne which he was to hold for six years. The ultras 
were unmuzzled. The parti pretre, strengthened already in 
the previous reign by the return of the Jesuits and by the 
formation of a rehgious association called "The Congrega- 
tion," obtained a law of strong penalties against sacrilege. 
The press was under a strict censorship. The nobles 
demanded a milHard (1,000,000,000) of francs as indemnity 
for their lands lost in 1789, which the new men would not 
give up except at the cost of a civil war; the money was 
raised on loan burdening France with an annual charge of 
thirty milhons. Matters came to a crisis in 1829 when 
PoUgnac was minister. In the Assembly there was a solid 
opposition of 221 ; it was dissolved, and the new elections 
returned 270 opponents to 145 ministerials. A newspaper 



32 EUROPE AFTER WATERI.00 [ch. 

campaign defied the censors, and among the writers were 
the young historians, Thiers and Mignet. Prosecutions 
and fines were ridiculed. Finally Charles issued four 
ordonnances, extinguishing altogether the liberty of the 
press, dissolving the Assembly, and pronouncing a new law 
of elections which gave votes to only the large landed 
proprietors, and thus destroyed the Charter of I^ouis XVIII. 
He tried to distract the French from home poHtics by a 
new colonial policy, the conquest of Algeria. 

In July 1830 the crisis came to the culminating point. 
Barricades were run up in the streets of Paris ; it was still 
the old Paris of mostly narrow and winding streets. Who 
would be resolute to clear them with whiffs of grape-shot? 
Marmont, Napoleon's old marshal, was in command. He 
stormed some barricades and saw others rise ; he failed to 
concentrate his men, then fell back on the lyouvre and 
Tuileries. Regiments went over to the people, "car les 
haionnettes aujourd'hui sont independantes," and only a 
monarchy sure of its soldiers can afford to use soldiers, as 
a comparison of the careers of Louis XVI and of Napoleon 
abundantly shows. Thiers issued a proclamation calling for 
the Duke of Orleans^, who came to meet a provisional 
government sitting at the Hotel de ViUe. Old Lafayette, 
the "hero of the two worlds," who had fought for American 
Independence and had been a leading figure in 1789, a 
theatrical person and yet popular as an old-time revolu- 
tionary, pubhcly embraced Orleans, and Paris accepted 
him for want of any better man. Charles X fled to England. 

The meaning of the "July Revolution" is very plain. 
The legitimist dynasty had had its chance; it behaved 

1 He was descended from the brother of Louis XIV; and was 
son of the Duke who posed as a revolutionist in 1789, and was known 
as PhiUppe EgaHte. 



I] THE JULY RBVOIvUTlON, 1830 33 

well as long as l/ouis remained cool, but went over to 
revenge and absolutism under Charles. Even the Charter 
of lyouis was insufficient, for it posited the divine right of 
Louis as the source of law in spite of responsibility of 
ministers and the existence of an Assembly. The men of 
July altered the Charter very considerably, taking these 
"rights" as belonging to them "essentially" and not as 
gifts of the crown ; it was the same spirit which had made 
the men of 1789 reject the scheme of reforms of Louis XVI, 
and put forward their own. They accepted Orleans as 
"Eling of the French," not "of France." They were 
fortunate in the circumstances of their revolt and in their 
having a candidate, even an untried ca.ndidate, to bring 
forward. At least they were not revolutionaries. Thus 
they gave no excuse to the Powers to interfere. 



CHAPTER II 

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 

The Turkish Empire has a great fascination for us. 
Yet we have to acknowledge that our ignorance about the 
Turks themselves, the proportion of their numbers to those 
of other Mohammedans, their history and past aims, even 
the spelling of names^, is considerable. We may read 
expert historians^, and yet remain doubtful whether we 
appreciate certain points. Where West and East clash 
there are, by the nature of things, rival explanations, 
because there are rival aspirations. 

Herodotus first saw that there was a pendulum swinging 
between Europe and Asia; the Greeks besieged Troy and 
settled on the coasts of Asia Minor and on the islands; 
Croesus and then the Persian kings conquered here, next 
came the great invasion and repulse of Xerxes, followed 
by Greek reconquest which to him was the culmination of 
a world war. He would not have been surprised if some 
prophet had foretold the overthrow by Alexander of 
Macedon of the descendants of Xerxes, and the foundation 

^ Mohammed or Muhammad represents the Arabian pronuncia- 
tion ; Mahomet or Mah'mett is our approach to the Turkish variation. 
Salonika is educated Greek, or even Thessalonika ; Salonica is 
popular. 

2 The Balkans (Clarendon Press, 1915) by Messrs Forbes, Toynbee, 
Mitrany, and Hogarth. 



CH. II] BAST AND WEST 35 

of the first overlordship of Europeans in Asia. Now it is 
self-evident that neither the Persians nor the Macedonians 
could themselves alone govern the lands that they overran ; 
their numbers were quite insufficient. The Persians, though 
stamping down national life and religion in some countries, 
as in Babylon after revolt, yet had to employ local native 
administrators ; they favoured the tyrants in the Greek cities 
of the Asiatic coast ; they had the ships and men of Egypt, 
Cyprus, Phoenicia, and these same Greek cities. Alexander, 
posing at first as the champion of the Greek cause, soon 
took up the role of liberator in Syria, Judaea, Egypt, and 
Babylon, and appointed native officials; even when *he 
reached Persia he governed through Persian nobles. But 
his life's work was, not so much mere conquest, as the 
admission, through conquest, of the Greeks into Asia; his 
Macedonian army was but his instrument, and the quick 
Greeks profited by his wars and influenced thereby the 
world's history, not the duller Macedonians. They settled 
not only on the coasts, but also on the roads of the interior, 
in the new cities such as Alexandria and Antioch and 
Seleucia on the Tigris, and in the old cities such as Iconium 
and Tarsus where Greek learning thus took root; the 
brighter wits amongst the natives learnt the Greek ideas 
and language, and we call them Grecians. Then came the 
Romans as Alexander's heirs as far as the Euphrates. 
So strongly did the Romans imprint on western Asia their 
form of government that to-day the Turkish Empire is 
"Rum." 

The original Mohammedan conquerors, the Arabs, 
swept through the southern provinces of the Roman Empire 
in Asia and Africa. But the Eastern Emperors at Con- 
stantinople held Asia Minor, or Anatolia as it is also called 
for convenience sake, as a strong bulwark in defence of 

3—2 



36 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

Christianity. A powerful dynasty of "Roman" Emperors 
was Anatolian by blood ; the Anatolians remained a sturdy 
rustic and inland race and changed their character but 
little, whether their overlords were Macedonians or Romans 
of old Rome or Romans of Constantinople, and they were 
the defenders of the empire for some centuries ; the Greeks 
of the coasts and of cities on the high-roads still gave a 
western touch to Anatolian civilisation. But the Turks 
came to reinforce Mohammedanism. Their home was in 
central Asia ; they served first as mercenaries of the Caliphs 
of Bagdad, were" converted to Islam, grew in numbers, and 
pushed on as adventurers to found dynasties, but never in 
such great numbers as to be more than a dominant military 
aristocracy. The thickest mass of true Turks to-day, we are 
told, is to be found in Persia, whence the true Persians fled 
and are to-day the fire- worshipping Parsees of India. The 
Seljuk Turks at last shattered the defence of the Eastern 
Roman Empire at the battle of Manzikert in 1071, and 
founded "Rum," their own Asiatic empire, with Iconium 
or Konieh as their capital. The advance of the Turks 
made the Crusades both necessary and possible ; they upset 
the Mohammedan world, for they were not orthodox, and 
when the Mohammedans were disunited the Christians had 
a measure of success in the First Crusade. Saladin, a Kurd 
and the son of a captain of mercenaries, rising by sheer 
merit in the midst of confusion to be Sultan of Egypt, 
reunited the Mohammedans and foiled the Third Crusade. 
Another tribe of Turks pushed into Asia Minor and 
conquered to the north of the Seljuks of Iconium. From 
one of their earHer leaders, Othman or Osman, they are 
known as the Ottomans or Osmanhs. They made Brusa, 
over against Constantinople, their capital in 1326. Their 
strength lay in their recognition of the Greeks and the 



II] ADVENT OF THE OTTOMANS 37 

Anatolians, neither persecuting nor annihilating, but 
granting privileges — such as remain to-day among Greek 
landowners in the district of Brusa, — converting to Moham- 
medanism where they could, and raising a professional force 
of soldiers among Christian recruits. I^ater they imposed 
the tribute of Christian children, who, trained to war, and 
forbidden to marry, became the famous Janissaries. They 
looked across the Dardanelles at the shrivelled remnant of 
the Eastern Roman Empire, still centred round Constanti- 
nople with its navy and impregnable walls, while behind 
lay the main territories of the Balkans, held by Slavs and 
Bulgars. They crossed and conquered at the great battle 
of Kosovo in 1389 a confederacy of Slavs, v/ho were terribly 
weakened by treachery and jealousy. But for a time the 
great city was yet safe, for a new peril came from the East. 
The Tartar hordes of Jenghiz Khan and Timur came 
out of Asia as the next great swarm behind the Turks. 
They shattered the Seljuks of Iconium, but in the mean- 
while the Seljuks covered the Ottoman attacks upon 
Europe. The Ottomans, when they had to face the Tartars 
in Asia, were already a European power. Thus, although 
their army was beaten and their Sultan taken prisoner at 
Angora in 1402, they were able from Europe to reassert 
themselves in Asia when the Tartar storm exhausted itself. 
They took into their empire most of the late Seljuk empire, 
and finally captured Constantinople in 1453, so that at 
last they had such a position both in Europe and in Asia 
with "second Rome" as their capital that they were the 
successors to Alexander and the Caesars, a dominant race 
with Greeks and AnatoHans their subjects, contemptuously 
tolerant of Christianity, and not at all fanatical after the 
Arab type with a choice between Koran or sword. Their 
impetus carried them through the Balkan Peninsula in 



38 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

spite of the resistance of the Venetians by sea and the 
Hungarians by land. The Christians did not unite to 
oppose them, but in their jealousy actually weakened 
Venice by a league to win Venetia from her; Spain did 
very Httle except occupy Tunis for a short time and take 
a small share in the victory at I^epanto in 1571. It was by 
land that the Turks at last found their masters when the 
Austrians beat them from Vienna in 1526. In the other 
direction they extended their power to Syria and Mesopo- 
tamia and Egypt, and nominally along the north of Africa 
and in Arabia ; but out on the extremities of their empire 
they were not so well obeyed as at the centre. The Sultans, 
after Selim 1512-20, had some glory as the successors of 
the Caliphs of Bagdad, and as the protectors of the Holy 
Places of Arabia, but received a grudged submission, for 
they were not orthodox, but merely the strongest Moham- 
medans. 

The decay of the Turkish Empire began when contact 
with the steady Germans first stopped them. Every 
conquering Eastern race has spent itself in time, the 
Persians, Arabs, Seljuks, Tartars, Moguls, and Hke them 
the Ottoman Turks in their turn. Only Christian jealousies, 
which allowed them to penetrate so far west, prevented 
their being turned out of Europe. When the Sultans 
ceased to lead armies to war, but directed from their 
palace; when the Janissaries as the strongest element in 
the state took to pull down or to set up, and finally, by 
extorting the right to marry, became a caste and intrigued 
in the government ; when corruption and persecution were 
the results of pride and power, and the overswoUen empire 
of many different races was suffocated by the combination 
of ignorant refusal to do things with ignorant persecution 
of those who tried, so that the riches of Anatolia and 



II] AUSTRIA OR RUSSIA v. TURKS 39 

Mesopotamia and Egypt were allowed to disappear through 
downright stupidity; when the Turks ruined irrigation 
works, or as in the 20th century, greedy for bribes, 
thwarted whoever has tried to restore them, and over- 
taxed the farmers till Anatolia produced a tithe of what she 
yielded in the old Roman days ; the Turkish peril was past. 
There was no interference in the horrible Thirty Years' 
War, 1619-48, when Germany was rent and exhausted. 
There was a revival of enterprise when the ambitions of 
lyouis XIV made all Europe look westwards in self-defence, 
and the Turks attacked Vienna in the rear in 1683 and 
were repulsed. The Austrians retahated and won back 
most of Hungary in 1699; again forced to fight against 
lyouis XIV they slackened their efforts against the Turks 
until, after the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, they took 
the offensive again and won more ground as far as Belgrad, 
where they halted in 1739 and left that city to the Turks. 

Russia came late upon the scene as a champion of 
Europe, and her interest has been due to an anxiety to 
reach to the sea, to the Black Sea in the i8th century, 
to the Mediterranean in the 19th and 20th. Under the 
Tsarina Catharine, a Russian war resulted in the Treaty 
of Kainardji in 1774, by which she was acknowledged the 
defender of the Christians of Rumania, and obtained 
commercial rights in the Black Sea. Napoleon in 1807, 
making alhance with Tsar Alexander I at Tilsit, sanctioned 
so to speak Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey, but 
nothing came of it because Alexander broke with Napoleon 
too soon. The seeds of the jealousy between Austria and 
Russia were sown, though forgotten when they were alHes 
against France, and later when they were allies against 
lyiberaUsm in Europe under Metternich's guidance. 

The Balkan peoples whom the Ottoman Turks brought 



40 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

into their empire were various. The tribes conquered by 
the Romans, the Roman and Greek settlers of the interior, 
the Slavs who burst into the Roman Empire in the wake 
of the Goths and Huns, the Tartar tribes from central 
Asia of race akin to the original Turks themselves, in the 
long period between 400 and 1400 fought each other and 
partly coalesced with each other, fell apart and were 
rearranged, while the Eastern Empire centred at Constanti- 
nople was weaker or stronger at intervals up to the coup 
de grace in 1453. 

The Rumans are descended from the Dacians of the left 
bank of the lower Danube, and from some few Romans 
who entered as colonists after the Emperor Trajan con- 
quered and annexed the country in a.d. 104. In the 
thousand years of confusion they were conquered or fled 
to the mountains to avoid conquest, yet maintained their 
distinct nationality and their language, which is lyatin 
essentially with a mixture of Slav. Some Rumans were 
caught into Hungary in the i8th century, and to-day the 
province of Bukovina is in the Austrian Empire. The two 
chief districts, Moldavia and Wallachia, which paid tribute 
to but were never directly governed by the Turks, had in 
that same century Greek governors; Ottoman corruption 
at the worst period in their history stooped to put up to 
auction these governorships, and the ready Greeks bought 
them^. But in 1774 the Russian protectorate over 
Rumania was established, though the Russians themselves 
held Bessarabia, and the Austrians had Bukovina which is 
Rumania irredenta. 

The Serbs belong to the great group of Slav nations, 
and have kept their blood pure ; the original Bulgars were 
Tartars of the same stock as the Huns and Turks. The Slavs 
1 See below, p. 47. 



II] RUMANS, SIvAVS, BUIvGARS 41 

broke from the north across the middle Danube, the Bulgars 
from the north-east across the plains of southern Russia, 
into the collapsing Roman Empire in the 7th century. 
Their modern historians claim, each for his own nation, 
the right of priority of invasion. But it seems that the 
Slavs, of whom the Serbs were the most numerous, were 
by 650 settled between the Adriatic and the Aegean, 
shortly before the Bulgars crossed the lower Danube. 
The Eastern Roman Empire, defended by a navy and the 
mighty walls of Constantinople, held them at bay, and 
they were always bitterly jealous of each other, as they 
contended for the middle debatable lands of Macedonia 
and Thrace then as now. There were two short periods 
of Bulgarian Empire, 893 to 972, and 1186 to 1258; and 
then the Serbs had the supremacy, until, weakened already 
by wars against the Hungarians, they collapsed before 
the Turks. During these years the Serbs retained their 
language and blood; Slavonic place-names have replaced 
the old Greek and Roman names, except on the coast. 
The Bulgars, on the contrary, attracted to themselves, 
coalesced with and absorbed into themselves such Slavs 
and, presumably, older inhabitants whom they conquered ; 
but, being adventurous and strong in physique, they 
dominated when they absorbed, so that now they are a 
hybrid race, largely Slav in blood, but with a high per- 
centage of their old Tartar energy to counterbalance a low 
percentage of Tartar nationahty. 

In the strong period of Turkish rule both Bulgars and 
Serbs were "suffocated." Some famiHes became Moham- 
medan, and colonies of Ottomans, or of other races converted 
to Mohammedanism and generically styled Turks, were 
planted. Where Christianity endured, the Orthodox Greek 
Church maintained its sway, though in Bulgaria the 



42 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

authority of the Patriarch at Constantinople was much 
resented. A Roman Cathohc influence came from the 
Adriatic coast. As regards administration the Turkish 
hold was tightest over Bulgaria, and over Herzegovina 
and Bosnia where the Mohammedan element was strongest 
among the Slavs. 

Then in the recoil of the i8th century the fortunes of 
these countries varied. The Slavs of Croatia and Sla- 
vonia were conquered by the Austrians and Hungarians, 
disliked the change of masters and would have wished the 
Turks back again, were forced into the Roman Catholic 
communion, revolted and were subdued, and some of them 
migrated into Russia; this tyranny was more Hungarian 
than Austrian, coming at a time when the aim of the 
Hapsburgs was to bribe Hungary into loyalty. Thus the 
majority of the Slavs in the Austrian Empire north of the 
Save are to-day Roman Catholics, and cut off from the 
Orthodox Serbs. 

One little ring of Serbs, being protected by their moun- 
tains, were governed by their prince-bishops without much 
interference from the Turks. These are the Montenegrins, 
Their bishop Daniel founded in 1700 a dynasty which still 
reigns, and his descendant Peter I won practical inde- 
pendence by the end of the century, though the Turks 
still held Scutari^. Their kinsmen, the Serbs of the Serbia 
that we know, had a harder task; Austria did not wish 
to fight the Turks to liberate them ; Russia was far away, 
and Russian treaties with the Turks only concerned 
Rumania; worse than that, the two families of Serbian 
patriots, the Karageorgevich and the Obrenovich, almost 
ruined the country by their rivalry in the 19th century. 
A revolt commenced in 1804 by Kara George (Black George) 
^ Scutari. 



II] SERBS, AIvBANIANS 43 

was, owing to Russian inability to help, put down by the 
Turks in 18 13. Then Milosh Obrenovich renewed the war 
in 1815, and was chosen as prince at Belgrad in 1817, 
though he soiled his name by the murder of Kara George. 
Meanwhile there is nothing to record as regards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, with their large Mohammedan population, on 
the one hand, or Bulgaria on the other; and the Turks still 
controlled Macedonia and Thrace with their mixed Serbian 
and Bulgarian population and Mohammedans interspersed. 

The mountaineers ot Albania, converted to Moham- 
medanism, are aboriginals, and represent to us that strong 
and manly race which contributed men to the armies of 
Alexander and Phihp, and under Pyrrhus were a danger 
to Rome herself. They were rugged and independent. 
Alternately they have been Turkey's best soldiers and, 
though Mohammedans, dangerous rebels. Early in the 
19th century, when the Sultan's governors in outlying 
provinces were making themselves independent in the 
manner of great medieval feudals defying their suzerain, 
such as Mohammed Ali in Egypt and Jezzar at Acre, the 
famous Ali Pasha ruled Albania. His capital was Yannina^ 
(Janina), and he utiHsed the services of the Greeks in his 
administration. His sons governed Thessaly and the 
Morea as pashas, and in fact his power was such that the 
Sultan's rule seemed to be extinct. 

Along the Adriatic coast from Albania northwards to 
Trieste the population is Slav. But in the middle ages, 
naturally enough, Venice extended her power over the 
islands and inlets, for she could not afford to allow pirates 
to threaten from them her commerce. Pola, Zara, Ragusa, 
became Venetian dependencies ; they were Slav cities, and 
their hinterland was Slav, but naturally enough they were 
^ Yannina. 



44 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

Italianised to a greater or less degree as they were nearer 
to or further from Venice. To-day we are told that the 
inhabitants, when in the cities they are Italians, in the 
immediate neighbourhood are Slavs, and even in the cities 
many who speak Italian as the language of Adriatic trade 
are by blood Slavs. The Turks in their heyday con- 
quered most of this coast. They left self-government to 
the cities, and Ragusa in particular thrived as a trading 
repubhc, paying tribute to the Sultan and never even 
trying to revolt. Venice regained part of the coast in the 
i8th century, including the Bocche (mouth) di Cattaro in 
Montenegro. But the most important fact in the history 
of the Adriatic is the award by the Allies at the Congress 
of Vienna; Venice and Venetia were given to Austria, 
and thus from Trieste, which was Austrian already long 
before, down to Ragusa and Cattaro every harbour of 
importance fell to the Hapsburgs as an inheritance from 
Venice. The Slavs of Serbia and Montenegro were thereby 
shut out from the sea, Austrian ambition to secure the 
Balkans at the expense of the natives was encouraged, and 
the Austrian navy, when once built up, had a strong line 
of bases. To-day the Italian kingdom is regarded by all 
Italians as the heir to Venetia, so that there is rivalry 
between Italian and Slav for this coast, solely for Austria's 
benefit as the present war has proved. The Ionian islands, 
Corfu, Zante, and the others. Napoleon wished to make an 
outpost of French influence in the Mediterranean; the 
British wrested them, all but Corfu, from him ; the Congress 
put them under a British protectorate. 

There remain to be discussed the Greeks, and this is 
no light task. In classical days the Hellenes prided them- 
selves on their pure blood, distinguishing themselves from 
all other nationalities who were Barbarians. But with 



II] THE ADRIATIC, GREEKS 45 

the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander they 
entered on a new sphere of activity. They profited where 
Alexander's Macedonians conquered. No longer confining 
themselves to the sea and coasts as in those classical days, 
they poured along the great high-roads of western Asia 
and settled in cities, whether the older cities such as Tarsus, 
or the new foundations such as Antioch and Alexandria. 
Wlien Rome conquered, there she found Greeks or Grecians, 
citizens, civil servants, traders, scholars, philosophers, 
proud of their race and yet cosmopolitans, citizens of the 
world, at heart. When the Roman Empire was spht into 
halves, the Eastern Empire was Roman in administration 
but Greek in character; the Orthodox Greek Church and 
the CathoHc Church fell apart, even as Constantinople and 
Rome were apart. Thus the Greeks were ready to accept 
the Ottoman Empire, "Rum," the Asio-European agglo- 
meration of races and tongues. The Greek blood must by 
that date have been more than a Httle diluted by Slav 
blood, yet the Greek strain was dominant, and ever in the 
worst days of subjection there was a consciousness of Greek 
superiority. Othman, the founder of the empire, savv^ that 
these Greeks were useful, whether the landowners of north- 
west Asia Minor to whom he gave privileges which. remain 
to-day, or the children whom he demanded and turned 
into Mohammedan soldiers. The Orthodox Church sur- 
vived the capture of Constantinople, being "spared by the 
Ottoman government to facilitate its own political system — 
by bringing the peasant, through the hierarchy of priest, 
bishop, and patriarch, under the moral control of the new 
Moslem master whom the ecclesiastics henceforth served^." 
It was useful to the Turks that the seat of the Patriarch 
should be in Constantinople. 

^ A. J. Toynbee, p. 182; Hogarth, pp. 325-6. 



46 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

Yet the Ottomans only used the Greeks where and as 
they were necessary for the empire. In Greece proper the 
landowners and peasants were trodden under foot; in 
Constantinople and other cities Greek residents were in the 
position of hostages, and they might be turned out at any 
time if, for instance, the Sultan wished to give asylum to 
the persecuted Jews of Spain. There is now a very large 
Jewish population in the cities of the coast which otherwise 
seem to be entirely Greek in character, Salonica in 
particular. 

Venice, the rival of Greek trading communities and of 
the "Greek" Empire in her days of strength before the 
Ottomans advanced, did her best in her own defence to 
save Greece. Crete was not conquered till 1669, and a 
new Venetian offensive in 1699 resulted in the possession 
of the Morea for some years. Genoa held the island of 
Chios up to 1566, and Venice kept the Ionian Islands. 
But whatever pOvSition the Greeks won in the Ottoman 
administration they won, not as the protegees of the fast 
decaying sea-republics of Italy, but by their own adapta- 
bility. 

The most remarkable of the Greeks of the end of the 
i8th and the first years of the 19th century were the 
islanders, the men of Chios and Psara near the Asiatic 
coast, of Hydra and Spetza near the Morea. The Chians 
are particularly praised by all writers as a self-governing 
and self-respecting race, prosperous and unmolested by the 
Turks. The Hydriots and the others had, we are told, 
a strong intermixture of Albanian blood, yet they were 
recognised as Greeks ; Byron's heroes were mostly islanders, 
fine dashing fellows, a blend of the pirate and free adventurer 
which appealed to the readers of his day. They entered 
on a new sphere of activity as Venice fell to decay. The 



II] RENASCENCE OF THE GREEKS 47 

coasting trade of the Levant was theirs and brought them 
much profit. Sometimes they traded under the Russian 
flag so as to secure the benefit of the Treaty of Kainardji 
of 1774. But what gave the strongest impetus to their 
trade was Napoleon's great continental blockade; all the 
efforts of the British to retaliate against Napoleon were so 
far confined to the western seas, that these Greeks had 
their chance. The men who profited by the Russian 
foundation of Odessa in 1792, and controlled the trade in 
South Russian corn, were Greeks. The Turks simply 
demanded a certain number of sailors for their own navy, 
but there were hundreds of other islanders to man the 
small trading ships which they armed and were ready to 
use. Hence the Greek island communities won self- 
government for themselves, and this practically meant 
government by an association of shipowners. They 
formed a strong contrast to the peasants of the Morea, 
who lived at the mercy of Turkish officials and Mohammedan 
landowners. 

Another class of Greeks were those who won their way 
into the Turkish administration in this period when the 
energy of the Ottoman race seemed to have sunk so very 
low. Clever men won positions as "dragomans" or secre- 
taries in the civil service. We have seen how some of 
them bought the position of "hospodars" or governors in 
Moldavia and Wallachia, where indeed their rule was much 
disHked; yet the mere fact of Christians being admitted 
to such ofiice, even by bribery, was a step towards the 
possibility of native Rumans holding it. Such Greeks are 
known as Phanariots, so named from Phanari, the quarter 
of the lighthouse at Constantinople. The Ottomans could 
not get on without the Greeks, who thus had in their hands 
more than a little of local administration, whether in 



48 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

outlying parts of the Turkish Empire, or in such districts 
as Albania which were in revolt against the Turks, as well 
as of local trade. Greek prosperity in some respects was 
pronounced just when the grip of the Ottoman was being 
relaxed. 

" The age of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic 
wars had silently wrought in the Greek Nation the last of 
a great series of changes which fitted it to take its place 
among the free peoples of Europe. The signs were there 
from which those who could read the future might have 
gathered that the political resurrection of Greece was near 

at hand The history of France, no less than the 

history of Greece, shows that it is not the excess, but the 
sense, of wrong that produces revolution. A people may be 
so crushed by oppression as to suffer all conceivable misery 
with patience. It is when the pulse has again begun to 
beat strong, when the eye is fixed no longer on the ground, 
and the knowledge of good and evil again burns in the 
heart, that the right and the duty of resistance is felt^." 
We sum up that many causes produced the Greek revolt, 
the sense of unity given by the wide power of the Orthodox 
Church, the tradition of ancient glory, the revival of 
Hellenism, the high hope that a new Greek Empire would 
arise to take the place of the Ottoman as the legitimate 
heir to the Eastern Roman Empire, the new development of 
Greek trade, the prosperity of Greek merchants at Odessa 
and Salonica, the cleverness of the race which made itself 
indispensable to its Turkish masters. If Rumans had 
Phanariot governors, and vSerbs were winning local inde- 
pendence, if Jezzar at Acre, Ali Pasha in Albania, and 
Mohammed Ali in Egypt could defy the Turks, the Greeks 

1 Fyffe, Modern Europe, chapter xv, pp. (popular edition) 525 
and 544. 



ii] GREEKS READY TO REVOI.T 49 

in their turn could not remain still. They were striving 
to educate themselves to be true Hellenes, reviving the 
name and the speech of ancient Hellas, and no longer 
submitting to be called "Romaioi" speaking the Romaic 
language as if they were mere provincials. They could 
look to their brothers in the Ionian Islands, free as they 
had never before been free, under the British Protectorate. 
Byron famiharised to the Western world the dream that 
"Greece might yet be free"; but Byron, though he after- 
wards died for the cause, wrote with a sneer, for they were 
"Ught Greeks carolling by," "hereditary bondsmen," 
"silent still and silent all," unable to show themselves 
worthy of lyeonidas and his Three Hundred. Shelley had 
a warmer heart and the New Hellenism meant more to him. 

"The World's great age begins anew, 

The Golden years return... 
Another Athens shall arise. 

And to remoter time 
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies, 

The splendour of its prime." 

He dedicated his Hellas to Alexander Mavrocordato, whose 
family were Phanariots connected with Rumania. 

Unfortunately a Greek rising in Greece was only too 
certain to endanger the safety of the Greeks in Constanti- 
nople and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, who, scattered 
in their various pursuits, or hving as a despised minority 
surrounded by Mohammedans, were hostages at the mercy 
of their lords. Moreover there was the Concert of Europe 
to be considered. The statesmen at Vienna had no thought 
for national aspirations when they settled the fate of 
Poland, Norway, Belgium, Genoa, and Venice. Metternich 
had captivated the minds of the sovereigns of Prussia and 
Russia, and would not regard Greece more favourably than 

M. 4 



50 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

Naples and Spain. "Russia," writes Shelley, "desires to 
possess, not to liberate, Greece." We are accustomed to 
an Eastern Question the difficulty of which is that each 
Western Power is too jealous to allow any other to settle 
the fate of Turkey. In those days it was not mutual 
jealousy, but the solidarity of the three Great Powers, 
which stifled nationahty and liberalism. 

The first impetus towards rebellion was furnished 
by the " Philike Hetairia," the Society of Friends, 
which was founded in 1814. The first scene of their 
activity was Rumania, and they hoped to interest the 
Tsar in their fortunes, through one of the Phanariots, now 
the Tsar's minister, by name Capodistrias ; but he was 
against any rash exploit. Then they won over Alexander 
Hypsilanti, a descendant of a previous Phanariot governor 
of Wallachia and an officer in the Tsar's army. The plan 
was to create a rising in Rumania in 182 1. But everything 
went wrong. The Tsar was against the movement, being at 
that very moment engaged heart and soul in preparations 
against the Italian revolt. The congress at I^aibach 
condemned the Greeks as much as the Italians and the 
Spaniards. The Sultan, Mahmud, forced the Patriarch at 
Constantinople to excommunicate the insurgents. The 
Rumans of course had no sympathy with the Greeks from 
whom they had suffered much tyranny under Phanariot 
governors. The Turks soon crushed the rising. 

But the excitement of the time produced different results 
in the Morea. There the Turks and other Mohammedans 
were in the minority; there was a general rising in April, 
accompanied by massacre in the open country. The Turks 
were driven to a few fortresses such as Patras, Tripohtza, 
and Nauplia. Similarly north of the Gulf of Corinth the 
Greeks carried everything before them, and massacred in 



II] RISING IN THE MOREA, 1821 51 

the country around Missolonghi. But both in Thessaly 
and along the coast they had no success. Then it was 
seen how fatal was such a movement to the Greek hostages 
in the Sultan's power. Greeks were massacred where they 
were helpless in both European and Asiatic Turkey. On 
Easter Sunday the Patriarch himself at Constantinople, and 
the Archbishops of Adrianople, Salonica, and Tirnovo, were 
executed. This was the moment when the Tsar might 
possibly have interfered. The hearts of the Russians were 
roused by the news of the massacre of their co-religionists 
and most sacred leaders. But still the influence of Metter- 
nich prevailed. The Tsar could not bring himself to support 
rebels, even persecuted Orthodox rebels, and the influence 
of England was thrown on the side of non-intervention; 
the terrible European war had been terminated only six 
years previously, and Castlereagh shrank from taking any 
part in what might lead once more to a war of all the 
nations. The most powerful argument that could be used 
in favour of non-intervention was that the British have 
been themselves since the middle of the i8th century 
a Mohammedan power, and it would be wrong for our 
statesmen to enter upon a crusade against Islam as Islam 
while there were so many Mohammedan subjects of our 
Empire in India. The atrocities committed on the Christian 
as weU as on the Mohammedan side doubtless did much to 
alienate sympathy. 

But in the Morea the Greeks carried all before them. 
Demetrius Hypsilanti, brother of Alexander, was one of the 
earliest leaders. With him was Alexander Mavrocordato, 
also the descendant of a Phanariot governor of Rumania, 
the first President of the Assembly which the Greeks 
formed in the early years of the war, and the man to whom 
Shelley dedicated his poem. Of a different type was 



52 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

Kolokotrones, who in his previous Hfe had been at one 
time a gendarme, at another time a brigand or "klepht," 
a man of low type but said to have been a born soldier. 
The Greeks pushed on. They captured Navarino, and 
massacred there. They invested TripoHtza, and fearing to 
lose their booty when they saw that negotiations for 
surrender were going on, they burst into the place and 
surpassed themselves in a massacre worse than that at 
Missolonghi. 

In 1822 the Turks were more free in the north, and 
equipped large and regular forces to crush the rebels. 
Early in the year they at last captured Yannina and killed 
AH Pasha. Two main armies were dispatched, the one 
against Missolonghi, the other against the Morea. The 
Greeks of Missolonghi held out successfully. The Greeks of 
the Morea, either by design or by happy accident, rising 
at the right moment after the Turks had pushed through 
the Isthmus into the interior, rose on all sides and Koloko- 
trones seized the mountains in their rear. Afraid to 
advance, deserted by the Turkish fleet, and in danger of 
starvation, the Turkish general, who in his pUght might 
be compared to some French marshal in the Peninsular 
War cut oft' from France and harassed by Spanish guerilla 
bands, was forced to cut his way back towards the Isthmus ; 
he himself died, and his army was annihilated. Such a 
collapse is often seen in Turkish history; demoralisation 
sets in just when matters seem most favourable, and usually 
has as its immediate cause some gross carelessness in 
connection with supplies. The outlying Turkish fortresses 
in the Morea now fell ; next Athens was taken. 

Meanwhile this same year a series of naval operations 
was taking place, the Turks victorious here, the Greeks 
there. Certainly the most energetic of the Greeks were the 



II] GREEK SUCCESSEvS, 1821-24 53 

Islanders who formed an association of shipowners, such 
as the Hydriots and the Spetziots from their islands near 
the Morea, and the Psariots, whose home lay close to 
Samos. But the fleet of the Islanders was not at hand 
when an army of 7000 Turkish regulars and a horde of 
irregulars were landed at Chios; in no part of the Greek 
world was there such an enlightened community, which had 
been self -governed and free from Turkish tyranny; now 
helpless before the Turks they suffered for the savagery of 
their kinsmen in the Morea, and were cut down or sold as 
slaves in thousands. Too late to save Chios, the Greek 
fleet under the command of Kanaris of Psara at last 
appeared. Kanaris himself steered a fire-ship by night up 
to the Turks' flag-ship and destroyed it. 

In 1823 there was no fighting on a large scale, and 
the Greeks had time to consolidate their position. But 
promptly they fell out and fought against each other. 
Islanders were jealous of the men of the mainland. 
Kolokotrones, the rough brigand, could not act with the 
landowners, and therefore there was the unedifying spec- 
tacle of civil war almost in the very presence of the enemy. 
A breathing space was thus allowed to the Turks, and 
meanwhile Mahmud apphed for help to Mohammed Ali^ 
of Egypt, nominally his vassal, in reality independent and 
the master of a considerable fleet and army. 

The year 1824 opened under new conditions. Ibrahim 
Pasha, Mohammed's adopted son, brought across a force 
to Crete. The plan of campaign was to attack outlying 
islands, with the idea that the wrangling Greek government 
in the Morea would be unable to send help so far in time ; 
the Greeks were strong in their navy of fire-ships, but a 
speedy joint attack by Turks and Egyptians, if the Greek 
1 See pp. 71 and 72, 



54 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

ships were on the wrong side of the Aegean and neglected 
the islands from which they could watch and blockade the 
Dardanelles, might be successful, and of course lessen in 
proportion the Greek offensive naval power. First Crete 
was overrun. Then a Turkish fleet from the Dardanelles 
attacked Psara, the home of the sailor-hero Kanaris, and 
it was surprised even as Chios had been. Too late the 
Greek ships arrived at Psara, though they paralysed the 
action of the Turkish-Egyptian fleets for the rest of the 
year. Then the Greeks returned to the Morea, and Ibrahim 
fell back unmolested to Crete. 

In 1825 Ibrahim transported his army from Crete to 
Morea, and nothing shows more strikingly the weakness of 
the Greeks than this repeated inability to understand the 
true need of a small naval power, the need to strike, like 
Drake, on the enemy's coast. The Egyptians now were 
planted in the Morea. They made their base at Navarino 
bay, and swept through the interior. Tripolitza was 
deserted. Meanwhile a Turkish army under Rashid Pasha, 
the conqueror of Ali of Yannina, laid siege to Missolonghi 
from April 1825 to April 1826. At first the Greeks held out 
heroically, especially as on the lagoons the light Greek 
ships materially helped in the defence ; but with the new 
year Ibrahim came across from the Morea and at last 
secured control of the lagoons with gunboats. The de- 
fenders made a desperate sortie with all their women and 
children, and a mere remnant cut their way through. In 
spite of the help of foreigners such as Sir Richard Church, 
whose life had been spent in the Ionian Islands, and who 
was an ardent sympathiser with Greek liberty, Athens was 
blockaded; an attempt to relieve the city from the sea 
came to nothing, for the Greek ships deserted and returned 
to Hydra, and Athens fell in June 1827 



II] EGYPT HELPS THE TURKS. 1824-27 55 

Relieved from the worst of his anxieties by Egyptian 
help, Mahmud carried out in 1826 a policy which he must 
have long meditated. The celebrated force of Janissaries, 
which was now an hereditary miHtia, not well trained enough 
to take the field, yet capable of thwarting the Sultan's 
wishes at Constantinople, was attacked and destroyed by 
a force of AnatoHans, the Sultan's devoted adherents in 
Asia Minor. From this may be dated the renewal of the 
Turkish miUtary power. Mahmud was now able to train 
an army of Mohammedans from the districts loyal to him, 
though they were not by any means all of them pure- 
blooded Turks. The mountaineers of Albania on the one 
side and Anatolia on the other were henceforward recruited 
into the Sultan's ranks without the interference of a jealous 
corps at the capital. 

The unspeakable atrocities of Turks and Egyptians, 
however much they may have been inspired by similar 
atrocities of Greeks when the revolt began, aroused at last 
the attention of the Great Powers. The conditions in 
Europe were undergoing change. Alexander I died in 
December 1825, and even he had been beginning to under- 
stand the need of the intervention of civilised force. The 
heart of Russia was being aroused. His younger brother 
and successor, Nicholas I, was ready to break the bonds 
by which the Russian freedom to act was hampered 
by Metternich. In England Canning had been Foreign 
Secretary since Castlereagh's suicide, and the voice of 
England was raised at last in April 1826, when Wellington 
himself, who made it the corner-stone of his miHtary 
policy to prevent Russia from becoming strong in the 
Eastern Mediterranean under cover of protecting Christians 
against Turks, went as ambassador to Petrograd on the 
new Tsar's accession. It was agreed that Great Britain 



56 THE INDEPENDENCE* OF GREECE [ch. 

and Russia should co-operate to save the Greeks. The 
idea was that Greece should be tributary to the Sultan, yet 
with local self-government on the Rumanian model. But 
the Turks rejected mediation. 

In April 1827, owing to the illness of lyord lyiverpool, 
Canning became Prime Minister, and thus was able to put 
the last touch to his rapidly maturing poHcy of interven- 
tion; let it be remembered that he was Foreign Minister 
from 1822 onwards, that he could have made a stronger 
stand on behalf of Greece at an earlier date, or at least 
have resigned if lyiverpool had made this a test question; 
yet it remains that he seized the opportunity now when he 
had full power, and when the conscience of Great Britain, 
however late, was at last fully aroused. It was too late 
to save thousands of Greek lives and infinite miser^^ and 
desolation, yet not too late to prevent worse things. The 
conscience of France was also aroused, and Charles X, 
though an absolute sovereign, was a good Christian and 
ready to take up the role of the ancient crusading kings of 
France. A formal treaty was made at London between 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, July 1827, on the basis 
of the Petrograd agreement. Canning died in August, but 
orders had already been given to the fleets. 

The aim of the Allies was to stop the war, not to make 
Greece independent. The Turks refused to submit. Ibrahim 
continued to ravage and destroy in the Morea. The 
three united fleets, under the command of our admiral, 
Codrington, as senior officer, entered Navarino bay, where 
lay the Turkish and Egyptian fleet. Ibrahim was absent 
on his fiendish task, and the wanton fire of Turks on a 
boat, followed by fire on even Codrington's flag-§hip when 
he tried to stop a general engagement, forced the sailors' 
hands. The Egyptians were destroyed, October 20. 



II] THE POWBRvS INTERFERE, 1827 57 

The Sultan was still defiant. But the stop-gap ministry 
of Lord Goderich withdrew from further action; it is 
notorious that, Canning's influence removed, our states- 
men regarded Navarino as "an untoward event." Their 
purpose is somewhat difficult to understand. The one 
great argument for our share in the Treaty of London was 
the need to prevent the Russians from taking the Eastern 
Question into their own hands ; therefore absolute inaction 
for fear of Russia obtaining too much power over the 
Balkans was illogical. Yet this was done. The French 
landed an army to clear the Morea. The Russians declared 
formal war on the Turks in 1828, while we took no further 
part. 

The mihtary power of the Turks had sunk very low, 
and the Russians enjoyed a tremendous reputation as 
fighters since 1812. But the campaign of 1828 was not 
decisive. Certain features appeared which were to be seen 
again in 1853-55 ^^^d. 1877-78. It was no easy matter to 
bring an overpowering Russian army, or sufficient suppHes 
for it, from a great distance ; and there seems to have been 
bad administration in high places, even corruption. The 
Turks fought stubbornly from their bases in Bulgaria, the 
fortresses of Silistria, Shumla, and Varna. Then the un- 
expected happened, as often has happened when the Turks 
seem to have the upper hand. In 1829 they accepted 
battle, were defeated, and collapsed. The Russians 
advanced on Adrianople, their wings spread out from the 
Black Sea to the Aegean, but they were not in very large 
numbers, and their position was anything but secure. 
The Turks, however, were as much demoralised as in 1878. 
Kars and Erzerum had fallen in the further east. So the 
Sultan came to terms, and accepted the Treaty of Adrianople 
by which the independence of Rumania was practically 



58 THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [ch. 

acknowledged under Russian protection, and the Bosphorus 
and Dardanelles were opened to the commerce of all 
nations. In fact, after all, the Tsar gained very little for 
himself. 

The Independence of Greece was settled in lyondon 
earlier in 1829. Her northern boundary was drawn when 
the Turkish resistance to the Russians collapsed. Under 
cover of the Russian invasion of Bulgaria, the Greeks 
regained Missolonghi and saw the departure of Ibrahim. 
But it must have been a sore disappointment to the Greeks 
that neither Thessaly nor Epirus was included, nor any 
of the further islands, Crete or Samos or Chios, and that 
their co-religionists of Salonica and so many other towns 
of the Turkish Empire were still unfree. At first a repub- 
lican form of government was set up with Capodistrias as 
President. But he was accustomed to the ways of the 
Russian court, when he had been minister under Alexander I, 
and believed in a centralised administration or bureaucracy, 
wisely, it may be, because the Greeks had proved to be 
unable to live in harmony among themselves and were 
hardly fit for a democracy ; moreover in Europe in general, 
even in Great Britain before 1832, there was no real demo- 
cracy. An aristocracy of "primates" or of Hydriot ship- 
owners might have caused civil war at any moment, and 
would have been unacceptable to the peasants. The crown 
of Greece was offered by the Powders to Leopold of Saxe 
Coburg, who first accepted and then refused it; then to 
Prince Otto of Bavaria, who entered into possession in 
1833 with a staff of German officials. Meanwhile Capo- 
distrias, trying to rule by Russian police methods, had to 
suppress a Hydriot revolt, and was assassinated. Thus 
modern Greece did not begin well. Government on 
Russian lines by a spy-supported autocrat was the only 



II] INDEPENDENCE WON, 1829 59 

alternative to lawless freedom, until German methods were 
introduced. The 20th century had 3^et to reveal fully 
what a German king can do in a country of non-Germans ; 
but in the 19th century it was clear enough already that 
he would crush individuality. 



CHAPTER III 

FRANCE UNDER LOUIS PHILIPPE 

lyouis Philippe, chosen by the July Revolution, was 
a bourgeois King of the French. Being son of Egalite 
and owing his throne to a revolution, he could not pose 
as an autocrat. The French nobles of the and en regime 
never acknowledged him as a body, though some few pre- 
tended to "rally" to his cause. There were but few 
conspiracies against him; even two efforts made by lyouis 
Napoleon had no chance of success. lyCgitimacy being 
dead and Bonapartism not yet having raised its head 
again, it remained that he had to be a constitutional 
sovereign. He was amiable and modest ; Frenchmen had 
no fault to find with him except that he had no command- 
ing presence, and was nicknamed King Pear; but he was 
under the taint which his father's action had attached to 
the name of Orleans, the taint of dallying with revolutionism 
in order to obtain the crown from the legitimate Louis XVI. 
He had had a life of poverty; but during his reign of 
eighteen years he amassed a considerable fortune which 
was invested in foreign countries, so that, when he in his 
turn was expelled, his family as well as himself, and it 
was a very large family, were well off. 

M. Adolphe Thiers was minister, and for a short time 
Prime Minister, in this reign ; he was also one of the ablest 



CH. Ill] ORIvKANIST IDEAI.S 6i 

French historians and wrote the history of the Repubhc, 
Consulate, and Empire. The thoughts of Frenchmen 
under the Orleanist regime can be understood from his 
work. The bourgeois government meant that pohcy could 
be neither revolutionary nor truly royal. There was a 
feeHng of satisfaction that "we were governed by our 
middle-class equals," but this was not enough for the 
French idee of honour and glory ; " it is necessary, according 
to an old writer, that the Fatherland should be not only 
prosperous but also sufficiently glorious." Hence came the 
yearning after distinction. Thiers thought that the most 
glorious period in French history was that of the Directory 
1796-97, when "France at the height of her power was 
mistress of all the soil which extends from the Rhine to 
the Pyrenees, from the sea to the Alps... when no eye, 
however piercing, could see in that generation of heroes 
any who would commit crime or stifle liberty." Therefore, 
when he was Prime Minister himself, he had his programme 
of glory. He longed to see the Orleanist dynasty as glorious 
as the best of the Bourbons or Napoleon himself, or, better 
still, as glorious as was the Directory before Bonaparte 
stifled liberty. Of course such an ideal was impossible. 
The bourgeois king at a critical moment failed to respond, 
and this yearning after miHtary honour, which the writings 
of Thiers did so much to encourage, only gathered strength 
later under Napoleon III. In fact the historian-premier 
created the Napoleonic legend, that is to say encouraged 
Frenchmen to beheve that the glories of Napoleon were 
far greater than his crimes, but was unable to create an 
Orleanist glory. 

In domestic affairs it is but natural to find that con- 
stitutionalism was estabHshed in a thoroughly middle-class 
manner. Membership of the Assembly was, by the electoral 



62 FRANCE UNDER LOUIS PHIIvIPPE [ch. 

law, open to those who paid 500 francs in direct taxes; 
quaUfication as an elector was fixed at 200 francs, or at 
100 francs for officials and professional men, this gave 
a voting strength in all France of about 200,000 citizens. 
Therefore respectability and consequent capacity to vote 
was a matter of money or profession; and we are irre- 
sistibly reminded of Disraeli's policy of what John Bright 
styled "fancy franchises." Similarly, by the municipal 
law, the same type of men elected town councillors, from 
whom mayors were chosen by the government. The same 
men again composed the National Guard, providing arms 
and uniform at their own expense. 

Foreign poHcy, of course, had to proceed on middle 
lines. I/Ouis Philippe could not possibly support Metternich 
and the autocrats of Russia and Prussia. If Thiers, like 
the older Whigs of William III and Anne, stood for a bold 
foreign policy, he also resembled them as advocate of 
parliamentary government; his was the party of the 
left centre. Guizot, another historian-minister, who had 
already held office under Charles X, was rather of the 
type of the constitutional Tories of the same period; he 
was a parliamentarian, yet preferred to see a pronounced 
influence exercised by the king himself; and thus he 
belonged to the right centre. Extremists were the right 
and left wings of the Chamber, I^egitimist Royalists and 
avowed Radicals respectively. 

Events in several foreign countries immediately tested 
the capacity of the new government. It was impossible 
for Paris to have its July Revolution without the govern- 
ments of neighbouring countries being also shaken. 
Naturally enough Belgium followed suit in the autumn of 
the same year 1830. The Belgians declared in their 
"Proclamation of Independence" that though they were 



Ill] UPRISING OF BBlyGlUM, 1830 63 

in a majority over the Dutch by about five to two miUions, 
they were outvoted in the States General ; that the National 
Debt of Holland was much greater than theirs before 
18 14, yet they paid taxes higher out of all proportion ; that 
almost all officials were Dutch, and the official language 
was Dutch ; and that mercantile policy favoured the Dutch, 
for with their possibilities as a manufacturing nation they 
wanted some form of protection, whilst the shipowning 
Dutch were in favour of free trade. Beyond all this 
Belgium was largely Roman Catholic, though with a free- 
thinking element, and a sense of unity between Flemings 
and Brabanters and Walloons had been growing up during 
French rule; the Calvinistic Dutch had in other periods 
been bitterly opposed to France, and their sense of nation- 
ality did not go so far as to acknowledge the Belgians as 
their equals. The outbreak took place at Brussels suddenly 
on August 25. A small Dutch army, advancing to the 
suburbs of the capital, was driven back on September 
21-27. A National Congress met on November 16 to 
proclaim independence. In February 1831 the second son 
of lyouis Philippe was chosen to be king, for the middle- 
class Belgians had no liking for a repubhc. But then 
Britain intervened, for on no account might a cadet of 
some Great Power hold a country which Hes nearest to the 
mouth of the Thames. In June the choice feU upon 
lycopold of Saxe Coburg, late king-elect of Greece; he 
accepted the crown, and was recognised by the British 
government. He was a straightforward and honourable 
king, and we know that his grandson has preferred to 
pursue the path of honour, though another Coburger 
and other Germans called to govern non-German countries 
and their German relations have subordinated national 
needs to the interests of Germanism. The French, not 



64 



FRANCE UNDER I.OUIS PHII,IPPE [ch. 



taking it amiss that their candidate was rejected, supported 
the new government. When King WiUiam of Holland 
refused to surrender Antwerp, a French army under 
Marshal Gerard — he had commanded an army corps at 
the battle of lyigny, and had tried to persuade Grouchy to 
march to the sound of the guns at Waterloo — came to 
besiege Antwerp and marched across the field of Waterloo 
on the way; an English squadron blockaded the mouth 
of the Scheldt, and Antwerp was surrendered December 

Duke of Coburg, lirxeally descended from 
the Elector of Saxony who lost the electorate in 1547 



Ernest 

m. 

Louise of Gotha 



I 

Victoria 

m. 

Duke of Kent 



Ernest 
d. 1893 



Albert m. Queen Victoria 



Ferdinand 

Son 

Ferdinand 

Prince of Bulgaria 1887 

Tsar of Bulgaria 1908 



Leopold II 
d. 1909 



Leopold I 

King of the 

Belgians 1831 

m. 

(i) Charlotte 

d. of George IV 

(2) Louise d. of 

Louis Philippe 



Philip 
Albert I 



1832. The Dutch finally retained most of lyuxemburg and 
the fortress of Maestricht. Yet King William did not 
give way to a final settlement till 1838, and the Treaty of 
lyondon guaranteeing Belgian Neutrality was not signed 
till April 1839; the guarantors of this scrap of paper 
were Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. 
In one particular the Belgians lost considerably by 
cutting their connection with Holland. The Dutch, holding 



Ill] POlvAND AND ITAI.Y, 1830-31 65 

both banks of the mouth of the Scheldt, could prevent ships 
from passing to and from Antwerp. Therefore the great 
port was useless to free Belgium. It was not till 1863 that 
free navigation was bought from the Dutch, and the Antwerp 
that we knew in 1914 is the creation of quite modern days. 

Poland also had her insurrection. Tsar Alexander I had 
in 1815 intended to govern constitutionally with a Chamber 
as King of Poland. He put in as Viceroy his brother 
Constantine, who married a Pohsh princess. When he 
became a reactionary, Poland of course suffered; freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press disappeared, and mili- 
tary colonies of Russians were introduced. Consequently 
secret societies were formed, for if any country aspired to 
freedom, especially after enjoying a period of enthusiasm 
for Napoleon, that country was Poland. The insurrection 
burst out at Warsaw November 1830. Probably the Poles 
took off the attention of Nicholas from Belgium and at- 
tracted it to themselves, thereby helping a distant country 
to their own loss. Both French and British sympathised, 
and Palmerston and Grey gave offence to the Russians by 
what they said, btit they were too far away to send any 
help ; thus, while they held out for Belgian independence, 
no autocratic power interfered to help Holland, but, while 
they only talked, the Russian autocrat crushed Poland. 

In Italy the Carbonari were still active. Since their 
failure ten years back their head-quarters were at Paris, 
from which some attempt was made to knit together the 
threads of revolutionary feeUng. Yet when they tried to 
raise the standard of revolt, profiting by the impetus 
given by the July Revolution, the risings in 1831 were 
but feeble and isolated. The kings and dukes of Bourbon 
and Hapsburg blood in Italy were not at all attached to 
Austria, nor even was the Pope, which fact explains why 
M. 5 



66 FRANCE UNDER I.OUIS PHII^IPPE [ch. 

Italian conspirators constantly looked to some monarch in 
their own midst to be their ultimate saviour. However 
when there was a rising at Modena in February 183 1, the 
Duke had no place to which to flee but Austrian soil. 
At once there was a similar movement in Parma whence 
Marie I^ouise fled, in Bologna, in Ravenna and the other 
cities of the Papal I^egations, in Ancona and all the Marches 
up to the Apennines. A National Assembly was summoned 
to Bologna. The collapse was as rapid as the outbreak. 
As soon as ever it was seen that I^ouis Philippe's ministry 
would not interfere, the Austrian troops overran Parma 
and Modena without any trouble, and proceeded, in spite 
of a check before Ancona, to reduce the papal provinces 
as well. Ministers of the Great Powers then met at Rome, 
where the British and French at least pressed upon the 
Pope the need of a generous measure of reform ; some vague 
promises were given, but probably no one was surprised 
that nothing was ever done. Again there was a rising at 
Bologna. This time papal troops crushed the revolt, and 
plundered some of the towns with ruthless severity, so that 
Bologna itself preferred to admit the Austrians rather than 
submit to papal atrocities. Now I^ouis PhiHppe sent a 
French contingent to occupy Ancona. The Austrians gar- 
risoned Bologna and the French Ancona for half a dozen 
years, and then were withdrawn by mutual consent. The 
episode marks a re-entry of France into Itahan poHtics, and 
was a presage of what might happen later when France 
and Austria would be rivals in defence of the temporal 
power of the Papacy. 

In Germany there were insurrections in Brunswick and 
Cassel. A measure of hberty of the press was granted in 
Hanover and Saxony. There was a rising in 1833 at 
Frankfort, which was immediately suppressed by Prussians. 



m] GERMANY AND KNGI.AND, 1832 67 

Metternich, as before, made use of the Federal Diet to 
pronounce against lyiberalism in Germany, entrusting to 
the individual sovereigns of the Federal States the task 
of suppressing Uberty. There was the same outcry as 
before against the Hcence of the press and the university 
professors. Yet even before 1830 a new poHcy was being 
carefully nursed and developed by Prussia; this was the 
poHcy of commercial union, from which grew imperceptibly 
the idea of poHtical union under the lead of Prussia. The 
Zollverein or Customs Union, by which the states one by 
one were united to admit goods duty-free across their 
common frontiers, was founded by Prussia, and from the 
very first Austria was left outside. 

In England we had the question of the great Reform 
Bill. The influence of France was seen over here in the 
reluctance of our new King William IV to take a strong 
attitude on the side of reformers, for he inherited the idea 
that was so rife in his father's reign, namely that, when 
Revolution appeared in France, Reform ought to be checked 
in England for fear of similar consequences. But when it 
was clear that the excitements attending the rejection of 
the Reform Bill by the Lords were not merely the revolu- 
tionary outbursts of rioters, but that a general popular 
wish for a bill could be no longer resisted, and when 
Wellington failed to create an anti-reform Tory ministry, 
WilHam consented to swamp the House of I^ords by the 
creation of new peers. The Reform Bill was passed, and 
was at once seen to be anything but revolutionary; in 
fact by the Radicals it was but a step towards a wider 
measure. In the Whig ministries 1830 to 1834, and then 
again in 1835, the Foreign Secretary was Lord Palmerston. 
He it was who made so decided a stand on the question 
of Belgium, acknowledging the new kingdom as fully 



68 FRANCE UNDER LOUIS PHIIvIPPE [ch. 

independent and guaranteeing its neutrality, whilst at tlie 
same time opposing the candidature of Louis PhiHppe's 
son. The new King Leopold of Coburg was uncle to both 
Victoria and Albert; it is impossible to read our late 
Queen's letters without seeing the strength of her affection 
for him, and his election was obviously considered to be 
a happy solution of the difficulties in the Netherlands. 
In Portugal British and French influence got rid of Dom 
Miguel. But further afield Palmerston's influence on the 
Polish question had no weight, and his attempt to press a 
scheme of reform upon the Pope came to nothing. He was 
beginning to lay a foundation of the reputation which he 
afterwards enjoyed of being a sympathiser with revolution. 
The chief work of Louis PhiHppe, which had the most 
lasting results for France and for which he is best known, 
was the conquest of Algeria; yet it had first been taken 
in hand by Charles X. We have to go a long way back 
in history to understand Mediterranean poHtics. When 
Venice and Genoa began to decHne, when the Turks 
extended their control along the coast of North Africa in 
a thoroughly Turkish manner, that is to say sometimes 
regarding the chieftains as the Sultan's vassals, and some- 
times as independent corsairs whom the Sultan could not 
or would not control, there was no one naval power strong 
enough to cope with the Mohammedan peril by sea. In 
the i6th century the Emperor Charles V sent unsuccessful 
expeditions to the African coast more than once, and held 
Tunis for a comparatively short time. But Spain never 
properly undertook the protection of Christian trade in 
the Mediterranean. Christian merchants had either to sail 
armed in company or to make terms with the Mohammedans. 
Here we see the justification of certain spasmodic efforts 
of our Stuart kings to protect our trade, including the 



Ill] THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1830 69 

dispatch of our "Ship Money" fleet, the temporary 
occupation by Charles II of Tangier, also of Cromwell's, 
policy when Blake bombarded Tunis. The new navy 
which Colbert gave to Louis XIV and our own occupation 
of Gibraltar did much to help Christian trade. As late as 
18 16, Great Britain being then in a position to enforce the 
wishes of the Congress of Vienna with respect to slavery as 
she was now protectress of the Ionian Islands, Lord Exmouth 
was sent with a fleet to demand the release of Greek slaves ; 
further than that he demanded the freedom of all slaves. 
Tunis and TripoH submitted, Algiers gave up Greek slaves 
and sold for ransom ItaHans. Opinion in England was not 
satisfied, and, when some Algerians again attacked Christian 
ships, Exmouth was ordered to take strong measures. A 
thorough bombardment of Algiers destroyed the harbour 
and batteries and ships. On another occasion United 
States ships had to interfere. 

It is clear then that there was no need to argue in 
defence of French interference. The question first came 
up in 1827, when a French consul was struck by a dey of 
Algiers, and a French ship entering the harbour to demand 
satisfaction was fired upon. In July 1830, the very month 
when he was dethroned, Charles X sent an expedition under 
General Bourmont — he is otherwise known in history as 
the French general who deserted Napoleon just before 
the battle of Quatre Bras — which besieged and captured 
Algiers. The work was carried on for Louis Philippe by 
Marshal Clausel, who as general had won a considerable 
reputation in fighting against Wellington in the later years 
of the Peninsular War. Several places were captured on 
the coast east and west of Algiers. The ministry probably 
meant at first to occupy only the coast. But the excited 
Arabs of the interior, especially the Kabyles under the 



70 FRANCE UNDER LOUIS PHII^IPPE [ch. 

command of Abd-el-Kader, resented so strongly the French 
attack that, just as has been the case of our government in 
India, it was absolutely necessary to conquer the hinterland. 
In 1836 Clausel advanced on Constantine, 50 miles from 
the coast at a point half-way between Algiers and Tunis. 
He reached the place, found that he was unable to batter 
it, as it stood on an inaccessible rock, without heavy guns, 
and had to retreat with heavy losses amidst a swarm of 
Arab horsemen. Next year another expedition with abun- 
dant heavy artillery was more successful. Constantine 
was breached and stormed, and a fearful number of Arabs 
were hurled to death over the precipices of the southern 
face. The resistance of Abd-el-Kader was gradually worn 
down. Natives were enrolled in the French service, 
Turcos on foot, Spahis mounted ; and a corps of French 
dressed in native style in baggy knickerbockers and short 
jackets, with shaven heads and wearing the fez, took the 
name of Zouaves from one of the local tribes. The Arab 
hero continued a desultory warfare of raids and did not 
finally surrender till 1847. The permanent occupation of 
Algeria was therefore not complete till the end of the reign, 
and spasmodic fighting went on much later. The army of 
occupation was at least 100,000 strong, and after Clausel's 
failure was commanded by Bugeaud. Here Cavaignac, 
Canrobert, Pelissier, and MacMahon learnt the art of war. 
Turcos and Spahis were brought over to fight for France 
in 1870 and again in 1914. 

The success of the French in Algeria has been pro- 
nounced. French engineers have found there a country 
where they could display their genius. Artesian wells have 
brought fertihty to barren places, and grapes and grasses 
have been grown. Thus although there was at one time 
a considerable outcry against the French occupation, and 



m] THE FRENCH IN ALGERIA 71 

it was more than insinuated that the methods of conquest 
were brutal and that Abd-el-Kader and his Arabs were 
national heroes, there is Httle doubt that it has tended 
towards civilisation, not only suppressing piracy, but also 
opening up the country, which in the days of the Romans 
had been highly fertile, and which the Turks had bUghted. 
After 1 87 1 many Alsatians who wished to remain French 
were settled by the government on the more healthy 
uplands of south Algeria. In 1881 Tunis and its hinter- 
land were added to the French Empire, and later the 
hinterland of Senegal and the central region of Timbuctoo, 
so that French ambition towards expansion has been 
chiefly connected with Africa. 

At the other end of the Mediterranean the affairs of 
Egypt and Syria attracted the attention of Louis PhiHppe, 
but he did not experience the same success. The traditions 
of France, dating from the Crusades, revived by Louis XIV, 
and strengthened by Napoleon's efforts in spite of his 
failure to hold Egypt or to conquer Acre, could not but 
have a strong influence in attracting French thoughts to 
the East. It was in connection with Egypt and Acre 
that Louis Philippe seemed likely to force France to the 
front to obtain her "sufficiency of glory," and to show that 
the Orleanist could defy Europe as well as Bonaparte. 
Mohamtned Ali, an Albanian by birth and an official of the 
Sultan, had been made Pasha of Egypt in 1805. He had 
governed that country tyrannically but effectually; he 
destroyed the Mamelukes, the hereditary caste of soldiers, 
who were the counterpart of the Janissaries at Constanti- 
nople, and his action must have suggested to Mahmud 
the idea of destroying the Janissaries; he conquered the 
fanatical Arabs, the Wahabees, whose idea was to revive the 
original Mohammedan programme of slaughtering infidels 



72 FRANCE UNDER IvOUIS PHIIvIPPE [ch. 

if they refused to accept the Koran ; he conquered up the 
Nile and founded Khartoum; he introduced cotton and 
sugar-cane and extended the canal system of Egypt. All 
this was connected with an oppressive method of govern- 
ment. The army and fleet which he sent under his son 
to crush the Greeks in 1825-27 were composed of the 
hardy Arabs and Sudanese of the interior rather than of 
the peasant fellaheen, who, after centuries of oppression, 
have little fighting force in them even to-day. Even after 
the destruction of his hopes at Navarino, his ambition was 
still high, his aim was to annex Syria of which he demanded 
the governorship from Mahmud, and next he demanded 
that his own position in Egypt should be that of hereditary 
viceroy. 

In 183 1, at the time when the Sultan seemed to be in 
the greatest difficulties owing to the Treaty of Adrianople, 
Mohammed Ali sent Ibrahim to invade Palestine and lay 
siege to Acre. Next year a Turkish army made an effort 
to come to its relief, but was too late. Ibrahim, after the 
fall of Acre, pushed northwards on Aleppo, routed the 
Turks, and pursued them over the Taurus, followed after 
a short pause and routed a second Turkish army at Konieh 
(Iconium). The Turkish miHtary power was so completely 
broken down that Mahmud actually listened to offers of 
help from Russia ; but this alarmed the French, and under 
French influence an armistice was arranged, by which the 
Sultan granted to Mohammed the whole of Syria and 
CiHcia south of Mount Taurus. 

At this moment the strange friendship between Russia 
and Turkey, unnatural and temporary, seemed however 
Hkely to bear fruit. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, July 
1833, created a defensive alliance entirely in Russia's favour, 
with a secret article that in case of war the Dardanelles 



in] EGYPT AND SYRIA, 1840 73 

should be open to her but closed against other nations. 
The chief result was that Louis PhiHppe made overtures 
to Mohammed. A new compHcation soon gave the 
opportunity that French statesmen required. There were 
risings against Mohammed's heavy rule on the outskirts of 
his newly annexed provinces. War broke out in 1839, 
the Turkish army was once more routed at Nissib, and 
Mahmud died suddenly before he had even received the 
news of the defeat. Now was the time for Russian aid to 
be given to the Turks, and in that case, with Thiers 
resolutely supporting Mohammed with a view to making 
France the paramount power in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
an explosion would have been inevitable and the Crimean 
War would have been anticipated. But Palmerston was 
by no means ready then to allow Great Britain to enter 
into the Eastern Question in the wake of either Russia or 
France. He took his stand on the necessity of maintaining 
the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and that could only 
be maintained by the evacuation of Syria by Mohammed. 
Russia and Great Britain were therefore ranged together 
on the side of the Turks, and this thwarted Russia's policy, 
because, if the Tsar were left alone as Turkey's friend, 
whatever advantage might come from the humbling of 
Mohammed would have been for Russia alone. Palmerston 
went further and drew Austria and Prussia into his scheme. 
The Quadruple AlUance was formed July 1840 to enforce 
Egyptian surrender to the terms of Turkey; Mohammed 
might hold Egypt by hereditary right, the four Powers 
declared, but southern Syria only as an ordinary governor 
under the Sultan. 

Mohammed's defiance was a trifle. The crux of the 
question was the exclusion of France from the Concert of 
Europe. Was France then to be considered no longer as 



74 FRANCE UNDER I.OUIS PHII.IPPE [ch. 

a Great Power, but as the humbled and exhausted kingdom 
of i8 14-15 that had to look on whilst others arranged the 
map of Europe to suit themselves ? Had she not recovered 
her position and right to have a voice in the Concert? 
Twenty-five years had elapsed since Waterloo, and the new 
generation was profoundly excited. Thiers had his chance 
to show that a bourgeois Government could make France 
sufficiently glorious and rival the deeds of Louis XIV or 
Napoleon. A similar spirit was roused in Germany and 
showed that there was a deep consciousness of the unity 
of Germany, however diverse the individual governments 
might be, whenever a threat of a French war should arise. 
Now were written new patriotic war songs, Becker's "Sie 
sollen ihn nicht haben den freien Deutschen Rhein," and 
Alfred de Musset's answer "Nous avons eu votre Rhin 
Allemand.'* The suddenness of the storm was remarkable; 
Egypt and Syria were forgotten, France and Germany were 
face to face. But whatever might be the ardour of the 
historian of the wars of the old French Republic, and 
however much he might yearn to see the French frontier 
extended as in 1794 to the Rhine, or French arms victorious 
as in 1796-97 down the valley of the Po, lyouis PhiHppe was 
forced to be cautious. A great European War might unlock 
the floodgates of Revolution ; therefore, when Thiers drew 
up an uncompromising speech for the King to deliver to 
the Chamber in the autumn of 1840, he refused to read it. 
Thiers resigned. Guizot was called to form a new ministry 
and submit to the will of Europe. 

The artificiaHty of Mohammed's power was quickly 
seen. A British fleet under Sir Charles Napier with an 
Austrian contingent reduced Acre and appeared off 
Alexandria. In the East the collapse of an apparently 
powerful absolute monarch is a common enough feature. 



m] POI.ICY OF THIERS, 1840 75 

Faced by the might of Europe, and deserted by the Syrians 
and Arabs, to whom he had been more strict than the old 
Turkish government^, Mohammed had no choice but to 
accept the terms offered by Napier and sanctioned by 
Pahnerston; he was to be content with the possession of 
Egypt to be held henceforth by heredity, and therefore he 
became the first Khedive. On the side of Turkey it was 
arranged that the Dardanelles should be closed to all 
ships of war, and therefore the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 
became null and void by impHcation. Palmerston^s poHcy 
was from his point of view wonderfully successful; he had 
used Russia to bolster up the Turkish government, and now 
Russia had no special advantage. 

Certainly the new Sultan had his chance to show that 
his country was not moribund. Palmerston's poHcy, 
which was a continuation of Welhngton's, namely that by 
no means should the Russians be allowed to reach the 
Mediterranean, had as its corner-stone the idea that the 
Turkish Empire was not " a dead body or a sapless trunk." 
There were no troubles then in the Balkans ; Greece was 
free, though hardly yet prosperous in her freedom ; Serbia 
and Rumania were practically free; the Janissaries had 
been destroyed, and the Turkish army was being remodelled 
on modern Hues, being now recruited from the sturdy 
Mohammedans of AnatoUa and those of the southern parts 
of the Balkans who had no traditions of insubordination 
towards their Sultan. No outburst of fury occurred within 
the next several years to prove to Europe that the Turk 
was beyond reform. 

^ Kinglake tells in Eothen how, at the time of his visit to 
Palestine, the mere name of Ibrahim was enough to terrify the 
people. The Holy Places at Jerusalem were then, under the 
-Egyptian government, controlled by Roman CathoUc clergy. 



76 FRANCE UNDER I.OUIS PHII,IPPE [ch. 

We return to France and the Guizot ministry. The 
new historian-premier during the next seven years pursued 
a dull and not very glorious pohcy. He declared openly 
that he had no wish for glory, only for the prosperity of 
France. For seven years he had an obedient majority in 
the Chamber, and governed it by methods which French 
writers compared to those of Sir Robert Walpole. He got 
into the Chamber ofi&cials and civil servants who were in 
the pay of the government ; outside the government, posts 
and pensions and a share in government monopoHes were 
granted to those who faithfully voted for his nominees. 
Meanwhile it was a period of prosperity, railways were 
being laid down, the colonisation of Algeria was going on 
well, the trouble with regard to England was removed for 
the time being, as the Whigs went out of power in England 
and Palmerston with them. He wished even to promote 
an entente with our government, and Louis PhiHppe and 
Victoria paid each other visits of state; but this was not 
popular in France. When Palmerston returned to the 
Foreign Office, he and Guizot fenced with each other on 
the question of the Spanish marriages. The marriage of 
Queen Isabella was considered a matter of high importance, 
and it was understood that a projected marriage between 
Isabella's younger sister Louisa and Louis Philippe's son, 
the Due de Montpensier, should not take place until the 
young Queen herself was married and had children. The 
French King and Guizot hurried on the marriage of the 
Queen to her cousin Francisco, and the marriage of the 
sister to the French Prince at the same time. The good 
feeHng with England therefore passed away, but what 
might have happened as the result of the Bourbon marriage 
it would be useless to argue, for the year of Revolution was 
approaching. Palmerston being a strong Liberal, Guizot in 



in] POIvICY OF GUIZOT 77 

opposition swung more to the side of autocracy, and in 1847 
troubles in Paris showed that he was so unpopular that 
he resigned. 

The Revolution of 1848 had both immediate and under- 
lying causes, as had that in 1789. There were no striking 
grievances, uneven taxes, grinding poverty of peasants, or 
restlessness of a people irritated by the haughtiness and 
contemptuousness of a privileged nobihty. The utmost 
that could be complained of was that only the rich and 
bourgeois had votes, which were used in an unworthy manner 
by systematic corruption, and the reformers were simply 
demanding electoral reform. They organised in 1847 a 
series of poHtical banquets, at which speeches were made 
in favour of reform. A certain banquet advertised for 
February 22, 1848 was forbidden by the government for 
fear of fierce oratory ; the result was rioting, and on the 
23rd barricades appeared, though Guizot had already 
resigned ; some shots were fired by the soldiers, and a few 
civiHans were killed. I^ouis Philippe apparently feared to 
trust the soldiers, and even the bourgeois National Guard 
was against him. Probably he had foreseen that, when 
a Revolution did occur, it would be safest for him to 
disappear at once rather than fight it out. On the 24th 
he abdicated in favour of his grandson, and left Paris. 
But the excited Parisians were not to be put off, and 
proclaimed a RepubUc at the Hotel de Ville. 

But an outburst of excitement cannot adequately 
explain the rapid downfall of the dynasty. The seeds of 
this Revolution were really sown by the writers and thinkers 
and even the amateur experiment-makers of the last twenty 
years. It was the result of modern conditions of life, of 
the new manufactures and railways, and the consequent 
emergence into poHtical Hfe of that very modern person 



y8 FRANCE UNDER IvOUIS PHII^IPPE [ch. 

the thoughtful working man, who was a townsman and 
not a peasant. In our own country, after the Manchester 
Massacre and the Six Acts, the Reform Bill of 1832 had been 
an answer to the demands of those who wished to have 
their voice felt in ParHament; and disappointed by it the 
same class had put forward the People's Charter. But in 
England there were many rival interests, middle-class and 
manufacturing as well as landowning interests, which 
opposed a barrier against extreme democracy. In the 
France of 1848 the bourgeois dynasty had been found 
wanting, and the extremists, and those who had been 
reading and thinking about poHtical theories, rushed to the 
front. 

Therefore, just as the great Revolution was caused, not 
so much by grievances and protests against noble privileges, 
as by talk and brooding over grievances; so the Second 
Revolution sprang, not so much from Guizot's corruption 
and a high electoral franchise, as from the brooding of 
working men over their wrongs and their poverty, their 
low wages and the new conditions of manufacturing Hfe, 
and their impotence against the capitaUsts. As in 1789 
the nobles, in 1848 the bourgeois were the enemy. As 
Rousseau had preached and prepared the way for 1789, so 
lyouis Blanc and other socialists created the feeHng which 
exploded in 1848. As in the one case inexperienced men 
who had never had any training in self-government rushed 
in to make amateur experiments in the art of parliament- 
making, — ^it is Burke's chief criticism of the National 
Assembly (1789-91) that the members were ignorant, 
therefore could only destroy and bring on bankruptcy, so 
that ultimately the greatest soldier would become master 
of France, — so in the present case the discontented workmen 
demanded universal suffrage and "the right to work," 



m] CAUSES OF REVOI,UTION, 1848 79 

knowing their wrongs and ready to destroy capital, but 
utterly inexperienced, as they could not but be, as this 
problem of labour and capital was so new. They too, like 
the men of 1792-94, were destined after a period of confusion 
and bankruptcy to be overcome by mihtary force. Therefore 
we need not be surprised that the Revolution was against 
the government of a mild bourgeois King, who had no 
Bastille as the symbol of his despotism, whose nobles were 
not privileged, and indeed whose new nobihty was of an 
upstart type not recognised by the old Legitimist aristo- 
crats. The movement did not originate with the peasants, 
nor was it popular with the peasants, who had gained by 
the first Revolution all that they wanted and were now 
distinctly conservative. 

As far back as 183 1 at the very beginning of his reign 
there had been a rising at Lyons among the silk-workers, 
who received miserably low pay and were Hable to be 
thrown out of work whenever the master spinners had 
too much unsold stuff on hand. They had overpowered 
the poHce, and had forced a minimum wage, but they had 
been promptly overpowered by the soldiers. However, the 
rights of working men were being preached. The pioneer 
of the movement was Saint Simon, who died in 1825, and 
his work was carried on by many enthusiastic men, even 
bankers and professors and men of letters. Bnfantin was 
prosecuted and condemned to prison in 1832, but he Hved 
on to 1864, studying social questions in Algeria and in 
Egypt, and dreaming of a great system of railways and 
steam-boats and even of the Suez Canal, a world of useful 
workers in which there would be no room for the lazy 
capitaHst who Hved only on what had been left him by 
industrious ancestors, of popular education also — which 
indeed made great progress under Louis PhiHppe — and 



8o FRANCE UNDER lyOUIS PHIIylPPE [CH. 

liberty of thought. There were other schools of thought 
after Saint Simon had provided the impulse. Fourier 
preached Communism, and others a system of entire 
freedom and anarchy. But Fourier was likewise dead, and 
the chief Hving exponent of SociaHsm in the middle of the 
century was lyouis Blanc, whose main idea was to make 
the State the one capitahst of the nation, and put the 
means of production into the hands of everyone. "The 
workers have been slaves ; they have been serfs ; they are 
to-day wage-earners; we must make them partners^ — ^the 
State owes to the citizen work." Therefore although the 
organisers of the banquets made speeches against Cuizot 
and poHtical corruption, demanding that public officials 
should have no seat in the Chamber, and that the franchise 
should be lowered, though the poet I/amartine made his 
oration about traffickers and the vices of officials, Louis 
Blanc appealed to a wider audience. Now nothing can be 
easier than to sneer at the vagueness or the impossibiHty of 
le droit au travail. But every one must acknowledge the 
need of enthusiasm for some system in modern Hfe which 
is not based upon sheer selfish individuaHsm. In England, 
in spite of much suffering caused by machinery and Ufe 
in insanitary slums, there were yet alleviations, and about 
this same time the conditions of the working men were 
becoming better, as some of the worst evils were being 
removed by the Factory Acts and Free Trade was being 
estabhshed. But France had entered later than England 
into the struggle for existence in the world of manufacture 
and competition, and was now suddenly demanding that 
experiments should be made on the fines of sociaHsm. 
The past history of England showed that rights could be 
graduaUy extended, for our Constitution has been the work 
of many centuries of slow development ; our most socialistic 



Ill] THE RIGHT TO WORK 8i 

institution, the Post Office, was created a long way back, 
and has gradually taken to itself the Savings Bank, the 
telegraph and the telephone, and recently the payment 
of old age pensions. But France was not prepared by 
long experience and wanted in 1848 to set up Socialism 
at once. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS 

The Provisional Government was constituted on 
February 24, 1848 by the pubHc voice of the Parisians. 
It included Lamartine and I^ouis Blanc. It decreed a 
general election by universal suffrage, together with absolute 
freedom of the press, and of pubhc meetings. Of course 
there was no question of any alternative to a Republic, 
for there was no possible king of a more democratic type 
than lyouis Philippe. The only question was whether it 
should be under the ' ' red " flag or the tricolour, and Ivamartine 
used all his powers of oratory against the "red" flag. 
At once the "Right to Work" was put into practice under 
a commission. Les Ateliers Nationaux were organised. 
Men were not put to work according to their capacity or 
training ; they were organised on a miHtary basis and then 
put to work, first to clear a space of ground for a new 
railway station, the Saint I/azare terminus, and then to 
dig up earth on a great open space and put it back again. 
In fact the Minister of Commerce dehberately meant to 
destroy the movement at once by ridicule. The pay was 
two francs a day. In the month of May 120,000 workmen 
were employed. The most unfortunate thing however was 
that these same men and others like them were admitted 
into the National Guard, which was thus no longer an 



CH. IV] PARIS IN 1848 83 

armed force of the bourgeoisie, but of the most dangerous 
men, who of course were either being turned into loafers 
ready for riot, or into revokitionaries angry past endurance 
at the ridicule which was attached to a movement in which 
they had profoundly beHeved. In fact the National 
Workshops were dehberately created to caricature the 
ideas of Louis Blanc, and violence was the result. 

When danger threatens France from the unbridled 
passions of the mob of Paris, it is usually found that the 
peasants, and especially since the first Revolution the small 
landed proprietors, are the counterweight. The feeling of 
provincial France in 1848 was strongly against so many 
Parisians being paid to do practically nothing. The new 
Assembly met on May 4; it was entirely in favour of 
a RepubHc, but was against Socialism. It created an 
executive of five, one of whom was Marie the organiser of 
the sham workshops. A mob rose to overpower the 
Assembly and create a new provisional government under 
lyouis Blanc; it was dispersed at last and I^ouis fled. 
In the middle of June the workshops were declared closed, 
and as a natural result the majority of the disappointed 
workmen rushed to arms. June 23-26 were the days of 
the barricades. It must be remembered that Paris was 
still mostly the old city of narrow streets, and when we 
shall come to the story of barricades in Milan this same 
year we must think of an old city of streets narrower even 
than those of Paris, and therefore favourable to an armed 
mob. The Minister of War was General Cavaignac, who 
had seen service in Algeria, and, having dictatorial powers 
from the Assembly, was ready to use his guns just as 
Bonaparte did in 1795. By massing his men on certain 
points he brought up overpowering forces and carried the 
barricades, until he forced the revolutionaries into their 

6—2 



84 THE YEAR OF REVOI.UTIONS [ch. 

last stronghold in the district of Saint Antoine, near where 
once stood the Bastille. Between 3000 and 4000 of the 
leaders were transported to Algeria and elsewhere without 
trial on the mere decree of the Assembly. 

A new Constitution was created and came into effect 
in the autumn. It was proclaimed that "Sovereignty 
resides in the people and all powers emanate from the 
people"; voting was to be by the universal suffrage of 
all Frenchmen over 21 ; the Assembly was to sit for three 
years, and could not be dissolved nor prorogued except by 
its own vote; the head of the Executive was to be a 
President, elected for four years by the direct votes of the 
people, responsible to the Assembly, and not re-eUgible for 
a second period of four years. Jules Grevy proposed that 
the Assembly should elect the President with power to 
depose him at need ; another suggestion was that no member 
of a family that had reigned in France should be eligible; 
each amendment was lost. The result was that the 
peasants of France, frightened by the spectre of a Red 
RepubUc, which they took to mean a confiscation of pro- 
perty in land, and the majority of Roman CathoUcs and 
lovers of law and order of all kinds, even RoyaHsts who 
despaired of a Bourbon being elected, and all those who 
forgot the despotism and the fatal results of the exhausting 
wars of the great Napoleon, but who had been excited by 
the "Napoleonic lyCgend" as read in the historians such 
as Thiers and Mignet, who showed how glorious France 
had been once upon a time in war even if the result had 
been fatal, voted for I^ouis Napoleon. He received 5| 
milHons of votes ; Cavaignac i J millions ; I^amartine a few 
thousands. Louis Napoleon was the son of Napoleon I's 
brother Ivouis, once King of Holland ; he had already made 
two theatrical attempts to capture the loyalty of the army. 



IV] I.OUIS NAPOI.EON PRESIDENT 85 

once at Strasburg and once at Boulogne; he had been 
imprisoned and had been allowed to escape to England, 
and, as no one seemed to take him seriously, the RepubHc 
let him come back to France in 1848. 

The Revolution in Paris was the signal for a Revolution 
in Italy. This too had been gradually prepared by much 
talk and reading and brooding over Italy's sense of wrong 
since the failures of 1831 and 1832 ; it was just the spark 
from Paris that was required to explode the train of gun- 
powder that had been laid. The soul of the new movement 
was Mazzini, a Genoese, who had been imprisoned for 
conspiracy in 1831, and was allowed to depart into exile. 
From France or from Switzerland he poured forth his 
doctrine of "Young Italy." The Carbonari had failed 
because their efforts had been too purely local or provincial. 
It was necessary to have a new faith, to trust the young 
and rising generation, to implant in them the feeHng of 
brotherhood and nationahty, of repubHcanism and of 
unity; then there would be some chance to be successful 
against the Austrian yoke, when the heart of the whole 
country was roused. Mazzini's ideal of a successful rebellion 
was taken from Spain rising against Napoleon, and to his 
eyes Italy seemed equally adapted for that gueriUa warfare, 
in which the ItaHans of the mountains could harass the 
Austrians and be themselves out of reach, while the canals 
and rivers of the plain and the narrow streets of the old 
towns would also play their part. He had no faith in 
dynasties, even though aware of the value of a regular 
army, however small, that such a Prince as Charles Albert 
might be able to bring against the trained troops of Austria. 
Moreover it was not only against Austria that he wanted to 
fight, or against the crime of forcing ItaUans into the Austrian 
ranks to be drilled in the hated white uniform; it was 



86 THE YEAR OF REVOIvUTIONS [ch. 

against all tyranny and officialdom, privilege and wealth, 
that he wished to arouse a New Italy as a land which ought 
to follow in the lead of Ancient Rome and of Dante and 
the republics of the middle ages, when the lyombard 
lyeague defied the Emperors of the Swabian House. 
Shelley, when he foresaw a New Greece, quoted Milan as 
the city of medieval liberty; "Her unwearied wings could 
fan the quenchless ashes of Milan. ' ' The historian Sismondi, 
a Swiss who wrote in French, yet an Itahan by birth and 
sympathy after his family had been for generations in 
exile, brought out a work which contributed to spread 
Mazzini's ideas; this was the History of the Italian 
Republics, the tale of Italy's greatness in art and in 
literature as well as in war, but of final ruin because the 
jealousy between State and State, or between party and 
party in each State, left her a prey to the French and 
Spaniards, and ultimately to the Austrians. There were 
many ItaUan nationalist writers who helped both to light 
up and to fan the new spirit. 

But there were other influences than Mazzini's. One 
hardly can quite understand how there should have been 
such a persistent behef that Charles Albert would prove 
to be the coming champion, unless indeed the wish was 
father to the thought. Yet, when we judge him, we are 
prejudiced by our knowledge of his failure and his lack of 
stamina when the crisis came. He had become King of 
Sardinia in 183 1^, was suspected by Metternich who, indeed, 
wished to exclude him in favour of the Austrian Duke of 
Modena, and had no declared friend in all Europe; his 
was not a strong character, and between his wishes and his 

^ We have to go back two centuries to find the common ancestor 
of Charles Albert and Charles Felix who was the last of the senior 
line of Savoy. 



w] YOUNG ITAI.Y UP "TO 1848 87 

natural fears lie passed his life in anxiety and asceticism, 
knowing well that, if he took a strong Une without support, 
he would do it at his peril. But men in those days hoped 
much from the House of Savoy, the only line of rulers not 
of Hapsburg or Bourbon blood, and therefore not con- 
demned by fate to be despots. Similarly those who looked 
to Rome for a leader are not to be ridiculed, though after 
events showed how deeply they were deceived. The "New 
Guelfs " had aspirations towards papal guidance and a new 
Rome taking the lead against the modern Ghibellines; it 
was a fantastic ideal, yet the medieval Papacy, as was 
told by Sismondi, had been the ally of the old I^ombard 
I/Cague. This explains why Pio Nono, raised to the chair 
of Saint Peter in 1846, was so fervently greeted. He 
started by giving an amnesty to all poHtical offenders, and 
granting to Rome a Civic Guard. Also he protested against 
the Austrian occupation of Ferrara. Moreover it was but 
natural for a high-minded Pontiff to wish to be free from 
Austrian leading-strings. " lyittle was done ; not much was 
actually promised; everything was believed." 

Meanwhile the practical side of the 19th century could 
be seen in the scientific congresses held in 1839 and each 
year onwards to 1847 at Pisa, Turin, Florence, Padua, 
lyUcca, Milan, Naples, Genoa, and Venice in turn. Railways 
were being projected, and even short stretches of line were 
being laid down. The tunnelHng of the Alps was talked 
about. Therefore modern ideas as well as the thoughts 
of Italy's past glory were preparing men's minds for a 
revolution, not only against Austria but against the disunion 
of Italy which the Austrian pohcy was to maintain. When 
Italians discussed science together, even in Naples and in 
Venice, where Bourbon and Hapsburg ruled, there was a 
consciousness of coming unity ; much more therefore when 



88 THE YEAR OF RBVOIyUTIONS [ch. 

Italians pictured in the future railways connecting Pied- 
mont with Venice or Brindisi. 

When minds are full of excitement very Httle things 
contribute to cause the explosion. Very early in January 
1848, whilst Parisians were excited about their poHtical 
banquets, yet before the RepubHcans of Paris actually 
rose, occurred the "tobacco riots" in Milan. The Austrian 
government had a monopoly of tobacco, and good patriots 
suddenly agreed to abstain ostentatiously from smoking in 
the streets. Of course the Austrian officers and soldiers 
smoked with equal ostentation until the patriots resented 
it. There were riots, and Radetzky, the veteran general 
commanding in Italy, having created trouble so as to have 
the excuse for punishing it, let loose his soldiers in the 
streets. Yet a serious rising was delayed, for the Milanese 
required first to be assured that Charles Albert, the 
"Wobbhng King," Re Tentenna, would come across the 
frontier with a trained army to their aid. They were 
waiting for his promise, while he was waiting for the city 
to rise in earnest. In February the French RepubUc was 
an actual fact. In March the people of Vienna rose in the 
streets, and Metternich fled to Saxony. Then Milan rose 
on March 18. Even 29,000 troops were unable to storm 
the multitude of barricades in the streets, and after five 
days Radetzky withdrew to the fortresses of the Quadri- 
lateral, Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio holding the 
narrow neck of plain between I^ake Garda and the Po, and 
Verona and I^egnago on the Adige in second- line. Charles 
Albert's army crossed the Ticino on March 25, late but 
not too late; perhaps by a resolute movement he might 
have carried Mantua, whilst the capital of Austria was in 
the hands of the mob and therefore Radetzky could expect 
no reinforcements. Even as small an army as 23,000 men 



IV] MII.AN AND VENICE IN 1848 89 

could have done much as a nucleus to the numerous bodies 
of armed volunteers now pouring in, many of them old 
ItaHan soldiers who had been drilled in the Austrian 
service; WelHngton's experience is quite enough to show 
how a small resolute force can prevail against numbers — 
Radetzky had some 60,000 men in his four fortresses — 
when guerilla bands distract attention. But the king 
seemed unable to strike hard and quickly. 

Almost simultaneously Venice rose. The mob released 
from prison Daniel Manin, an arch-conspirator and a Jew 
by birth, who took the lead relying on the number of 
ItaHans in the Austrian garrison and in the fleet. He 
surprised the arsenal of Venice, and finally proclaimed the 
RepubHc of Saint Mark. City after city both in Lombardy 
and in Venetia, and after them Parma, Modena, Bologna, 
and other papal cities, followed suit; everywhere a pro- 
portion of the soldiers of ItaHan blood joined them, and 
volunteers hurried towards the Mincio. Even the Pope 
and the King of Naples were forced by public opinion to 
send contingents up north. Garibaldi appeared with some 
devoted friends from South America, where he had had 
much experience in guerilla tactics in Brazil and Uruguay, 
and these were ideal leaders of volunteers to worry and 
threaten the Austrian Hues of communication. United Italy 
certainly had numbers on her side. But would she remain 
united? There was a fatal rift. Charles Albert and the 
RepubUcans were opposed to each other, and co-operation 
was impossible as long as it remained uncertain what would 
be the state of Italy after the defeat of the Austrians. 
The RepubUcans accused the king of bad faith in admitting 
the incorporation of Parma and Modena into his dominions ; 
lyombardy was already incorporated, but the king was 
accused of slackness in arming the I^ombards. Neither 



go THE YEAR OF REVOI.UTIONS [ch. 

the Romans nor the Neapolitans were ready for union 
with the distant north ; Pius, much opposed to the 
ascendancy of Savoy and Piedmont, ordered his general 
not to fight; Ferdinand withdrew his contingent, and 
in Naples overpowered by force and dissolved the Con- 
stitution which he had had to grant. 

Thus it is probably beside the question to argue whether 
Charles Albert was or was not incompetent as a general, 



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Map to show details of the Campaigns 
of 1848 and 1859. 



for the elements of weakness were fatally present. Though 
the Austrian Court was in despair and even offered to 
consent to the annexation of lyombardy to Piedmont, the 
deciding voice was that of Radetzky, and he actually 
received reinforcements and at last was in a position to 
take the offensive. He reconquered Venetia up to the 
lagoon which protected Venice herself; then he threw 
himself upon Charles Albert's army which was divided by 



IV] DEFEAT OF THE PATRIOTS 91 

the river Mincio, won a victory at Custozza on July 25, 
and threw him back on Milan. Charles Albert refused, 
amid the howls of the disappointed citizens, to defend 
Milan, and fled to Piedmont. Thus concentration and 
determination prevailed after divided counsels. There 
were yet thousands of volunteers in arms, but they had 
no rallying point, while Radetzky's army was in the flush 
of victory; he entered Milan, and only the consideration 
that after aU he had barely enough men to hold the country 
that he had occupied, also knowledge that an advance on 
Turin would be resented by the new French government — 
the days of the barricades were now over and Cavaignac 
was the master of Paris, but lyouis Napoleon was not yet 
President — prevented him from marching into Piedmont 
where demorahsation was complete. 

Therefore we have now to turn to the other problems 
which faced the Austrian government. Hungary demands 
attention first. The Magyars of Hungary, headed by a 
proud aristocracy which ever opposed the poHtical domina- 
tion of the German Austrians of Vienna, had been alter- 
nately restive and loyal, according as each Emperor had 
tried to coerce or conciHate them : in the previous century 
they had been loyal to Maria Theresa and again to Francis II 
in his wars against Napoleon, but resentful towards Joseph 
II whose poUcy of unifying the whole Empire threatened 
their individual right. They acknowledged only the 
authority of their own Diet, for theirs was an independent 
monarchy, and Francis II and Metternich from 1825 were 
forced to acknowledge it too. But the privileged Hun- 
garian nobles had aU the power in the Diet, besides 
exemption from taxation. Transylvania, with a mixed and 
patchwork population of Hungarians and Germans and 
Rumans, had a historic right to have its own Diet, and here 



92 THE YEAR OF REVOIvUTIONS [ch. 

noble Hungarian influence prevailed to the detriment of 
the non-Hungarians. In the land of the Drave and Save 
the Croatian Slavs, of the same race as the Serbs but Roman 
Catholics, resented Magyar supremacy and the compulsory 
use of the Magyar language as much as the Magyars 
resented Austrian interference ; they had their local Diet 
at Agram, as well as representation in the Hungarian Diet ; 
and in their country there was opposition of native Slavs 
against Hungarian immigrants and officials. 

In the midst of the complex series of troubles various 
reforms were being carried out up to 1848. Count Szechen3d, 
one of the great Hungarian nobles, led the way in a poHcy 
of material interests; to him was due the construction of 
the bridge connecting Buda and Pesth, also the blowing up 
of the Iron Gates in the Danube at Orsova: "he was no 
revolutionist, nor was he an enemy to Austria." The hero 
Kossuth started a journal in 1840 with the aim of uniting 
aU classes of Hungarians, encouraging expression of 
opinions; for only by discussion could the need of recon- 
ciling noble and non-noble Hungarians, or Magyars and 
non-Magyars, be expressed. Thus new ideas spread in 
Hungary, and the^Diet in 1843 seriously took in hand the 
questions where reform was demanded, equal representation 
of towns with nobles in the Diet, equal taxation, trial by 
jury, etc., problems which were bound to be important 
when the " Hberal " ideas of Western Europe were influencing 
a feudal aristocracy ; in fact democracy as well as nation- 
ahty was in question. The fiercest controversy raged over 
the problem of language; was Magyar to be the official 
language both in the Diet and in government employ? 
The Croats appealed in favour of I^atin, and the question 
was not yet settled in 1848, for neither nation would give 
way on so vital a point. 



IV] HUNGARY AND VIENNA, 1848 93 

In the nortli Bohemia was an island of Slavs surrounded 
by Germans, and indeed inside the island there were both 
Germans and Slavs. The Tsechs were conscious of their 
nationaUty, and had traditions from their past history and 
a love of their old Hterature. 

Therefore when Vienna rose in March 1848, and Milan 
immediately after Vienna, the Emperor had to face other 
troubles as well in Hungary and Bohemia. The Vienna 
insurrection was the work of both the middle classes and 
the mob against despotism and a haughty German aristo- 
cracy of a most exclusive type ; and the university students 
played a conspicuous part. In England, if some proportion 
of ardent young men and even dons are violently radical, 
or if pro-Boers and even pro-Germans are to be found, 
we take it as a temporary craze ; otherwise, our universities 
may be Uberal but never revolutionary. But abroad things 
are different. In Vienna in 1848, and in Paris in 1871, 
the students were very genuine radicals and revolution- 
aries, as must happen when aristocrats keep power and 
privilege to themselves, and the intellectual poor are 
sUghted. A Teufelsdrockh can so easily become rabid 
and dangerous. 

The demands in March were for a National Guard and 
a Constitution. The Emperor's ministers did not draw up 
a satisfactory scheme, and in May there were more riots. 
Then the Emperor fled to Innsbruck. A Committee of 
PubHc Safety was appointed to represent students, the 
middle class, and workmen, and governed Vienna. Here 
the movement was German and democratic. At Prague it 
was national and Slav, yet the Slav element was com- 
paratively weak, and there was no sympathy between 
Vienna and Prague. In consequence it was possible to use 
Austrian soldiers against the Tsechs, without any fear that 



94 THE YEAR OF REVOI,UTIONS [ch. 

the Viennese would help them. Windischgratz, an Austrian 
aristocrat who was in command in Bohemia, was able to 
capture Prague June 17. 

The Hungarian demand was for absolute self-govern- 
ment, and the Emperor in the early months of 1848 was 
quite unable to resist it. Moreover the demand was for 
democratic self-government, extending as far as aboUtion 
of serfdom. Kossuth was supreme, not the old native 
aristocracy, though Prince Batthyany was Prime Minister. 
For a time the Hungarian government was independent 
of Austria, having army, finance, and foreign poUcy under 
its control. The Viennese democracy, inasmuch as both 
movements were directed against a hated despotism, was 
not ill disposed to Hungarian Nationalism. But as the 
year proceeded new features presented themselves. The 
Slavs demanded recognition of their pecuHar rights, free 
of Hungarian ascendancy: Kossuth refused to Hsten, and 
the Croats were roused against the Hungarians even as the 
latter against Austria. Already the province or "banat" 
of Croatia had as governor or "ban" a Slav officer named 
Jellacic. The Hungarian ministry demanded that Jellacic 
should be subordinate to them, and even obtained from the 
Emperor, then residing in humiliation at Innsbruck, an 
edict to suspend him. But he played his cards very cleverly ; 
he appealed to the Croatian regiments in Italy to remain 
loyal, and thus made himself necessary to the Austrian 
cause. By this time the Austrian arms were successful 
both in Bohemia and in Italy. Jellacic and Batthyany 
were at daggers drawn, the Slav leader being in favour of 
a single government at Vienna to control war and finance 
and foreign policy, and the Magyar still devoted to Hun- 
garian independence which included domination over the 
Slavs. The Serbs of Hungary were in arms for union with 



IV] AUSTRIAN EMPIRE SAVED 95 

their kindred in Croatia. The Emperor, as was natural, 
threw in his lot finally with Jellacic. 

Once more Vienna broke into revolt when it was seen 
that the Austrians had made this aUiance with the Croats, 
aU the sympathies of the city democracy being with 
Hungary against the Emperor. I^ate in October Win- 
dischgratz from Prague marched on Vienna; Kossuth, 
feehng that the city rising was saving Hungary from 
Jellacic, prevailed on his associates to depart from their 
defensive attitude and march to the rehef of Vienna; 
Jellacic marched to support Windischgratz. The Austrians 
were successful; while Jellacic held off the Hungarian 
reheving force, Windischgratz stormed Vienna and treated 
it with considerable severity. 

It would be wrong to leave this part of the story without 
reference to another part of the Austrian dominions. The 
Tyrolese were always devotedly loyal to the Emperor, so 
that there was no need to play a double game for however 
short a time to secure their fideHty. As in Napoleon's 
days when they rebelled against Bavaria under whose rule 
he put them to weaken Austria, they fought, and fought 
well, whether in Italy or in Hungary. Had the Croats and 
the Tyrolese wavered, one does not see how either Win- 
dischgratz or Radetzky could have been victorious. 

The restored Emperor did not at once cancel all the 
reforms that had been granted so far. In November the 
Reichstag met at Kremsier in Moravia. But a new minister. 
Prince Schwarzenberg, was meditating a decisive move ; he 
persuaded or ordered Ferdinand to resign, and the crown 
passed to his nephew Erancis Joseph, then aged eighteen, 
who still reigns. The young man was bound by no personal 
pledge towards ParUament or Hungary. So Schwarzenberg 
was able to dissolve the one and to decree the aboUtion of 



96 THE YEAR OF REVOLUTIONS [ch. 

the freedom of the other by the "Unitary Constitutional 
Edict" in March 1849, by which one Austrian system of 
government was to be appHed to the whole Empire. But 
Hungary was not yet conquered, and more risings were yet 
to occur in Italy. 

Germany was as deeply affected as Austria. But 
whereas the movements against Austria were, with the one 
exception of Vienna, racial, and the Slav support of Austria 
was racial, in Germany as a whole and in each German 
state in particular there was no aspiration but for German 
unity and freedom. The Federation of 1815 was a sham; 
it was merely a union of sovereigns, who profited thereby 
to be autocrats in their own states. Since 18 15 a really 
popular and national movement was gathering momentum, 
and in 1840, when Thiers nearly induced France to defy 
the will of Europe, this feeling was voiced in the cry that 
the German Rhine would be defended and "they" should 
not have it. Now in 1848, after various preHminaries were 
settled, a real Pan-German ParHament met on May 28 at 
Frankfort. Dreams seemed to have come true ; hberals of 
all kinds, patriots, poets, professors, doubtless also theorists 
and faddists, came together to create a Constitution which 
should govern United Germany for all time. 

Yet first Prussia claims attention. In March Berlin 
rose, and, strange as it may seem to those whose knowledge 
is only of the 20th century, Berhn forced its HohenzoUern 
king to grant a free Constitution, and Berlin defied the 
Prussian army. Some fives were lost in the crowd, the 
troops were withdrawn in face of popular hatred, and the 
king did a sort of penance before the corpses. Between 
the two great kings, Frederick II and WilHam I, the 
HohenzoUerns were not the strong men that our fancy 
paints. On the contrary the three Frederick Williams* 



IV] IvIBBRAl^ISM IN BERIyIN, 1848 97 

descended from Frederick II 's younger brother, were mean 
and selfish intriguers; one gained a good share of Poland 
by allowing Austria alone to fight the French Republic; 
a second estabhshed a claim to Hanover as the price of 
standing by while Napoleon crushed the Austrians and 
Russians at Ulm and AusterHtz, did not even rise in a 
manly fashion after the Moscow catastrophe, yet claimed 
on Napoleon's collapse a large amount of land in Saxony 
and Poland and Rhineland; the third was mean in 1848. 
Having promised a Constitution, he plunged into a war 
against Denmark to recover Holstein and Schleswig for 
Germany, — ^the first cry of Pan-Germanism in 1848 was to 
"Hberate" these duchies, — and then he drew back when 
Russia and England remonstrated and the Danish fleet 
was too strong for him. When the Prussian troops returned 
from Schleswig he turned them against BerUn; this was 
at the end of the year, when both Prague and Vienna had 
been regained by the Bmperor of Austria, and monarchy 
was recovering generally from the shocks of the early spring. 
The Assembly which met at BerHn was dissolved. A new 
royal Edict announced a new Constitution; it was on the 
time-honoured principle of the Hohenzollerns that Prussia 
might do nothing for herself, but was to receive ever5rthing, 
whether a form of government or material prosperity, from 
a benevolent despotism supported by the aristocrat- 
ofiicered army. 

Such was the character of the King of Prussia. The 
German Assembly met at Frankfort on May 18, amidst 
much excitement and high hopes, and the newly granted 
Prussian Assembly met at BerHn about the same time. 
From the very beginning it was seen that the question of 
the relations between Austria and Prussia on the one side 
and the Pan-Germanic body on the other was difficult 

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CH. IV] GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1848 99 

beyond solution. First the Archduke John, an uncle of 
the Emperor of Austria, was created Administrator; as 
this office carried with it control of the armed forces of 
Germany, including the army of Prussia as one of the 
members, it was clear that either the Administrator would 
have no real authority, or Prussia would be offended. 
Another point at issue was whether the Austrian Empire 
as such should be considered a member or only the purely 
German part of Austria. When towards the end of the 
year Schwarzenberg, confident that the ItaUan and 
Hungarian dangers were over-passed, brought out his 
Unitary Edict, centraHsing the whole of the Austrian 
Empire at Vienna, he clearly showed that he did not mean 
Austria to be a mere part of Germany as represented at 
Frankfort. Who then was to be the head of Germany? 
The four independent kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, 
Hanover, and Wurtemberg stood by Austria. The minor 
German states seemed to have no choice but to offer the 
headship to Prussia. Frederick WiUiam promptly refused 
the offer; it was against Hohenzollern principle to accept 
as a popular gift what the d3masty might create for itself ; 
he was not strong enough to assert himself by arms, even 
if he had the courage, against both Austria and the four 
minor kingdoms: if the Empire came to him at all as a 
gift, it must be offered by the sovereigns and not the peoples 
of Germany, after Prussia had done something conspicuous 
to earn it. If these ideas were not consciously present to 
the Prussian King, at least we can see from our knowledge 
of 1871 that such conditions alone would make the much- 
desired German Empire a possibility. 

After a year of futile talk and disappointed hopes, 
the Prussian refusal coming in April 1849, the Frankfort 
Assembly pubHshed its projected Constitution of Germany. 

7—2 



100 THE YEAR OF REVOIvUTIONS [ch. 

Twenty-eight minor governments accepted it. Austria and 
Prussia would have nothing to do with it. The unfortunate 
Assembly could not even suppress a feeble rising in Baden, 
for the Archduke John refused to accept its orders. Some 
of the deputies departed in despair; some of them sat for 
a short time at Stuttgart ; and there was an end to a demo- 
cratic attempt at Confederation. 

There remained in 1849 the final suppression of Italy 
and Hungary. Charles Albert had only obtained from 
Radetzky a truce which came to an end in the March of 
that year. The Austrians were now quite strong enough to 
refuse terms. Nothing short of a complete restoration of 
their power in I^ombardy and Venetia would satisfy them. 
Charles Albert had not the smallest chance of success if 
he took up arms again; Naples and Sicily were crushed; 
Rome was in open insurrection against the Pope and had 
gallantly declared a RepubHc, but with no prospect of 
success; the Tuscans had declared a Republic; Venice 
was still holding out, but was strictly blockaded. But 
Charles Albert was cut to the heart by the hatred which 
he had incurred the year before by giving up the struggle 
too soon. He and the army of Piedmont could at least, 
though without allies, strike one more blow to show their 
true manliness. He made the same mistakes as before, 
spread out his army behind the river Ticino, and allowed 
Radetzky to concentrate and break across the undefended 
river, and the result was the battle of Novara March 23. 
Then in the midst of the rout of his troops he abdicated, 
presented his son Victor Emmanuel to his generals, and fled, 
without returning to Turin, to self-imposed exile and death 
in Portugal. Radetzky had Piedmont at his mercy, yet 
did nothing more than quarter his troops on the country 
for a time and impose a heavy fine. Young as he was 



IV] THE ROMAN RBPUBI^IC, 1849 lor 

Victor Emmanuel refused the friendship of Austria, which 
indeed would have lowered him to the position of a puppet 
like the Duke of Modena or of Parma ; he refused to destroy 
the Constitution of his kingdom and reign as a despot at 
Austria's bidding. The only thing which was in his favour 
was Austria's fear to drive him to extremities, for then 
France and Great Britain could not have failed to interfere. 
As to the two Republics, Tuscany was overrun at once 
by the Austrians and the Grand Duke restored, but Rome 
put up an unexpected resistance. The government had 
Mazzini himself at its head. Garibaldi came with his 
volunteers from north Italy, and a few of his old South 
American comrades, forming the I^egion of the Red Shirts. 
An energetic young lyombard, named Manara, led a legion 
of desperate refugees from Lombardy. Students and 
artists of various nationalities, citizens of Rome, and even 
some papal guards, were ready to man the walls. After 
all the enemy was, not Radetzky nor any other Austrian 
general, but an army sent in defence of the Church by the 
French RepubHc and its President I^ouis Napoleon. The 
forces of reaction were so strong in France against anything 
which savoured of Red RepubHcanism or Sociahsm, and 
lyouis Napoleon was so keen to appeal to the respectable 
element to prove that he was a good Roman CathoUc, and 
to prevent Austria from getting all the glory and corre- 
sponding influence in Italy, that a French army appeared 
off Civita Vecchia in April under General Oudinot. Rome 
was surrounded to the walls of the Emperor AureHan, built 
in A.D. 275 ; but the high ground on the right bank of the 
Tiber had not been enclosed in ancient Rome at all ; here 
was the medieval city of the Popes and its wall was medieval. 
It was against this higher ground that Oudinot advanced; 
for if once he gained possession of it, the old city of the left 



102 THE YEAR OF RBVOI^UTIONS [ch. 

bank lying low would be at the mercy of his artillery. 
But he had only 7000 French and no heavy guns, and he 
was quite unable to carry the papal wall. Garibaldi 
made a sortie amongst the villas and gardens outside, and 
drove the French off with considerable loss on April 30. 
During the whole of May Monsieur de lycsseps was nego- 
tiating with the Roman RepubHc, whilst I^ouis Napoleon 
was waiting to see how the elections would turn out in 
France; as soon as ever he saw that a Roman Catholic 
majority was assured in the new Chamber, lyouis Napoleon 
repudiated I^esseps and reinforced Oudinot. Attempts at 
revolution in Paris and I^yons failed completely. So the 
attack upon Rome could proceed safely. On July 3 
Oudinot stormed the breaches of the same wall where he 
had previously failed, in the face of desperate but unskilled 
valour. 

Garibaldi took a pathetic farewell of his comrades in 
Rome, and fled while there was yet time to the mountains. 
Hunted in every direction by Spaniards and PapaHsts 
from the south, and Austrians from the north, he reached, 
after hairbreadth escapes, the Httle State of San Marino 
and afterwards Piedmont. His wife Anita, a South 
American Spaniard, died of exhaustion after having 
accompanied him everywhere. The value of the last 
desperate attempt of Charles Albert and of Garibaldi's 
hopeless defence of Rome is that the Italians and all the 
lyiberals of Europe and America saw the devotion and self- 
sacrifice of both, and forgot the failure. Young Italy had 
something to which to look back, for an apparently mad 
devotion to a cause may lead to future success by means 
of the memories that are evoked. In England, at least, 
there was strong excitement and much sympathy. Our 
government as represented by Palmerston did Httle beyond 



IV] DESPOTISM TRIUMPHANT, 1849 103 

negotiating between Austria and Piedmont; there was no 
thought of making a strong stand on behalf of a distressed 
nation, but, though mere sympathy may seem to be very 
cheap, it was at least something that Italy knew that she 
had aroused a kindly feehng. On the other hand France 
seemed to have betrayed a sister lyatin nation. Yet Pius IX, 
when restored to Rome, had no wish to take French advice, 
and refused to grant a Constitution. Under the influence 
of Cardinal Antonelli he returned as an autocrat with the 
fixed opinion that the maintenance of the temporal power 
of the Papacy over Rome and the Marches and Legations 
could only be ensured by despotism. The French, therefore, 
had the satisfaction of having forestalled the Austrians, but 
not having influenced the Papacy towards mild methods. 

In August Venice capitulated, though Manin escaped to 
Piedmont. At the other end of Italy Ferdinand not only 
crushed Uberty at Naples and gave asylum to Pius during 
his exile ; he also reconquered Sicily after a cruel bombard- 
ment of Palermo, from which he received the name 
"Bomba," swept away self-government, and made for 
himself a reputation for vindictiveness surpassing that of 
any of the Bourbons. Some time later Gladstone was 
allowed to see some of the prisons of Naples, and startled 
Europe out of its smug complacency by his tale of horrors ; 
even those who thought that every despotism was justified, 
as long as it prevented revolution, were shocked by his 
revelation of Bourbon brutaUty. 

This year also witnessed a collapse of the Hungarian 
movement ; yet the Hungarians offered a resistance which 
roused almost as much sympathy in Liberal countries as 
the efforts of Garibaldi himself. In January, indeed, the 
Austrians seemed to be in a winning position ; the loyalty 
of the Croats, the consequent entry into Vienna, and the 



104 'I'HB YEAR OF REVOI.UTIONS [ch. 

policy of Schwarzenberg in procuring the abdication of 
the Emperor, followed by the issue of the Unitary Edict, 
seemed to promise immediate success. Windischgratz 
occupied Pesth. But then there was a wonderful change of 
fortune. An untried general chosen by Kossuth, by name 
Gorgei, was marvellously successful ; and even when 
Gorgei was rashly superseded by a Pohsh refugee, Dembin- 
ski, the tide was still in Hungary's favour. In April the 
Austrians were even forced to retire from Pesth. A 
Declaration of Hungarian Independence was proclaimed, 
though the original demands of 1848 had only extended to 
self-government separate from Austria under the personal 
rule of the Emperor as King of Hungary. But in July the 
Tsar of Russia came to Austria's aid. This was decisive; 
the Hungarians were crushed on each side, and finally 
Gorgei capitulated unconditionally to the Russians. The 
brutaUties of the Austrian revenge were a by-word through- 
out Europe, more particularly those of General Haynau, 
who had already earned an evil reputation in Italy. Even 
Batthyany the ConstitutionaHst, who had never gone so 
far as Kossuth, was executed. Kossuth himself escaped 
into Turkey ; he afterwards visited England and was feted 
here. 

The Austrian Empire was now distinctly strong, even 
though it was galUng to Austrian pride that the final 
victory was only achieved by the help of Russia. Within 
Germany proper also, the Austrian position was distinctly 
strong. The great majority of the small states, some 
twenty-eight of them, sided with Prussia and formed a 
new Confederation, but the four minor kingdoms Bavaria, 
Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, with the Hesses and 
Baden, stood by Austria. There was a rising in Hesse 
Cassel, and Prussian troops were sent to suppress it, so 



IV] HUNGARY SUPPRESSED, 1849 105 

that for a moment there was actual danger of a war between 
Prussia and Austria. This was avoided by the mediation 
of the Tsar, who in a meeting at Warsaw in 1850, decided 
in Austria's favour; indeed Austria was in the position of 
being his protege, and he had particularly disliked the 
Prussian interference in Schleswig Holstein. Finally the 
Treaty of Olmiitz in Bohemia was arranged, by which the 
Prussians withdrew from both Hesse Cassel and Schleswig 
Holstein, and agreed to recognise the Federal Diet as set 
up in 1815. Therefore for the time being Prussia took 
quite a second place. Another ten years were to go by 
before a new king would enter upon the path of enterprise 
and take up again the question of Prussian supremacy in 
Germany. During these ten years Prussia slept. 

Young Germany had so far failed as much as Young 
Italy. The moral of the failure in each country was the 
same, namely, that divided interests lead to certain failure. 
But Germany had no glorious memories of 1848-49 to 
counterbalance failure as had Italy. 



CHAPTER V 

NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE 

The Constitution of the Second Republic was drawn up 
November 12, 1848. I^ouis Napoleon, elected President 
December 20, took an oath to remain faithful to the 
RepubHc and defend the Constitution. In 1849 he sent 
his expedition against the Roman RepubUc, and yet 
Article No. 5 in the Constitution said, "the French Repubhc 
wiU never use its forces against the Hberty of any people." 
But the elections in June to the I^egislative Assembly were 
entirely anti-Repubhcan ; they were conducted by the 
"Party of Order," managed by the so-called "Committee 
of the Rue de Poitiers," being a mixture of I^egitimists, 
Orleanists, Bonapartists, and Roman Catholics in general; 
about 500 members represented the "Party of Order," 
and there were 250 RepubHcans. When Ledru-RoUin 
protested against the ItaHan poHcy, he was outvoted in 
the Chamber; and when he tried to appeal to the men in 
the streets, many of his brother members were arrested, 
and he escaped to England. Both the Chamber and the 
Army having thus declared themselves in favour of the 
Roman CathoHc poUcy, there was passed in 1850 an 
Education Law, by which the University of France and the 
schools were put almost entirely under the control of the 
Church. Next the Assembly, following the lead of Thiers, 



CH. v] THE COUP D'lETAT, 1851 107 

passed an Electoral I^aw to enforce a three years' residence 
and a contribution in direct taxation as the qualifications 
for a vote ; here it put itself in opposition to the President, 
who was in his turn quite clever enough to avail himself 
of such a blunder, and to pose before the French people 
as the champion of Universal Suffrage. In fact the 
Assembly was mostly lyCgitimist and Orleanist, and he 
was determined to crush not only the RepubHc, but also 
Monarchists of both kinds. 

In 1850 and 185 1 his poUcy was to secure the army, and 
it was no Hght task to bring even the army round to 
Bonapartism. At a grand review the cavalry saluted him 
as Emperor, but the infantry marched past him in silence ; 
in revenge he got rid of various superior officers, even 
those who had in the previous year suppressed the rising 
of lyedru-RolHn. Throughout the year 185 1, in proportion 
as he was gaining over gradually the army, he was more 
and more opposed to the Assembly. The celebrated coup 
d'etat was carried out in the night of December 1-2. Officers 
such as Cavaignac and Changarnier, and poHticians such as 
Thiers, were arrested. In the morning Paris found the 
walls placarded with the President's " Appeal to the People," 
by which he announced that a plebiscite would be held at 
once by universal suffrage ; he would claim for himself the 
Presidency for ten years, in defiance of the Constitution of 
1848, with a ministry dependent solely on him; a I^egis- 
lative Chamber should be elected by universal suffrage, 
and a second Chamber or Senate nominated by himself. 
December 3 and 4 were days of barricades, not only in the 
quarter of Saint Antoine, but also farther west in the wider 
and more respectable streets. The soldiers destroyed the 
barricades without much trouble and fired almost indis- 
criminately in the streets. MiHtary law was declared all 



io8 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

over France. It is said that there were 100,000 arrests, 
and certainly several thousands were exiled or deported. 
Yet the promised plebiscite of December 14 was taken, and 
7J milHons of votes approved of the coup d'etat against 
650,000. Just one year later he threw off the mask and 
deUberately took the title of Napoleon III; a second 
plebiscite approved of this, November 1852, by 7,800,000 
votes against 253,000. 

Napoleon III was now seriously in the saddle, how would 
he govern his mount? It is certainly not too much to say 
that for a score of years his will seemed to dominate Europe ; 
for ten of these he really was a power which counted 
actively, and for a second ten his influence was mainly 
negative or destructive, yet was the deciding factor. Or 
to put it in other words, for ten years his sword settled 
the affairs of nations, and then for another ten his back- 
wardness and failure to seize his opportunities allowed 
Prussia, or one ought more properly to say Bismarck, to 
advance from success to success. At first he was trusted, 
or if people did not trust him they beUeved in his star, 
he was almost thought to be, as he himself posed to be, 
the Man of Destiny. Then he was less trusted, even 
suspected, yet thought to be still safe and powerful, so 
that the fearful suddenness of the collapse in 1870, which 
was a matter of a bare four weeks, was a startling surprise. 
Then arose against him a howl of detestation. Yet it is 
very difficult for us even now to judge him. He violated 
his oath in suppressing the RepubHc, yet the almost over- 
whelming voice of France approved of him. One can only 
suppose that the general horror which the Reign of Terror 
of 1793 and 1794 made to sink deeply into the hearts of 
all lovers of law and order was still powerful sixty years 
later, that the fiasco of the National Workshops and the 



v] NAPOIvBON EMPEROR, 1852 109 

four days of the Barricades of June 1848 raised fears lest 
there would be a second Reign of Terror, and that a new 
Bonaparte was justified, even as his uncle before him in 
1795, in having recourse to "a whiff of grape-shot." 
Granted that his coup d'etat was a crime, he had a chance 
to show that he could govern France and influence Europe, 
if he should use his power wisely and show sympathy in 
those directions where it would be reciprocated. Many an 
empire has been founded by sheer brutal conquest and 
questionable methods, yet the conquerors, by wishing to 
govern justly and sympathetically, have justified them- 
selves in the eyes of history. The doctrine of the fait 
accompli is indeed dangerous. Queen Victoria was no bad 
judge of character; she reserved her judgement after the 
coup d'etat, and by no means approved of Palmerston's cool 
ofihand pronouncement that Napoleon was justified and 
could hardly have done anything different, but very soon 
she was almost fascinated by him and beheved in his 
destiny. The howl of execration was not heard till after 
Sedan. It is very easy now after half a century to 
argue that a RepubHc can be both permanent and truly 
patriotic, but the great majority then, especially French 
peasants, feared that it would be unstable. One name 
however always comes into our minds; Victor Hugo 
from the very first dubbed him Napoleon the I^ittle, the 
false-swearer and tyrant ; he wrote the History of a Crime 
and Uved in exile for conscience sake. Thiers indeed never 
served under him, but continued to write his uncle's fife 
and indirectly approved of, because he popularised, 
Bonapartism. 

His real fault was that he was an ordinary and even a 
weak man, called by force of circumstances and the accident 
of being his uncle's nephew, into a position which he could 



no NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

not adequately fill. The Napoleon Legend pushed him to 
the front, and when he was there he could not justify 
himself. Unworthy people got his ear and then betrayed 
his confidence. He had no power to go below the surface 
and find out when things were going wrong. 

His chief confidants were his half-brother Comte Morny 
and the Comte de Persigny, and it can hardly be said that 
they had a good infiuence over him, besides that they were 
men of very ordinary capacity put in power by the Imperial 
pleasure. In 1853 he married Eugenie de Montijo, a 
beautiful young Spanish noblewoman, who was a devoted 
Roman CathoHc, and is always thought to have been under 
the control of the Jesuits. 

From the beginning the Imperial government, nominally 
liberal and based upon universal suffrage, was upheld by 
various tricks which tended to absolutism. The Emperor 
could raise money beyond what was voted by the Chamber, 
and could commence on his own authority pubUc works. 
He could appoint the mayors of towns and villages, propose 
and recommend ofiicial candidates at parhamentary elec- 
tions, and demand an oath of fidehty — he himself having 
broken his oath in 1848 — from deputies and civil servants, 
and even from the university professors. So great was the 
ofiicial influence over elections, because not only were the 
Emperor's nominees recommended, but also the mayors, 
who were the Emperor's choice, had entire control of the 
voting papers, that in the Chamber there was a very small 
and weak Opposition; in fact there were at first merely 
five deputies for Paris, one for Lyons, and one for Bordeaux, 
who formed any opposition at all. These men were elected 
in 1857, and one of them, Emile Olhvier, in course of time, 
rallied to the Emperor. In 1863 the Opposition increased 
in numbers to thirty-five, whether RepubHcans or 



v] CHARACTER OF NAPOLEON iii 

Royalists ; amongst them were Thiers, elected for Paris as 
an Orleanist, and Jules Favre as a RepubUcan. Their chief 
protest was against governmental control of elections which 
made universal suffrage a farce. Opposition in the news- 
papers was controlled by a censorship, and by special 
tribunals which had the right to suppress a newspaper after 
a second offence. But one right of free speech the Emperor 
was quite unable to control ; any lawyer who defended an 
accused pressman was practically beyond the Emperor's 
vengeance, and it was in the law-courts that the Opposition 
was adequately voiced. 

It was on the side of material prosperity that the Empire 
did most to justify itself to the people. The luxury and 
extravagance of the Court, largely copied by the richer 
classes in spite of the severe aloofness of the I^egitimists, 
were good for trade. Paris was largely rebuilt, with wide 
streets and boulevards, great open spaces and "quais," under 
the control of Baron Haussmann. There was a Universal 
Exhibition in 1855 and another in 1867. A Treaty of Free 
Trade was negotiated with Great Britain through the 
services of Cobden himself, which indeed did not introduce 
an absolute free trade, but which regulated the tariff on 
British products and in return lowered the tariff on French 
wines and corn. The railway systems were widely extended 
during the reign. The Suez Canal scheme was carried 
through. Whilst France seemed to be the centre of com- 
merce and wealth in Europe, as well as of fashion and show, 
the peasant proprietors, strengthened by the institution of 
banks and agricultural societies, were still the real back- 
bone of the nation, and the peasants supported him. 
Consequently it was a long time before Napoleon III was 
"found out." In fact, if his foreign poHcy had been more 
sane and steady, if he had not rushed from one scheme to 



112 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

another to show his military glory as a true Napoleon, 
and then failed to carry each scheme to a really satis- 
factory finish, he might have founded a dynasty. The 
corruption of his rtde was such that he himself was not 
aware how badly organised was the army on which his 
safety depended. Yet, only a very short time before that 
fatal four weeks which shortened his power, when his last 
plebiscite to the French nation gave him an enormous 
ntunber of votes, our Punch issued a cartoon which 
depicted him as making his throne safe for "Napoleon IV." 
So Httle did the pubhc opinion of Europe suspect that 
eighteen years of corruption had undermined his throne. 

" U Empire cest la Paix" were Napoleon's words in a 
speech at Bordeaux, whilst he was only yet Prince- 
President. Whether he was deceiving himself or not when 
he spoke, it would be impossible to say. He plunged into 
a series of wars, because he could not control his destiny. 
He was a Napoleon, and therefore he had to follow after 
glory ; the army had made him, and he now had to satisfy 
the army. Nobody could at first say in which direction 
he would turn his arms, and indeed he might have pro- 
voked a quarrel with Great Britain to avenge the memory 
of Waterloo. But chance threw in his way the opportunity 
to take advantage of the Eastern Question, and he was 
drawn into a war to avenge his uncle's retreat from Moscow, 
dragging in his wake Great Britain as his ally. The more 
that one looks into the causes of the Crimean War, the more 
one thinks that both Nicholas and Napoleon were whirled 
into war as if by fate, while Great Britain was pushed in 
by the two strong men who knew their own minds, Palmer- 
ston and Stratford de RedcHfEe,the rest of our statesmen and 
our countr>^ at large being indifferent at first and somewhat 
surprised by the final reahty. France, carried away by 



v] DRIFTING INTO WAR, 1853 113 

une idee, and willing enough to rush into war, had 
reached a period in her history when la revanche took the 
place of les idees revoluUonnaires which had launched the 
first RepubHc on a career of conquest. 

It was quite easy for any Tsar to meditate a new attack 
upon Turkey by straining the terms of the treaties of 
Kainardji and Adrianople^. He had only to claim a sort 
of general championship of all the Christian subjects of the 
Sultan, and thus would have an excuse to satisfy the 
traditional poHcy of Russia to expand towards the sea. 
The particular occasion was a dispute as to the rights of 
the Greek or the Roman Cathohc monks at Jerusalem to 
have the keys of the Holy Places ; Nicholas supported the 
first ; Napoleon, already offended because Nicholas did not 
acknowledge him as a "brother" sovereign, saw his chance 
in supporting the second. The Sultan gave way to France. 
Then Nicholas meditated an attack upon Turkey, "the 
sick man" of Europe, and suggested to Lord Aberdeen, our 
prime minister, that Russia and Great Britain should unite 
to partition the country. He hked our country and people ; 
he remembered how his brother Alexander, our warmest 
ally against the great Napoleon, had been welcomed in 
lyondon in 1814. So he thought it natural that he should 
make the other Balkan provinces as independent as 
Rumania was already, even occupy Constantinople for a 
time, and give the British a free hand as regards Egypt and 
Crete. What he failed to understand was that the British 
were no longer as well disposed towards Russia as in 1814, 
regarded him as a cruel despot, and remembered the Holy 
AUiance and the merciless suppression of the Poles and 
the Hungarians. WelHngton's poHcy of keeping the 
Russians away from the Eastern Mediterranean was now 
1 See pages 39 and 57. 

M. 8 



114 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

supported by two energetic men, Palmerston who was most 
influential in Aberdeen's ministry^, and Lord Stratford 
de Redclifie^ our ambassador to Turkey. The cry was to 
uphold the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and this just 
suited Napoleon III. Thus, in place of joining an old ally 
against an old enemy, the British government drifted into 
alHance with Napoleon, who on his side was ready to 
avenge Moscow rather than Waterloo. It was at least to 
the good that Britain and France could be alHes. Other- 
wise our vStatesmen were committed to an impossible task, 
namely to bolster up an oriental government, which never 
could, and never wished to, reform itself. Of course it 
is difficult to criticise our statesmen of 1853-54 without 
thought of 1876-78 or 1912-13, and we must remember 
that Gladstone in 1876, even in his fiercest speech against 
the Turks, said definitely that he beHeved the Crimean 
War to have been reaUy necessary, and that he accepted 
fuUy his responsibihty for his share in it. Having so 
many Mohammedan subjects in India our statesmen could 
not refuse to help the Turks simply as being Moham- 
medans. Thus to-day it is not for their rehgion, but for 
their failure to reform after aU the help given to them by 
the western nations, that they have lost the sympathy and 
support of the West. Lastly, British enthusiasm for war 
is curiously spasmodic. In 1853-54 pubhc feehng seemed 
to be set on war as if we had had enough of peace since 
Waterloo, as if we were ashamed of being a nation of 
shop-keepers devoted only to free trade and manufacture, 

^ Palmerston, who had gained a reputation for being too head- 
strong as Foreign Secretary, was Home Secretary in 1854. 

* Sir Stratford Canning, cousin of the late premier George 
Canning, known in Turkey as "the Great Eltchi," and recently 
made a peer. 



V] CAUSES OF WAR, 1853 115 

and required a little excitement and glory. The tone of 
our country is seen when men talked of 185 1, "The Great 
Exhibition year/' as the beginning of a new era of peace 
and trade, and yet at a moment's notice a lust for war 
flamed out. 

Thus, when in 1853 Nicholas demanded not only the 
Holy Places for the Greek clergy, but also his right to 
protect all the Christians of Turkey, the Sultan, relying 
on lyord Stratford, refused. Russian armies appeared on 
the Danube. British and French fleets appeared off the 
Dardanelles, and then passed through the straits; but 
they were not promptly sent forwards, and the Russians 
destroyed the Turkish squadron at Sinope, a port on the 
south shore of the Black Sea. War was inevitable, and 
the general impression left on our minds is that none of 
the powers engaged expected war, or thought that the 
others meant war, and so they all drifted into war. In 
1854 the Russians besieged Silistria on the Bulgarian bank 
of the Danube, and the French and British armies arrived 
at Varna on the Bulgarian coast. Now the Emperor of 
Austria played his part ; if the Tsar could have calculated 
on the help of any monarch at this date, surely the Emperor 
of Austria was that monarch, for the Russians had helped 
him to crush Hungary. But he demanded the evacuation 
of Rumania, and Nicholas had to submit. Henceforward 
Austria has always been Russia's opponent in Balkan 
problems. 

The AlHed armies still lay at Varna, and what more 
could they do ? To call them home, now that the Russians 
had left Rumania, seemed to be a feeble ending after much 
excitement, and Nicholas might begin the war again at 
any moment. So the demand was made that he should 
give up his right to protect the Christians. He refused. 

8—2 



ii6 NAPOI/BON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

Thereupon both armies were ordered to the Crimea to destroy 
Sebastopol, the one great arsenal and place-of-arms on the 
Black Sea. It was now late in the year, cholera was raging 
at Varna and would accompany the troops, the climate of 
the Crimea was unknown, stores for a long siege were not 
ready. Thus it is difficult to acquit the governments of a 
blind eagerness to prolong the war to satisfy the excitement 
at home, France being critical about the new Napoleon, 
who had yet to prove himself a great ruler, Britain bent 
on proving herself not whoUy given to trade and manu- 
facture. The armies landed to face the unknown, each 
about 30,000 strong. Marshal St Arnaud commanded the 
French, but he was at death's door ; lyord Raglan, aged 66, 
who had seen no service since Waterloo, commanded the 
British; our allies had mostly had much experience in 
Algeria, but only a few of our ofiicers and men had been 
in India, and all our traditions were of the Peninsular War 
forty years earlier. One has to emphasise this point, for the 
military administration was rusty, and the economy of a 
nation devoted to trade as a sacred duty until the blaze of 
excitement came had prevented efficiency. It must be 
noticed here that this is the first war when aU the infantry 
had muzzle-loading rifles ; in our ranks it was quite a new 
weapon, except for a few special regiments, for Wellington 
had resolutely refused to discard the old musket, and he 
had only recently died. 

Advancing southwards along the coast the Allies found 
the Russians drawn up on the far bank above the river 
Alma. The British, September 20, made a straight frontal 
attack on the left ; the French on the right by the sea had 
a steeper bank to cHmb, and were just threatening to 
outflank the Russians when they retreated. But the 
beaten enemy refused to let themselves be locked up in 



V] IvANDING IN THE CRIMEA, 1854 117 

Sebastopol and retired inland, leaving in the place, under 
the command of Todleben, a garrison and the sailors of 
the fleet and a small army of trained workmen. Ships 
were sunk to block the mouth of the harbour, and Todleben 
worked hard to throw up fortifications. He said himself 
that the Allies could have rushed the northern defences at 
once. But they swept round, and occupied an upland in 
front of the south side of the harbour, the British on the 
right with their base at Balaclava, a small and distant 
harbour, the French on the left resting on Kamiesh Bay 
close to them. While they waited for their siege guns, 
Todleben dug and bmlt. Meanwhile St Amaud died, and 
Canrobert'took his place. 

Siege in the ordinary sense of the term there was none. 
The Russians always held the north side of the harbour, 
and there was free access across by a bridge ; reinforcements 
and suppHes could enter Sebastopol during all the eleven 
months. The AlHes, having received their guns, simply 
bombarded and prepared to assault. As fast as they 
destroyed the works by day Todleben rebuilt by night, and 
the wooden warships, trying to force the harbour mouth, 
were powerless against the land forts above it. Then on 
October 25 the outside Russian army crossed the river 
Tchemaya and tried to capture Balaclava, that is to say 
tried to cut off the British from their base; they were 
repulsed, but held a strong position on our rear. On 
November 5 an attack from Sebastopol and the outside 
army feU on the British extreme right on the upland at 
Inkerman, and was repulsed with greater difficulty. Before 
the bombardment could be renewed came a storm of rain, 
which converted the upland into a sea of mud. Siege works 
were out of the question when stores and food could hardly 
be moved. The horrors of the winter, semi-starvation, 



ii8 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

disease, lack of clotliing and drugs, loss of stores in bad 
weather at sea, frost and snow in the trenches varied by- 
mud after a thaw, utter inability to help the sick and 
wounded, congestion at Balaclava when the stores did 
arrive but could not be distributed, the awful story is only 
too well known. Miss Nightingale arrived in November at 
the hospital at Scutari, on the Asiatic shore opposite to 
Constantinople, but it was some time before her influence 
was felt. In January 1855, Lord Aberdeen resigned, and 
Palmerston formed a new and more energetic ministry. In 
March died Tsar Nicholas I, and Alexander II succeeded. 
Things were very much better for the AlHes in the 
spring. The French, who had suffered less, were strongly 
reinforced till they had in May about 100,000 effectives; 
the British after all their losses, having sunk as low as 
12,000, numbered 30,000; about 40,000 Turks arrived 
whose services were considered to be worthless, and 15,000 
"Sardinians, "for Victor Emmanuel, who had no quarrel with 
Russia, wanted to put both France and England under an 
obHgation to the House of Savoy. Consequently there 
were enough French and ItaUans to occupy the ground 
between Balaclava and the Tchernaya, and the Russians 
retired beyond the river. On the upland the British were 
too few to carry on the whole of the right attack, where 
Todleben had erected several new forts, notably the 
Malakofi; so the French took over the extreme right as 
well as the left, while our men had only the right centre. 
Now Napoleon interfered much with the generals, this 
being the first war when field armies were tied to head- 
quarters at home by the telegraph, and his idea was to 
give up the siege and attack the Russian outside army. 
Lord Raglan was clearly right in insisting that the AlHes 
were committed to the siege, and that the Malakoff was the 



V] 



SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOI. 



119 



key of the defence. Canrobert, distracted between them, 
asked to be superseded, and General Pelissier came to take 
command, a man of energy and fire, able to carry out his 
own ideas in spite of Napoleon. So the siege was pressed, 
but expeditions were also sent to the isthmus to cut off the 



'"^;;^;^.^,V^\f advance 
advance m\ h^ 




Kamiesh 
Bay 



Map to illustrate the Crimean War. 
M Malakoff, stormed Sept. 8, 1855. 
R Redan. 

O Battle of Inkerman, Nov. 5, 1854. 
X Battle, August 16, 1855. 
^Railway, 1855. 

ever inflowing stream of Russian reinforcements and sup- 
pHes. The bombardment was far more severe than before 
and the siege guns heavier. Some of Todleben's forts were 
carried by the French. But a great combined attack on 



120 NAPOIvEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

Waterloo day failed, and then Raglan died worn out^. In 
August the Russian army crossed the Tchernaya to relieve 
the tension of the siege, but the French and ItaHans easily 
repulsed them with great loss. After a fiercer bombard- 
ment, Todleben being wounded, the final assault was made 
on September 8. The mighty Malakoff, occupying entirely 
an isolated hiU, seemed to be impregnable, but the French 
had sapped to within a dozen yards, and its weakness was 
that it was enclosed all round, so that, when they rushed 
it under General MacMahon, they were covered against fire 
from the rear. The British carried the central fort, the 
Redan, but it was open to the rear and the Russian fire 
drove them out again. General Simpson, Raglan's suc- 
cessor, has always been unfavourably criticised, and the 
honour of the day belonged to Pelissier. On the other hand 
the very powerful British artillery had greatly contributed 
by its cross fire to the fall of the Malakoff. 

Next day it was found that Sebastopol had been 
deserted in the night. The AlUes spent another winter in 
the Crimea and there was no repetition of horrors. The 
British were over 50,000 strong and in good condition, and 
a German legion of 10,000 was in our pay, the last of those 
mercenary corps so common in the i8th centiiry. But 
Napoleon had the deciding word, as he had constantly kept 
up his army to some 120,000 men and they had won 
Sebastopol. He seemed to think that enough had been 
done for glory. The Russian army stiU held the Crimea 
and was not attacked, though Russia was for the time 
exhausted and nearly bankrupt. Peace was made with 

1 He had shown Httle skill or alertness in battle, but much quiet 
persistence in the winter months of the siege ; and much tact towards 
the French. Had he died earlier, probably Napoleon would have 
had his way and given up the siege. 



V] FAIvI. OF SBBASTOPOL, 1855 121 

Alexander II by the Treaty of Paris in March 1856 ; the 
navigation of the Black Sea and the Danube was to be free, 
and no warships might be kept and no military-maritime 
arsenals maintained on the coast by Tsar or Sultan. 

Turkey received a new lease of life if only the Sultan 
had been clever enough to take advantage of it, for the 
offensive power of Russia was crippled for the time being. 
But Rumania was acknowledged as completely free, even 
as Serbia practically was already. The British government 
wished to keep Moldavia and Wallachia separate, Napoleon 
preferred the union of the two Provinces, thinking to see 
in the United Riunania an additional barrier against 
Russia. But the Rumanians settled the question for 
themselves, when they chose the same man to be "Hos- 
podar" of each province for Hfe, though each still had a 
separate government. In 1862 the Union was effected, and 
in 1866 Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, a distant connection 
of the King of Prussia and a Roman CathoUc, was recognised 
as Hereditary Prince ; in 188 1 he became King. 

Sea Power, and Sea Power alone, had enabled the 
AUies to conquer the Russians. All the French and British 
stores and reinforcements had come easily by water, and, 
assured of their naval base, the armies were not straitened 
in any way when once the horrors of the first winter had 
been overcome. On the other side all the Russian reserves 
had been forced to tramp on foot mighty distances; it 
was not only the terrific losses that the Russians suffered 
in battle when they fought in heavy unwieldy masses, or 
in the siege when they were crowded under the fire of the 
AlHed heavy artiUery in anticipation of a bayonet attack 
at any moment, which left Russia exhausted at the end of 
the war, but also the tremendous severity of the marches 
from inland to the Crimea, during which unknown numbers 



122 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

died ; in fact this was the last war in which the transport 
upon one side at least was entirely of the old-fashioned 
type, before the advent of railways. Yet the Sea Power 
of the Allies was useful only so far as it controlled the 
lines of communication; as an offensive power the navy 
of neither Britain nor France contributed at all to the fall 
of Sebastopol. The wooden ships could not carry guns 
powerful enough to destroy land forts. Floating batteries 
were designed during the war to attack the Russian defences 
at Kimburn in 1855 ; they were plated with 4-inch armour 
and carried 50-pounder guns. After the war it was the 
French Admiralty, not our own, that first experimented in 
constructing an ironclad sea-going battleship. It was only 
natural that the country, which had so long enjoyed a 
sea power which rested on wooden ships, should be slow 
to experiment in a new direction; but in the sixties our 
Admiralty was doing something slowly but surely. Mean- 
while the first war in which ironclads were actually used 
was the American Slave War. 

At the same time, as the Crimean War saw the last of 
the old "wooden walls," so too the nature of land fighting 
was changed. The rifle, even if awkwardly loaded at the 
muzzle, was destined to revolutionise strategy. The siege 
of Sebastopol foreshadowed the coming era of trench war- 
fare ; and, if this be thought to be a far-fetched argument 
because the great campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were fought 
out by marching and not by entrenched armies, we have the 
entrenchments of 1877 in justification. "The more power- 
ful the weapon of the infantry, the greater the power of 
the defence," is the lesson of 1854-55, especially when we 
reflect that there was really no siege at all but only a 
frontal attack upon a fortified position, where the enemies' 
Unes of communication were uninterrupted. Moreover the 



v] THOUGHTS ON THE CRIMEAN WAR 123 

interest for us to-day is that the permanent fortifications 
of Sebastopol were not so important as those devised by 
Todleben after the "siege" had begun. 

Both Napoleon and the French nation were pleased 
with themselves. The bulk of the work had been done by 
their army; theirs was the honour of the capture of the 
Malakoff and the victory of the Tchernaya; if Pelissier's 
resolution refused to abandon the siege against his Emperor's 
will, yet even so the reflected glory was the Emperor's. 
When the Concert of Europe met to settle the terms of 
peace, Paris was chosen, not lyondon. Whilst it was sitting 
the Prince Imperial was born, and thus succession was so 
far safe. Napoleon III was not yet found out as the 
potentate who would embark on a scheme and abandon it 
at once; but his uncle would not have been satisfied to 
make peace so quickly, and the British were disappointed 
that he was unwiUing to continue the war to exhaust 
Russia still further by a campaign in 1856; so that as 
we look back we can hardly say that the war really 
revenged Moscow or showed him as a worthy Napoleon. 

On the other hand our nation is much too ready to 
depreciate the services of our soldiers. Many people still 
beheve that we did nothing more than "muddle through 
somehow," a phrase that no self-respecting statesman 
should ever use. The truth is that a nation devoted to 
trade as the one serious pursuit of life, having just recently 
held a Great Exhibition as a memorial of the arts of peace, 
and looking forward to an era of manufacturing prosperity 
based upon free trade, as if all the world would henceforth 
send to us raw materials and corn duty-free, whilst we 
manufactured for the world, was suddenly dragged into 
a war and roused again to the idea of glory, and then was 
bitterly disappointed that the fighting machine was too 



124 NAPOIvBON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

small and too rusty. Hardly any one paused to reflect 
that tlie nation itself was responsible if our army was not 
immediately successful, if we had scanty reserves when once 
the really good trained men of the first line were exhausted, 
or if the officers, who had never been allowed to practise 
manoeuvres on an adequate scale during peace time, were 
not able to reduce Sebastopol at once. PubHc opinion 
seemed to take deHght in criticising Raglan and Simpson 
as if they were solely to blame, just as if in 1793 the fault 
belonged to the Duke of York alone, and not to Mr Pitt 
who had cut down and starved the army in the years 
between the War of American Independence and the 
French Revolutionary War. Even modern historians seem 
to think it sufficient to jeer at the generals and not at the 
false economies. Yet of course there is a reason why one 
section of EngHshmen at least have always feared to 
maintain an army, namely the suspicion that it is main- 
tained by the aristocracy to give them a weapon against 
reform. "Yet barracks there must be," wrote Cobbett in 
1821, "or Gatton and Old Sarum must fall, and the 
fall of these would break poor Mr Canning's heart." 
Therefore when Dr Russell of The Times poured out his 
criticisms, he was not very happy in attributing blame. 
Unfortunately it is only too notorious that after every 
war, when the newspapers have satisfied themselves by 
criticising the generals and officers, on the assumption that 
their own reporters could have done very much better, 
there has never been a strong move to strengthen adequately 
the much-criticised army; the one party seems to have 
always thought that officers ought not to be paid a Uving 
wage, so that only aristocrats and rich men could hold 
commissions; and the other party has always starved the 
army in order that it may continue to make economies. 



V] FBKIvINGS AFTER THE WAR 125 

and has seemed to look upon soldiers simply as hirelings 
kept ready to suppress rioters and strikers. 

In the next few years after the Crimean War, the 
French and British were not very good friends. In fact at 
one time there was even some danger that there might be 
war. Even a personal interview between Napoleon and 
Victoria did not do much good, in spite of the strong 
friendship that had somewhat quickly sprung up. This 
is the period when the volunteers were raised in England, 
and there was a certain complacent feeHng that mere 
volunteers without serious training would be as good as 
regular soldiers. Of course in 1857 our government was 
quite unable to take a strong position in, Europe because of 
the Indian Mutiny which was almost directly caused by 
the Crimean War; for even the excitement about the 
greased cartridges would hardly have been sufficient to 
cause it, had not the leaders thought that our army had 
been defeated in Russia, and that the time was ripe for 
a mutiny, so that the excitement of the sepoys could be 
utiHsed. 

As to the more serious question of the wrongness of 
war between France and Russia and Great Britain or any 
two of them, it is impossible now to lay down the law. We 
can see now that the profit was to Germany alone. Yet 
sixty years ago no human mind could foresee the wonderful 
development of Germany, much less the alHance of Prussia 
with Austria. When we look back to the wars of the 
great Napoleon, we see how Russia wavered between fear 
of France and respect for France. There is no such thing 
as either a natural alHance or natural enmity. In spite of 
the overtures of Tsar Nicholas I and his admiration for 
England, it could hardly be expected that Palmerston 
could entertain friendship for the power which represented 



126 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

absolute despotism, kept alive the policy of Metternich, 
crushed Poland and Hungary, and sent exiles to Siberia. 
But one good result of the war was that British and French 
could be aUies and prove the wrongness of their natural 
enmity, even though there was a momentary scare due to 
the triumphant boasting of the one nation and the resent- 
ment of the other. In 1859-60 the French and British 
did co-operate once more in an attack upon China, but the 
feeHng of suspicion grew up in the next ten years. Napoleon 
was thought to be insincere and frivolous. The present 
generation of British seem to have forgotten what tre- 
mendous influence was exercised at that date by Thomas 
Carlyle, the admirer of German philosophy and sohd sense 
as opposed to French Hghtness, so that for the time it 
seemed as if the natural enmity would be revived. 

In 1858 occurred Orsini's famous attempt to murder 
Napoleon on his way to the opera at Paris. Orsini was 
a Roman who had had his share in the defence of Rome in 
1849, ^^d hated Napoleon as the conqueror of the Roman 
RepubHc. But Napoleon was even then meditating a new 
war against Austria on behalf of Italian Independence, and 
though Orsini and a fellow conspirator were executed, the 
speech of their advocate Jules Favre, an oration in favour 
of ItaHan patriotism, was authorised to be printed in the 
Moniteur. 

The bringing of Napoleon into ItaUan poHtics was due 
to the minister of Victor Emmanuel, Camillo Benso, Count 
Cavour. The Kingdom of Sardinia had embarked on a 
strongly anti-clerical poHcy as a step towards proving the 
right of Victor Emmanuel to be the leader of ItaHan 
HberaHsm in opposition to Rome, as his father had, as it 
were, consecrated him to be. The clerical courts were sup- 
pressed and their rights transferred to the ordinary civil 



V] POI.ICY OF CAVOUR, 1855-59 127 

courts. Religious houses were suppressed, and when the 
Senate, frightened by papal anger, would have thrown out 
this law, Cavour resigned ; it was impossible to create any 
other ministry, he was recalled and the Senate gave way. 
A pohcy of material prosperity was seen in the construction 
of railways and canals, the press was practically free and 
old Repubhcans and Revolutionists were conciliated, so 
that even Daniel Manin wrote pubHcly to Victor Emmanuel 
"Make Italy and I am with you." The most notable 
stroke was Cavour's aUiance with France and Great Britain, 
which resulted in the dispatch of the expeditionary force 
to the Crimea, putting the two countries under an obUga- 
tion; from this it resulted that Sardinia had the right to 
be represented at the Congress of Paris as an acknowledged 
member of the Concert of Europe ; it was Cavour himself 
who attended that Congress. He found Great Britain 
sympathetic but not ready to take up arms so soon after 
the Indian Mutiny ; our country was not ready for an3rthing 
of the nature of knight errantry, and Palmerston was under 
a cloud for a time in 1858 because he had introduced a 
bill to punish conspiracy hatched in England, which bill 
it was thought was dictated by Napoleon, because Orsini 
had received asylum over here. Also from February 1858 
to June 1859 lyord Derby's Conservative ministry was in 
power. Palmerston, therefore, not being in a position to 
help Italy even by moral influence, Cavour had no one but 
Napoleon to whom to appeal. In July 1858 he was invited 
to meet Napoleon at Plombieres, when an Austrian war was 
decided. Evidently Cavour flattered Napoleon into imagin- 
ing himself the patron of Italy; I^ombardy, Venetia, and 
the Papal I/Cgations were to be added to Piedmont, a central 
ItaHan kingdom was hinted at, but there was no question 
yet of an absolutely United Italy. Of course Napoleon 



128 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

was too shrewd to be a mere knight errant ; he wanted all 
the glory of fighting for an idea, that is to say chivalry 
and the help of the weak, but he demanded his price. 
Nobody knows what really was settled at Plombieres on 
that point, but one supposes that the bargain was then 
made that his price was the cession of Savoy and Nice 
to France. Prince Napoleon^, the Emperor's cousin, was 
to marry Clothilde, Victor Emmanuel's fifteen-years-old 
daughter. 

During the latter months of 1858 the press of Piedmont 
was full of talk about war. Volunteers were being enrolled, 
Lombards were coming in from across the border, and 
Garibaldi was making ready to lead them. Victor 
Emmanuel's regular army was obviously making pre- 
parations and war was in the air. On January i, 1859 
Napoleon spoke coldly to the Austrian ambassador at 
Paris, regretting that "our relations with your government 
are not so good as in the past." It was obvious therefore 
that the Austrians had timely warning, and indeed they 
were hurrying up army corps from the more distant parts 
of the Empire. It might be thought therefore that a strong 
demonstration in arms would have overawed Victor 
Emmanuel's government before the French armies had 
time to cross the Alps or Apennines. Probably however 
it was the attitude of Russia that made for delay; ever 
since Francis Joseph had showed his ingratitude to Russia 
at the outbreak of the Crimean War, the relations between 
the two countries had been badly strained. Yet even so, 

1 Son of Jerome King of Westphalia, Napoleon I's youngest 
brother. He was heir to Napoleon III before the Prince Imperial's 
birth. He was very unpopular and a poor soldier, and was nick- 
named "Plon plon." But he was a very good friend of Italy, and 
often kept his cousin up to the mark as Italy's protector. 



v] THE CAMPAIGN OF 1859 129 

when an Austrian ultimatum, demanding the disbandment 
of the Piedmontese forces and volunteers, was sent in to 
Victor Emmanuel, and was rejected by Cavour in a spirit 
of defiance on April 27, the Commander-in-chief, Marshal 
Giulay, was unaccountably slow. Negotiations indeed were 
going on, and both England and Prussia were trying to 
mediate up to the last moment, suggesting a Congress of 
the five Great Powers, to which a representative of Sardinia 
should be admitted for a general disarmament to be dis- 
cussed; yet to trust to such a Congress was childish. 

On May i the main Austrian army about 100,000 
strong was massed on the river Ticino and began to cross. 
Canrobert's army corps was only then crossing the Mont 
Cenis pass, and he did not reach Turin until May 2 ; Niel's 
corps came eight days later ; four other corps came rather 
slowly by water to Genoa and crossed the Alps and con- 
centrated around Alessandria on the plain to the south of 
the upper Po by about May 10. Yet Giulay wasted all 
this time in moving a very few miles west of the Ticino, 
though he had Turin for a time at his mercy. By the time 
that the French were concentrated he had lost the initiative^. 
There were now rather over 100,000 French ready for 
battle, the Piedmontese numbered from 50 to 60,000, and 
the problem for the Austrians was to guess where the main 
blow would fall. The strategy of Napoleon I in 1796 was 
to strike rapidly south of the Po where a spur of the 
Apennines left a narrow pass, and cross east of Pavia, thus 

1 Readiness to take the initiative is so clearly the right thing, as 
long as it is not confused with rashness, that it is wonderful to see 
how often the lessons of history are wasted. Radetzky twice 
concentrated and attacked successfully, in 1848 and 1849, yet 
Giulay failed to imitate him now, and Benedek failed in 1866. 
Napoleon failed badly in 1870, and the Turks in 1877. But it must 
be a readiness based on preparation. 

M. 9 



130 NAPOIvBON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

turning the line of the Ticino and taking Milan in the rear ; 
whoever now planned Napoleon Ill's campaign certainly 
knew how to frighten Giulay that the same would happen. 
He concentrated to his left towards Pavia, and one 
French army corps feinted in that direction to keep up the 
illusion; then corps after corps pressed northwards from 
Alessandria to cross the Po at Casale, whilst the Pied- 
montese pressed eastwards towards the Ticino and covered 
the French advance. MacMahon's corps, pushing furthest 
to the north and then eastwards, crossed the Ticino high 
up, on June 2. By this time Giulay had withdrawn the 
whole of his army behind the Ticino and some of it behind 
the canal in the rear. In fact the French army had carried 
out a long flanking march straight across the enemy's 
front, a most dangerous move, but one which when success- 
ful gives to the army which carries it out a winning position. 
Napoleon I himself very rarely tried such a move, for he 
almost always aimed at distracting the enemy on his 
wings, and then breaking his centre. The risk once taken, 
the general who carries it out, if confident of the fighting 
superiority of his army, can push on to battle with security. 
On June 4 MacMahon stormed the village of Magenta and 
by nightfall threatened the Austrian right rear, whilst the 
Austrian right centre had been driven in and was in danger ; 
at the same time those French who were still south of the 
Po pushed on down the river. Outflanked on one wing 
and threatened on the other, whilst higher up in the 
mountains Garibaldi's volunteers were carrying everything 
before them, and neutraHsing at least a whole Austrian 
army corps, Giulay had no choice but to abandon Milan 
and fall back. Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel entered the 
Lombard capital amongst scenes of tremendous enthusiasm 
on June 7. 



V] MAGENTA AND SOIvFBRINO 131 

Of course the Austrian rallying-point was the Quadri- 
lateral. Strongly reinforced and commanded now by 
Francis Joseph in person, some 160,000 men held the Hne 
of the Mincio from Mantua to the Alps, but they recrossed 
to the westwards and held a position on the rising ground 
to the south-west of Lake Garda, which dominates the flat 
ground further south. The village of Solferino was the 
key of the position. Here Napoleon I had fought to beat 
off the Austrians who were tr3dng to save Mantua from 
him in 1796. On June 24 the Piedmontese and four 
French corps, about 135,000 in aU in Hne, assaulted and by 
nightfall had carried a position to turn the Austrian left. 
It was a fierce and not very scientific fight on a front of 
several miles. The Austrians retreated behind the Mincio 
in the midst of a terrific thunder-storm. 

Then occurred the great surprise of the campaign. 
Just at the critical moment, when his uncle would have 
made a dash, regardless of his own losses, to throw his 
enemy into confusion and to isolate Mantua, Napoleon 
hesitated, then on July 11 he had an interview with Francis 
Joseph at Villafranca, on the Austrian side of the Mincio, 
close to the field of Custozza of bad omen. 

An armistice was concluded between the two Emperors ; 
Victor Emmanuel, they agreed, was to have lyombardy, 
and there was to be a vague sort of Itahan Confederation 
to include both Austrian Venetia and the Pope. It was 
an almost farcical conclusion to Napoleon's grandiose 
schemes. There had been a bare two months' campaign 
after all his parade of taking arms in the cause of freedom 
and knight errantry. Partly no doubt he was frightened 
of the attitude of Prussia, who had begun to mobilise upon 
the Rhine; partly he was frightened of the spirit of 
enthusiasm and even of revolutionary fervour, which had 

9—^ 



132 



NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE 



[CH. 










v] ANNEXATIONS TO PIEDMONT 133 

been let loose by the Austrian defeats, and perhaps he felt 
that he had promised too much at the Plombieres inter- 
view; a good Catholic could not afford to strengthen too 
much the Itahan kingdom which was so anti-papal in 
character. He retired himself towards France the very 
next day, passing through Milan and Turin, where he saw 
nothing but cold looks. Within a month the French army 
quitted Italy. In November a formal peace was made 
between Victor Emmanuel and Francis Joseph, by which 
the cession of lyombardy was confirmed. 

But the spirit of Italy was not going to be content with 
so tame a result. It was altogether a different spirit than 
that which had been evoked in 1848 ; failure then had been 
due to the rivalry between the republicans and the adherents 
of the House of Savoy; now there was no party but that 
of Savoy, for Victor Emmanuel had justified himself. 
The Austrian garrisons being withdrawn from Tuscany, 
Parma, Modena and the Papal I^egations, because their 
services were required in the Quadrilateral, the entire 
population of these countries called out for annexation to 
Piedmont. Cavour suggested a plebiscite. Obviously an- 
nexation was not in Napoleon's programme, yet a plebiscite 
was his favourite method of obtaining a vote of confidence 
from the French nation, and he could hardly object to 
Cavour's policy, which took a leaf out of his own book. The 
voting was practically unanimous, and Victor Emmanuel 
accepted the decision. Tuscany was incorporated as an 
entire province ; Parma and Modena and the lyCgations 
were grouped together as the province of Emilia, so called 
because the old Roman road, the Via Aemilia, ran through 
the country from the Adriatic in a north-westerly direction, 
passing through Bologna, Modena, Parma, and striking the 
Po at Piacenza. It was a decision fraught with danger of 



134 NAPOI^BON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

offending both Napoleon and Francis Joseph. In all Europe 
Victor Emmanuel had but one friend, namely Great Britain, 
whose sympathies were warmly aroused, and where 
Palmerston had returned to office in the very month when 
Magenta and Solferino were fought. Palmerston and lyord 
John Russell, who was his Foreign Secretary, were indeed 
pledged to non-intervention; but to them this word was 
double-edged, it implied not only that Great Britain wished 
to keep out of foreign entanglements, but also that we 
wanted fair play for Victor Emmanuel without the inter- 
vention of either France or Austria. However much 
Napoleon himself or his officers might jeer at the miUtary 
weakness of our country, as exempHfied according to their 
ideas in the Crimean War, and however much he might 
try to frighten our statesmen by making them think that 
his next move would be against us — it was in 1859 that 
the volunteer movement, started the previous year after 
the Orsini plot, was widely extended as an answer to 
French boastings — he knew perfectly well that he could 
not dispense with our good-wiU. Francis Joseph dared not 
move for fear of bringing Napoleon's armies back again, 
and was not sure of Russia. Consequently the annexation 
was a fait accompli. 

Now the price had to be paid, and it was impossible for 
Cavour to refuse it. A plebiscite was taken in Savoy and 
the territory of Nice, for what was good for one district 
was good for another. The Savoyards had really little in 
common with the Piedmontese; they had previously been 
incorporated with France for twenty-two years, they were 
considerably attached to the Roman Church, so now they 
voted in favour of transference to France. Though the 
red cross of Savoy on a white shield still holds its place 
in the middle of the national ItaUan flag, the tricolour of 



v] SURRENDER OF SAVOY AND NICE 135 

red, white and green, the home of Italy's royal family has 
now been French for nearly sixty years, and one never 
hears that any Savoyard has regretted it. Similarly the 
people of Nice had no sentimental tie binding them irre- 
vocably to Italy, except that their town was Garibaldi's 
birthplace. Modern Nice has been entirely rebuilt and has 
been the resort of the devotees of fashion, so that it too has 
not regretted the change. Victor Emmanuel forced himself 
to accept the one sacrifice. Garibaldi bitterly resented the 
other. On April 2, i860. Parliament met at Turin, to which 
came deputies from I^ombardy and Tuscany and Emilia, 
and the surrender of Savoy and Nice was accepted. 

Ferdinand II of Naples, King Bomba, died in 1859. 
Francis II succeeded, and refused to grant a Constitution 
to either Naples or Sicily, though advised to do so by 
Napoleon. An insurrection broke out in Sicily as early as 
i860. Garibaldi had done useful work in the campaign of 
1859, though of course the stress of the fighting had fallen 
chiefly upon the regular armies of Napoleon and Victor 
Emmanuel. Now was the chance for the hero and his 
volunteers. He collected at Genoa his celebrated Thousand 
Red Shirts; he was planning what the adherents of 
despotism would call a fiUbustering raid, but, after his 
tremendous efforts in Rome in 1849, nothing seemed to be 
impossible to such a man, and he knew how to get the utmost 
results out of the devoted men ready to accompany him. 
His Thousand were badly armed and two steamers were 
sufficient to take them across from Genoa to Sicily. Cavour 
played a double game ready to disown or to profit by the 
movement. Persano, the Piedmontese admiral, was under 
orders to stop Garibaldi if he put into a Sardinian port, 
yet he let him pass and may be said to have shepherded 
him. The Thousand landed on the south-west coast of 



136 NAPOIvBON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

Sicily, then, marching across the island towards Palermo, 
they charged and routed a Neapolitan force on the hills of 
Calatafimi. Then they advanced on Palermo itself. Some 
of the best regiments of the garrison being absent chasing 
Sicilian rebels, Garibaldi stormed his way in through the 
streets of the city; then when the returning NeapoHtan 
regiments might have overwhelmed him yet, the King 
sent orders from Naples that the troops were to evacuate 
Palermo and retire to Messina May 30. Garibaldi took 
the title of Dictator in the name of Victor Emmanuel. 

King Francis, it is thought, should have taken the 
stronger course, defied Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi 
aUke, and appealed to Austria. Actually he did the worst 
thing possible; he granted a Constitution and formed a 
ministry of lyiberals, wishing to conciliate both France and 
Great Britain. It is clear that Napoleon strongly disHked 
the union of South Italy to the already overgrown kingdom, 
as it seemed to him, of North Italy, and to pose as a 
Constitutionalist was to make a bid for French help. But 
twice already had a King of Naples granted a Constitution 
when under the influence of fear, and twice had it been 
set aside when the cause for fear had departed. There was 
no security that Francis would be more inclined to keep 
his word than his father or grandfather had been. His 
one chance was to make proper use of his regular army, 
100,000 strong in all and containing some good Swiss 
mercenary regiments. Palermo had been lost ingloriously, 
but the Neapolitan force in Sicily was yet strong and, when 
concentrated on the straits, could easily prevent Garibaldi 
from reaching Messina and thence crossing to the mainland. 
But the lyiberal pohcy was to stand on the defensive, 
a most fatal choice. Garibaldi pushed eastwards and 
overcame a small force at Milazzo on July 20. Meanwhile 



V] GARIBAI.DI IN SICII.Y, i860 137 

there were 15,000 men in Messina, only twenty miles distant, 
and Neapolitan warships were in the neighbourhood. Yet 
on July 28 a treaty was made between the Bourbon 
commander at Messina and one of Garibaldi's ofl&cers to 
stop hostihties. 

All this summer reinforcements were being collected for 
Garibaldi in north Italy, partly by his own friends, partly 
by Cavour secretly. There were a few Hungarians amongst 
them, and one of his most useful of&cers was the Hungarian 
Tiirr; there were a few French and even KngUsh, but the 
great majority were Itahans of the north, specially of 
Ivombardy, which was in the throes of enthusiasm for his 
cause ever since the annexation to Piedmont a year before. 
The men were being shipped across in detachments to 
Sicily, and were much better equipped for battle than the 
original Thousand. SiciHans, excited enough in the hbera- 
tion of their own country, were not keen to enHst under 
Garibaldi for an attack on Naples. The chief danger 
however was in the anxiety of Mazzini himself and 
Garibaldi's adherents in Piedmont to divert these rein- 
forcements into an attack upon Rome. Garibaldi looked 
upon a conquest of Naples as merely a step to the ultimate 
conquest of Rome ; this of course would have simply meant 
that Napoleon would openly interfere. Cavour therefore 
had a most anxious time. He allowed Persano to cover 
the passage of the reinforcements to Sicily, but spoke of 
preventing Garibaldi from crossing to the mainland; in 
the meanwhile he did his best to provoke a revolution in 
Naples in favour of Victor Emmanuel and annexation to 
North Italy. When this was found to be impossible, he 
laid his plans to encourage Garibaldi to cross whilst he 
mobihsed the regular army, so as to get as much profit out of 
the Garibaldian revolution as possible, and then he would 



138 NAPOI.EON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

seize the country for Victor Emmanuel. For tliis purpose 
Persano was officially ordered to stop Garibaldi, but a 
secret letter from Victor Emmanuel himself authorised 
him to give his help. At the same time Sir James Lacaita, 
a NeapoHtan exile and a naturahsed EngHshman, obtained 
a personal interview with lyord John Russell in I^ondon, 
to persuade him to abstain from making an agreement with 
the French to send the united fleets of England and France 
to the Straits of Messina. The action of Lord John was 
decisive. There was no entente between these two 
countries; Napoleon was not prepared to stop Garibaldi 
by himself, and confined himself to non-intervention as 
long as Rome itself was not threatened. 

There was still the difficulty that the straits had to be 
crossed in the face of the NeapoHtan navy. Garibaldi's 
main force was on the beach near Messina. On the night 
of August 18-19 some 3000 Garibaldians sHpped across 
from Taormina to the tip of the toe of Italy where they 
were not expected. There were thousands of NeapoHtan 
troops along the coast, but they were scattered in detach- 
ments. Reggio was surrendered. When the warships 
sailed southwards too late to stop Garibaldi or to save 
Reggio, another detachment crossed from Charybdis to 
ScyUa in row-boats. One by one the disconnected frag- 
ments of the NeapoHtan army retreated or surrendered, 
and Garibaldi's policy of disbanding the men so that they 
might go to their own homes had a great effect in encourag- 
ing others to surrender. Now he posted ahead on the great 
high-road towards Naples. Would Francis come out to 
offer pitched battle with the remainder of his regular army 
which stiU numbered close on 50,000 men ? Certainly he 
could have driven back the Garibaldians, as they came 
up detachment behind detachment in rear of their leader. 



v] GARIBALDI IN NAPIvBS. i860 139 

But on September 6 he departed from Naples to retire 
to Capua, leaving a considerable proportion of troops to 
garrison the castles of Naples. Persano was already in the 
bay with the navy of North Italy, and had been intriguing 
with all his might to imdermine the allegiance of the 
NeapoHtan sailors. Thus Francis and his queen quitted 
Naples alone in one small ship, and almost all his navy went 
over to Persano. On September 7 Garibaldi made his entry 
into Naples. His nearest brigade under the Hungarian Tiirr 
was still two da^'-s' march behind him; the guns of the 
castles of Naples were trained on his carriages as he came 
into the city by way of the quays ; but he risked all to save 
Naples from anarchy and possible mob-rule. Then as his 
army came straggUng in from the south he rested them, 
and finally pushed on against Capua. 

The next move was Cavour's. His difficulties were 
always the same. He must offend neither France nor 
Austria; he must secure Garibaldi's conquests for Victor 
Emmanuel, without either driving the Revolutionists or 
RepubUcans to extremities, or tempting the Moderates to 
repent of deserting Francis; above all he must stop 
Garibaldi from attacking Rome. Between the Kingdom of 
North Italy and Naples still lay a compact block of papal 
territory from sea to sea. As yet only the Legations had 
been taken over by Victor Emmanuel ; there still remained 
the Marches between the central Apennines and the 
Adriatic, as well as the Patrimony, and across this papal 
ground Cavour had to strike to join hands with Garibaldi. 
Fortune favoured him, if indeed the ever-present jealousy 
between France and Austria can be put down to fortune. 
Napoleon's troops garrisoned Rome; Austrian troops, 
though they were actually in the Pope's service, garrisoned 
Ancona and the Marches; therefore Cavour might be able 



140 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

to invade the Marches without offending Napoleon, and 
indeed might even hope to have his protection so far as to 
set him off against Francis Joseph, in case the latter threat- 
ened to send an Austrian army across the Mincio. Moreover 
Napoleon was a man of moods; he had his pro-Italian 
moments, when he remembered his youthful enthusiasms, 
and, although he posed as the good Roman CathoHc and 
defender of the Pope to conciHate the orthodox and respect- 
able French, he knew perfectly well that the real French 
I^egitimists either detested him or at best only tolerated him. 
A wave of Catholic feeling was sweeping through Europe. 
Enthusiasts were enlisted for the cause of the Faith, 
Germans, Irish, Belgians, Austrians, and French lyCgitimists, 
forming an army of " Crusaders." He knew that such men 
were against him. Their feeHngs were anti-Bonapartist, 
and they were commanded by Ivamoriciere, once republican, 
now I/Cgitimist, but always anti-Bonapartist. Cavour might 
fight against such extremists without offending Napoleon. 
A decision had to be made quickly. Prince Napoleon 
counselled action and did his best to influence his imperial 
cousin. Cavour sent his confidential agents, the statesman 
Farini and the general Cialdini, to a secret interview with 
the Emperor at Chambery in Savoy on August 28. "Be 
quick" was his advice. Cavour was quick; September 7 
he sent a demand to the Pope that the foreign mercenaries 
must be disbanded ; September 11 some 33,000 regular 
troops entered the Marches, and Persano's fleet was ordered 
round to the Adriatic. 

The bold plan indeed succeeded. Whilst the remainder 
of the army of North Italy waited in lyombardy in fear that 
the Austrians would make this a casus belli — a fear which 
was not realised — the invaders in two columns swept 
southwards. General Cialdini intercepted Lamoriciere at 



V] 



CAVOUR WANTS NAPLES 



141 







\ Xl66i 



^6 



tafimi 
\m6o 



Map of South Italy and Sicily to illustrate Garibaldi's 
Campaigns, 



railway in i860. 



« 



142 NAPOI.EON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

Castelfidardo on his way to Ancona, and overpowered him 
on September i8 by superior nmnbers; on September 29, 
Persano co-operating in a strong bombardment, he forced 
Ancona to surrender. Inland the other column, under 
General Fanti, received the submission of city after city, 
whose inhabitants had even to be restrained by the Pied- 
montese from taking vengeance on the PapaHst garrisons. 
The quickness that Napoleon had advised took the various 
detachments by surprise, and whether Itahans or foreigners 
the Papahsts were routed before they could be concen- 
trated. 

Meanwhile Garibaldi was facing the NeapoHtan army 
before Capua. He was no longer enjoying a triumphal 
procession, for the best and most determined of the Bourbon 
troops were now in Hne under the eyes of their king, and 
the peasants of this country were not revolutionists. He 
had to fight now ; the magic of his name and the sympathy 
of Constitutionahsts and Liberals, which had done so much 
for him up to his entry into Naples, would no longer make 
his enemies to melt away before him. Some 50,000 
NeapoHtans were in arms, based on Capua and Gaeta. 
Garibaldi had up with him about 20,000 men, his old 
volunteers and new levies, who had come straggHng into 
Naples in rear of him and were now concentrated around 
Caserta and Old Capua ; there was a Bourbon palace and 
park at Caserta, connected with Naples by a short Une of 
railway, for even Bourbon despots were not backward in 
benefiting by modern science for their convenience and 
pleasure. On October i the NeapoHtans crossed the river 
Volturno to assail Garibaldi's position, while a separate 
corps made a wide detour to take him in the rear ; from 
his head- quarters at Caserta he was able to put in his last 
reserves to beat off the frontal attack ; the detached corps 



V] CAVOUR JUSTIFIED 143 

split into two bodies in the mountains and lost touch, thus 
spoiUng what would have been a dangerous move. But 
now Victor Emmanuel's army was approaching, and it was 
a regular army with heavy guns and baggage for a pro- 
longed campaign. Though repulsed by Garibaldi, the 
Neapohtans were still strong enough to hold the Une of 
the Volturno against him, and fully strong enough to prevent 
him from making that dash on Rome which was so dear 
to his heart ; but their rear and left were threatened by 
Victor Emmanuel. 

The danger now was not that the Bourbon army might 
yet upset anticipations by some great victory, but rather 
that Victor Emmanuel and his soldiers might fall out with 
Garibaldi and his volunteers. Enthusiasm had done all 
that it could do. It was now the time for organisation 
and discipline. That bitterness should be aroused was 
only natural, for the enthusiast cannot but be heartsore 
when the fruit of his labour is plucked by another, and 
the volunteer is ever ready to take offence at the pro- 
fessional pride and coldness of the trained regtdar. On 
October 26 Garibaldi, having ridden out the previous day, 
met his King. "Saluto il primo Re d' ItaHa." His 
patriotism stood the test; melancholy rather than bitter, 
he understood that he had to go to the rear, and he went. 
His bitterness was for Cavour, whom he violently attacked 
later for having, by the cession of Nice, rendered him 
homeless ; yet in truth he was hardly fair, for the price of 
Napoleon's aid in 1859 had to be paid, and it was Cavour's 
cleverness that made Napoleon benevolently neutral through- 
out i860. 

The events of i860 may indeed be described by an 
appUcation of the words used by Hallam concerning our 
own Revolution in 1688: "it united the independent 



144 NAPOLEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

character of a national act with the regularity and the 
coercion of anarchy which belong to a mihtary invasion." 
The North Italian army, hke William Ill's army, prevented 
anarchy and put the finishing touch to the collapse of the 
Bourbon regime. After a day's bombardment Capua fell 
on November 2, and with it 10,000 NeapoHtans surrendered. 
Another 17,000 fled over the frontier into the Papal States, 
The remainder fell back, fighting well, into Gaeta, and did 
not surrender till the February of 1861. 

On November 7 Victor Emmanuel made his state entry 
into Naples with Garibaldi in the same carriage. Already 
the plebiscite, which the Italians were by this time 
accustomed to expect, had been taken in the Kingdom of 
Naples, in Sicily, and in the Marches; and the customary 
"yes" had been given by enormous, though it may be 
intimidated, majorities. On November 8 was signed "the 
act of annexation." Garibaldi retired at once to his 
cottage on Caprera^. The new government had much work 
before it, the reign of law and order to introduce, and 
brigandage to suppress, for Sicilians in particular Uke no 
law at all, and all along the southern Apennines there were 
thousands of disbanded soldiers and of sham volunteers, 
ex-servants of the Bourbon and mere lovers of mischief, 
who put on red shirts as an excuse to gratify their instincts. 
The strongest admirer of Garibaldi ^ admits that the sudden- 
ness of his conquests upset calculations, that as "Dictator" 
he was not wise in his choice of men, that many professed 
to be liberationists who were only selfish and covetous, all 
of which simply means that anarchy had to be coerced and 

^ A little island ofiE the north coast of Sardinia, which Garibaldi 
had bought. 

2 Mr G. M. Trevelyan, Macaulay's grand-nephew. His references 
to our English Revolution of 1688 are most apt. 



v] ENGLAND'S HELP TO ITALY 145 

Victor Emmanuers government alone could do this. The 
same writer suggests that the officers of the regular army 
influenced the King, who otherwise could have done much 
by tact and courtesy to make up to Garibaldi for the sad 
necessity of getting him for a time out of the way. 
Gratitude is impossible in history if it impHes that the real 
advantage of a country must be disregarded for its sake, 
but it may be possible to be tactful whilst showing in- 
gratitude. As to whether North Italy would have had a 
happier history between i860 and 1914 if Naples and 
Sicily had not been annexed, it would be rash for an outsider 
to lay down the law. Certainly the complaint of Piedmont 
and Lombardy in recent years has been that they, the richer 
and industrial provinces, have been too heavily taxed in 
order to support the clever lawyers and professional 
politicians of Naples and Sicily, who outvote them in 
Parhament and secure all the best places for themselves. 
But in i860 they could not be deaf to the call of the south, 
for history has certainly made up its mind that the Bourbon 
government was too utterly brutal and uncivilised to be 
endured. 

Mr Trevelyan also points out to us very strongly how 
Lord John Russell deserves a greater credit for resolution 
and practical assistance to the ItaUans than he has usually 
received. Palmerston left to himself would have carried 
out very hterally the doctrine of non-intervention, that is 
to say, would have stood aside whatever the Emperor of 
Austria might have decided to do. Lord John very defi- 
nitely put it before the autocrats of the three Great Powers, 
when they met at Warsaw, that they too should observe 
the poUcy of non-intervention, that "the Itahans are the 
best judges of their own interests." He adds that when 
a few years later Lord John was staying at San Remo, he 
M. 10 



146 NAPOIvBON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. 

found portraits in the house of four great men, Mazzini, 
Cavour, Garibaldi, and himself. The ItaHans evidently did 
not think that the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain had 
given them only a cheap sympathy, but had, to use a 
homely phrase, kept the ring to see that Italy had fair 
play. Odo Russell, the ambassador of Great Britain at 
the papal court, who was afterwards better known as I/ord 
Ampthill, wrote to his uncle December i860, that this was 
"a great and real national movement, which will at last be 
crowned with perfect success, notwithstanding the legion 
of enemies Italy still counts in Europe." lyord John also 
wrote at an earUer day, "I wish to put in a caveat against 
the indiscriminate use of the words revolution and revolu- 
tionary. A revolution may be the greatest of calamities; 
it may be the highest of blessings." He pointed to the 
revolutions in England and in France respectively, to show 
that it is not necessary to imagine that a revolution "from 
government maintained by torture to a free regular 
government " is per se wicked. Punch's comment was 
"Well said, Johnny Russell." Garibaldi himself, saying 
goodbye to the British admiral before he departed for 
Caprera, thanked him, England, Her Majesty's Government, 
and above all lyord John, for their sympathies for Italy. 
Perhaps, also, even Napoleon deserves some Httle credit, 
however much he wavered and threatened; at least he 
confined himself to a defence of Rome and the Patrimony, 
being rather anxious not to offend pubHc opinion in France 
than ill-disposed towards Victor Emmanuel. 

The Parliament which met at Turin in March 1861 
represented an Italy of 22,000,000 inhabitants. By its 
vote Victor Emmanuel definitely took the title of King of 
Italy ; in i860 he had struck coins as " Re Eletto." Cavour 
openly said that he looked upon Rome as the natural capital 



V] FINAI. UNION OF iTAIyY 147 

of Italy, yet for the time he was unwilHng to take the 
risk of defying Napoleon. Next June he died. In 1862 
Garibaldi was once more on the war-path. Starting in 
Sicily he proclaimed a new crusade for the possession of 
Rome. It may be that Napoleon, freely abused by the 
papal party for his consent to the dismemberment of the 
I^egations and the Marches, wavered for a moment as if he 
would no longer defend Rome. But when Garibaldi crossed 
the straits he was confronted by royal Itahan troops ; he 
refused to let his men fire upon them, but was himself 
wounded and taken prisoner. He was imprisoned for a 
short time at Spezia and once more allowed to retire to 
Caprera. I^ater, Napoleon withdrew his troops from Rome 
on the understanding that no further attempt would be 
made. Garibaldi did however make one more effort in 
1867, and again Napoleon sent a French army which routed 
his volunteers at Mentana near Rome; on this occasion 
General FaiUy bitterly offended ItaUans by his scornful 
jeers, when he remarked on the superiority of the breech- 
loading chassepots. 

It may seem strange that the Great Power which 
ultimately consummated the Union of Italy was Prussia. 
In that decade Prussia was winning her way to the supre- 
macy as against both Austria and France, so that Italy 
could not but profit thereby. The humiliation of Austria 
in 1866 gave Venetia to Victor Emmanuel ; the humiliation 
of France in 1870 caused the French troops to be finally 
withdrawn, and Victor Emmanuel's men marched into 
Rome September 20, 1870. Therefore the balance of power 
compelled Italy to be the ally of Prussia. She was forced 
into the Triple Alliance at a time when her relations with 
France were much strained, and when Germany required 
the assistance of the ItaUan navy in the Mediterranean; 



148 NAPOIvEON Ill's FIRST DECADE [ch. v 

German aggressiveness and German peaceful invasion of 
Italy by merchants and manufacturers, seizing a large part 
of Italian trade and arousing Italian hatred of the ill- 
mannered Tedeschi, prevented Victor Emmanuel III from 
supporting William in 1914. The charge of ingratitude 
was hurled against Italy as a matter of course, although 
Bismarck himself had once openly said that gratitude counts 
for nothing in politics, and the whole course of Prussian 
history proves it. 



CHAPTER VI 

NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE 

Napoleon was still the chief figure of Europe throughout 
the sixties. Europe indeed was accustomed to his waverings 
and trusted him very Httle. Palmerston, in particular, up 
to his death in 1865, would in all probabiHty have taken 
a course quite different from that which he actually 
took, if he had been quite sure of the hearty co-operation 
of France on the question of either Poland or Schleswig 
Hoist ein ; also, had the Entente Cordiale endured, it is just 
possible that a Franco-British interference would have 
profoundly influenced the Civil War in the United States. 
After Palmerston's death, neither DisraeH nor Gladstone 
had any wish to interfere in European poHtics, and Napoleon 
had to pursue a course alone, or when British influence was 
exerted at all it was exerted against him. In these years 
it was partly what he did, and partly what he was suspected 
of wishing to do, that left him without an ally in Europe. 
If we are to particularise any one scheme which damaged 
him more than any other, it is his Mexican poHcy. 

In i860 Great Britain was still engaged in a Chinese 
War, which had indeed broken out in 1857, but had not 
been pressed to a conclusion because of the Sepoy Mutiny. 
The French and British were united to punish China for 
the proclamation of a Chinese ofiicial, by which he offered 



150 NAPOIvEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

rewards for the heads of Europeans. In 1859 the allied 
squadrons were repulsed from the Taku forts at the mouth 
of the Peiho river ; in i860 a second expedition captured the 
forts, and proceeded to attack Pekin, where the summer 
palace was taken and looted. For many years to come the 
behaviour of the Chinese towards Europeans was much 
better. In this year Napoleon sent an expedition to Syria, 
where in the district of Mount Lebanon Christian Maronites 
were persecuted, and many of them massacred by Moham- 
medans; when order was restored there was no excuse to 
keep French soldiers there any longer, and they were with- 
drawn. 

In 186 1 the most important question in Europe was the 
emancipation of the serfs in Russia by the Imperial Ukase 
of February 186 1, which is the chief title to honour of the 
Tsar Alexander II. On the Imperial domains, serfs were 
not only freed but were made absolute proprietors of their 
plots of land. On other estates a part of the land remained 
to the noble owners, part was given to the peasants on 
certain terms, indemnity being gradually paid to the 
nobles on money advanced by Imperial banks. Emancipa- 
tion in itself does not of course mean absolute prosperity; 
Russian peasants might be free, but free to starve; the 
money-lender, we have been told, has been the great curse 
of the small holders in such a country, who are dependent 
upon the produce of their small farms, who are cut off 
from their neighbours by enormous stretches of flat and 
therefore depressing plains, and have not everywhere a 
ready market ; moreover a system was estabhshed by which 
lands were re-divided every year amongst the inhabit- 
ants of each village, so that permanent improvement of the 
farms was almost impossible. Yet troubles could not but 
happen when the serfdom of many centuries was abolished. 



VI] RUSSIA AND POIvAND, 1861-63 151 

The general tendency of recent years Has been to remedy 
mistakes, and at least personal freedom was assured by 
Alexander's great act, by whicli tie was hailed as "Libera- 
tor." He proceeded to put local government into the 
hands of Zemstvos, councils elected by the inhabitants of 
each district. He introduced jury trial. But he con- 
sidered that Russia was not then ripe for parhamentary 
government. The growth of anarchy and especially the 
rise of the Nihilists at the end of his reign culminated in 
the murder of the "lyiberator" by a bomb in 1881. 

In 1863 there was a new PoHsh rising, which took the 
form of isolated attacks upon Russian garrisons, and bitter 
guerilla warfare raged. The insurgents never occupied 
Warsaw and set up no national government. Even a 
liberal Emperor was forced to suppress the Poles with 
severity. He made a distinction between nobles and 
peasants, the bitterest enemies of Russia being the nobles 
who a century earUer had been absolute masters of the land, 
and whose pride resented their treatment by Russians as 
an inferior class. Lands of rebel nobles were made over to 
the peasants who betrayed or attacked them. Of course 
the miUtary superiority of the Russians was soon seen, 
and the rebellion collapsed. Local government and local 
customs were aboUshed and the country was henceforth 
governed directly from Petrograd. The natural protectors 
of Poland would have been France and Britain if they had 
been united; but they were by no means united at this 
date, and whatever remonstrances they made to the Tsar 
only served to irritate him. In the meanwhile the new 
King of Prussia, WiUiam I, prevented Pohsh refugees from 
crossing into his country; it was clearly to his advantage 
to put Russia under an obhgation to him, in view of the 
struggle which he foresaw was coming. 



152 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

Meanwhile events of enormous importance were taking 
place across the Atlantic, and had their cause in the 
development of the United States. We have to go back 
to the i8th century to understand them. The critical year 
is 1763, when by the Treaty of Paris at the close of the 
Seven Years' War the French lost all their territory east 
of the Mississippi, leaving an immense field for Anglo-Saxon 
expansion. The remnant of lyouisiana west of the river 
was handed over to Spain, who in turn handed over Florida 
to the British. The War of Independence left the United 
States free to expand and settle questions as to boundaries 
with both France and Spain. In 1800 by a secret treaty 
Spain transferred l/ouisiana once more to France ; in 1803 
Napoleon I sold it to the United States for 15 milHon dollars ; 
in 1812 it was included in the Union as a State. Shortly 
afterwards Mississippi and Alabama became States. Not 
only now was the control of the cotton crop almost entirely, 
and the control of the tobacco crop very largely, in American 
hands, which meant that the slave question would soon 
become more acute, but also men of Latin blood were in 
the Union with Anglo-Saxons^. The dominant race would 
soon be stretching forward along the curve of the gulf 
further west. In the meantime the "building up of the 
Middle West" was proceeding very rapidly. Kentucky 
entered into the Union in 1792, Tennessee in 1796, Ohio 
in 1803, Indiana 1816, IlHnois 1818, and Missouri 1821; 
the chief factor here was the inabihty of the Eastern States 
to compete with Great Britain in manufacture, so that 

^ Both "Anglo-Saxon" and "Latin" are unsatisfactory terms, 
but have come to be accepted. "Anglo-Saxon" covers the lands 
occupied by and the civilisation represented by both the British 
and the Americans of the United States. "Latin" covers the 
Spanish and Portuguese lands of Central and Southern America, 



VI] PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 153 

emigrants from the Old World and from the original States 
ahke flocked towards the great river. The problem of the 
future was that of slavery, and mere temporary compro- 
mises could not last. In 182 1 there were twelve slave- 
owning and twelve free States, but the last formed, 
Missouri, which was carved out of the indefinitely wide 
lyouisiana purchase and at the date of the purchase was 
practically vacant, was admitted as a slave State. Would 
then other western lands be free soil or slave soil as the 
newer waves of emigrants crossed the Mississippi, the 
future Kansas or Arkansas for instance? 

The Monroe doctrine was laid before Congress by 
President Monroe in December 1823 ; he had negotiated the 
Louisiana purchase twenty years earHer. The main points 
were these : "With the existing colonies or dependencies of 
any European power we have not interfered, and shall not 
interfere. But with the governments who have declared 
their independence and maintained it " — i.e. Spain's revolted 
colonies — "we could not view any interposition by any 
European Power.... Our poHcy in regard to Europe is to 
consider the government de facto as the legitimate govern- 
ment for us." The doctrine is quite simple and straight- 
forward. But it says nothing of what would happen if one 
of the governments concerned, Mexico for instance, were 
to repudiate its debts to Europeans, or offer violence to the 
persons of Europeans. Would then an European Power 
have the right to demand redress by force, or would the 
United States demand it for that Power, acting as school- 
master to punish, as well as to defend, the schoolboy Latin 
state? Surely there would be a moral obhgation on the 
United States to compel the Latins to act with some regard 
to the decencies of civiHsation, if they should consider 
European compulsion to be an unfriendly act. No civiHsed 



154 NAPOI.EON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

country should allow pandemonium to flourish next door. 
Then comes in the question of profit. No civiHsed com- 
munity can afford to play the schoolmaster for the benefit 
of others alone without profit to itself. Now the newly 
freed Latin repubhcs, Hke schoolboys of whom too much 
has been expected, disappointed their early admirers. 
They were too democratic in form, and the party in power 
used democratic privileges for personal gain; hence arose 
civil wars, dictatorships, revolts, etc. Mexico chiefly 
concerns us, being nearest to the United States, having 
a population in which the proportion of Indian blood to 
Spanish blood is very high — ^this is the real crux of the 
position in every I^atin- American state, but in none is the 
Indian proportion so high as in Mexico — and even to-day 
showing a disposition for uncivihsed method and a disregard 
for paying just debts. 

The old Spanish province of Texas was governed 
separately from Mexico. In 1824 it formed part of the 
new state of Mexico, and had its grievance in that it 
depended on slavery and Mexico abohshed slavery in 
1829. It welcomed emigrants from the United States, for it 
was a land of rich possibihties, and Mexico excluded them. 
It rebelled in 1836, and successfully asserted its independ- 
ence, being acknowledged by the United States and France 
and England. Annexation to the United States was inevit- 
able. But delay was caused as annexation brought up the 
question of slavery. The RepubHcan party, known as 
such in 1856 but previously styled Whigs, was based on 
the rights of the Union as the res publica to legislate for 
the whole community over the heads of the individual 
States; the Democratic party insisted on the right of 
each State to regulate its own concerns and especially 
its own property, and slaves were included in property. 



VI] THE MEXICAN WAR, 1847-48 155 

Compromise after compromise was made, but the question 
always cropped up again. In 1821 it was settled that 
Missouri should be a slave-owning State, but that its 
southern boundary 36° 30' should be henceforward the hmit. 
Now Texas was slave-owning, and was admitted into the 
Union in 1845 on the condition that 36° 30' should remain. 
War with Mexico resulted. The Americans can certainly 
boast that their campaign was well planned, and well 
executed, especially when the smallness of their regular 
army is taken into consideration. Whilst a small force 
held the frontier of Texas, the main attack under General 
Winfield Scott landed from the Gulf and captured Vera 
Cruz, March 1847; in May Puebla was taken, and in 
September the city of Mexico; when it is added that 
Mexico is 260 miles from Vera Cruz, that the enemy had 
vast numbers of guerillas as well as a regular army of 
between 20,000 and 30,000 men, whilst the number of the 
Americans who finally stormed the capital did not amount 
to 7000, the skill of Scott and his ofiicers may be faintly 
appreciated ; yet in the United States the profession of 
regular soldiering has always been despised. Meanwhile 
other troops occupied New Mexico and CaUfomia. In 
1848 by treaty New Mexico and Upper California were 
ceded, a vast amount of territory which was afterwards 
apportioned into States as it was gradually peopled by 
immigrants. In 1850 Mr Henry Clay arranged a com- 
promise as regards slavery, but the history of the next 
ten years is one long tale of bitter squabbHng on the 
interpretation of the compromise. Soon the nature of the 
controversy changed. As far back as 183 1 the Liberator 
had been founded by WilHam lyloyd Garrison, demanding 
total aboUtion, and in 1833 was estabHshed the American 
Anti-Slavery Society; this being the year in which the 



156 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

British Parliament finally carried abolition throughout our 
own Empire. In 1848 gold was discovered in CaHfornia, 
and the gold rush began, which, rather than the fact of 
conquest from Mexico, led to the rapid peopHng of the new 
country, with the ultimate result that the importance of 
the old Eastern States was balanced by a new Far West. 
In 1859 John Brown made his celebrated raid across the 
river Potomac into Virginia to raise a slave insurrection, 
after which he was hanged by the authorities of Virginia. 
The election of Abraham I^incoln to be President, November 
i860, was the final signal for war. Even now the issue at 
stake was not slavery itself, hardly even the right of slave- 
owners to carry their slaves with them when they migrated. 
It was a question, as Burke so strongly insisted, when the 
troubles were brewing which caused the War of Inde- 
pendence in 1775, of "Temper and Character." The slave 
owners were aroused to passion by the extravagant attacks 
upon them and accusations of horrible cruelty, such as 
were read in Uncle Tom's Cabin, published in 1852. Time 
had greatly modified the iniquity of the system ; the slaves, 
it was passionately asserted, were happy and merry, well 
fed and well cared for, as the devotion of thousands of them 
to their masters when once the war began certainly seems 
to prove. It was the jealousy of the free States, the 
Puritan N.E., where manufacture and trade had no need of 
the negro, which was the cause of the exaggerated outcry 
against the planters, who could not raise their tobacco, 
their cotton, and sugar, without black labour ; and yet the 
slave-owning south had been the home of the aristocracy as 
represented by Washington himself, I^ee, Hamilton, and 
Monroe, the greatest leaders, without whom there would have 
been no United States. But a new type of pohtician was 
arising, who had none of the old high ideals, to whom politics 



VI] CAUSES OF THE ClVIIy WAR 157 

were merely a game, and abolition an insincere cry. On 
the other hand, the character of Abraham I^incoln is a 
sufficient answer to the insinuation of mere jealousy and 
insincerity. The new Repubhcanism was not represented 
only by Puritan Massachusetts and trading New York; 
the newer farming States, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Iowa, Wisconsin, produced a new type of men, who were 
even then laying the foundations of the mighty industries, 
corn-growing and stock-breeding, which are the foundations 
of modern America; such men based their Hfe on free 
labour, and had no respect for the past services and historic 
traditions of Virginia. Yet again we have to make a strong 
distinction between two classes of Virginians ; the old 
planters of the hot lowlands, the traditional aristocracy as 
represented by the great hero of the coming war. General 
Robert B. I^ee, "Marse Robert " as he was affectionately 
called ; and the small free farmers of the Shenandoah Valley 
and the western Blue Mountains, who had either no or few 
slaves, men reared in a bracing cHmate, and descended from 
old Irish or Scottish famihes from Ulster, whose sturdy 
sense of independence resented dictation from New York, 
as represented by that ideal hero of the Havelock and 
Gordon type, Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. To both classes 
the Secession was a movement dictated by devotion to the 
ideas of State Hberty under the terms of the Declaration of 
Independence. 

In February 1861, Secessionists, withdrawing from 
Congress at Washington, met at Montgomery in Alabama, 
and in March they constituted the government of the 
Confederate States^. At first only the seven Cotton and 

1 In contrast to " Confederates " the Northerners, holding for 
the Union, are termed "Federals." Nicknames were "Rebs" and 
"Yanks." 



158 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

Gulf States were represented; Virginia, N. Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Arkansas, joined in when I^incoln called for 
the service of mihtia and volunteers. Jefferson Davis was 
their first and only President. Fighting first began in 
S. Carohna, where the Confederates attacked Fort Sumter 
and captured it on April 13. The area of the war was 
very great, practically the great square of the south- 
eastern States, between the coast and the Mississippi, of 
which the diagonal, from New Orleans to the northern point 
of Virginia at Harper's Ferry, is close on 1000 miles. The 
vastness of the struggle may also be estimated by the 
official figures available for the North alone ; in 1861 lyincoln 
raised an army of 150,000 men and a navy of 25,000; 
in January 1863 he had 900,000 under arms, and in May 
1865 tie had 1,500,000 ; the total raised was about 2,700,000. 
At the end of the war there were 671 ships, with 4717 guns 
and 51,500 seamen. There was a considerable number of 
competent officers trained at West Point and some of them 
had served in the Mexican War, but not nearly enough to 
train the vast numbers of raw recruits, who had very 
Httle sense of discipUne, and who were inclined towards 
both desertion and mahngering to a degree which one 
suspects from the various hints was far more common than 
official accounts allow. The habitual American contempt 
for the mihtary profession was bitterly punished by the 
awful loss of life amongst the hastily raised and poorly 
officered armies of the first few years. Where, therefore, 
but Httle mihtary skill and organisation were forthcoming, 
everything depended on devotion to the cause. The dash 
and impetuosity of the devoted Virginians, cleverly 
directed by the skiU of the few great soldiers such as I^ee 
and Jackson, at first carried the day; then gradually the 
tenacity of the North, the readiness of the prairie farmers 



VI] RESOURCES OF NORTH AND SOUTH 159 

to enlist in great numbers, the organising power of I^incoln's 
officials, and Grant's discipline and steadiness, prevailed in 
the long run, and numbers plus devotion and skill wore 
down devotion and skill alone. 

Two sources of strength the North always had, command 
of the sea and manufacturing superiority. The U.S. navy 
was manned from the north-east and was solid for the 
Union; throughout the four years it blockaded the Con- 
federate ports, stopped the export of cotton and tobacco 
and the import of munitions from Europe, and directly 
contributed to the first and ' definite Northern success, 
namely the conquest of the line of the Mississippi. Mean- 
while all the coal and iron of the United States at that 
date was in the North. Rifles, heavy artillery, mimitions, 
ironclads, could be turned out in a steady and unending 
stream. Here again we see that the problem of success 
for the South depended upon time; if their armies in 
Virginia could at once win such victories as would force 
peace, then their poverty in ships and material would 
matter Httle ; but when the Northern superiority in these, 
as well as in numbers, was fully developed, there could 
be but one end. It was owing to this that the attitude of 
Britain and France was so important. If the two entente 
Powers combined to help the Confederates, they would 
supply just the things that were needed, munitions and 
manufactured goods, release the bales of cotton and 
tobacco, and, if not overpower, at least contest the 
Northern control of the sea. PubUc opinion here was mostly 
in favour of the South. This was but natural, for the 
United States had won independence by fighting for self- 
government, the right to settle both taxation and trade for 
their own benefit, and not for that of the mother country ; 
even so the South had seceded to control their own domestic 



i6o NAP01.E0N Ill's SECOND DHCADE [cu. 

concerns as against a dictatorial Union. Also there was 
a prevalent feeHng that the Southerners were a more gallant 
and more gentlemanly race^, less given to jeering at the 
Britishers or "tail-twisting," less loud and self-assertive. 
There can be Httle doubt that a feeHng of this kind existed, 
and that the Northerners resented it very bitterly. On the 
other hand they did not take enough into account that 
very many British, even if a minority, still S5mipathised 
with them on the main question of slavery. On one occa- 
sion a Northern warship took two Southern ambassadors 
off a British ship and held them as prisoners. A loud cry 
was raised, and Palmerston took steps which threatened 
war ; the ambassadors came from a de facto independent 
government, and the Monroe doctrine recognised de facto 
governments, so that the arguments of the Americans were 
turned against themselves. I^incoln gave way, somewhat 
grudgingly, and released them ; the Northern press asserted 
that he did so for justice' sake, and not because "John 
Bull" blustered. Another cause of bitterness was that 
ships were built in England, the Alabama in particular, 
which were armed and converted into privateers, and did 
much damage to Northern commerce. SmuggHng of arms 
and munitions from the West Indies into the blockaded 
Southern ports was common, but the capture of smugglers 
and confiscation of contraband rested with the Northern 
cruisers, and could not give rise to international incidents. 
Very luckily war did not result from bad temper on each 
side. Yet the bitter taste remained for many years. 
One doubts if Napoleon ever seriously thought of entering 
into the war ; he took advantage to enter upon his Mexican 

^ This comes out strongly in Disraeli's Lothair, where one of his 
characters speaks of a Virginian as a gentleman fit to associate even 
with a duke. 



VI] FEELING IN ENGLAND i6i 

scheme, which will be discussed later on; yet, if he had 
foreseen the end, it would have been better by far for him 
to have first fought and weakened the North, rather than 
to have sent his troops to Mexico under cover of the Civil 
War, only to withdraw them when theNorthwas triumphant. 
The Potomac, which divides Maryland from Virginia, 
was also the eastern dividing Hne between the North and 
the South. Washington, the capital of the Union, lying in 
the "district" of Columbia which is a piece of Maryland 
cut off, is on the Potomac at a distance of just lOO miles 
from Richmond, the Confederate capital. Such armies as 
could be immediately equipped met in a preliminary cam- 
paign in 1861 at Bull Run in Virginia, 45 miles from 
Washington. As in the preliminary battle at Edgehill in 
our own Civil War, not much science was shown, except by 
Jackson, whose Virginian brigade "stood like a stone wall." 
Early in 1862 a much wider campaign was planned; 
McClellan developed a main attack, by means of the superior 
sea power of the North, upon the promontories which jut 
out into Chesapeake Bay between the estuaries of the 
Potomac, York, and James rivers; a subsidiary attack was 
directed up the Shenandoah Valley, from which a powerful 
flank attack could be made upon Richmond on the other side. 
McClellan was a good organiser of partially trained troops, 
and by no means a bad strategist ; he pushed upstream to 
within a few miles of Richmond, where Lee stood at bay. 
But on the other side Jackson cleared the valley by rapid 
marches which disconcerted the larger but ill-combined 
forces opposed to him, then came down to form up on 
Lee's left flank. Lee and Jackson united pushed McClellan 
down the peninsula in a six days' fight, June 26 to July i, 
themselves losing heavily but forcing the evacuation of the 
peninsula. A second invasion of Virginia in force, this 

M. u 



i62 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

time by an advance straight down the centre of the State, 
was foiled in a still more remarkable manner; Jackson 
made a wonderful flank march, seized the Northerners' 
base and all their suppHes, compelled Pope to retreat, 
and with Lee's main army advancing won a great victory 
at the second battle of Bull Run, August 29 and 30. 
Now came a Confederate counter-attack into Maryland, 
which resulted in Lee's repulse by McClellan's reorganised 
and numerically superior army at Antietam, September 17. 
A third invasion of central Virginia, under Burnside, was 
repulsed at Fredericksburg on December 13; a fourth, 
under Hooker, was badly defeated in the district of the 
"Wilderness" at Chancellorsville, May 2 and 3, 1863, when 
Jackson made another wonderful flank march to the 
Northerners' rear, but he was killed at the critical moment. 
In all these battles the same features are seen; both 
Presidents interfered too much with the plans of their 
generals, but Lincoln was the great offender as he rang the 
changes and tried one general after another ; Lee's strategy 
was much superior, but the Confederates were always out- 
numbered, lost heavily in both attack and counter-attack, 
were too weak in artillery, and never had a sufiicient reserve 
to follow up a success, so that no crushing victory, no Jena 
or Sedan, resulted. The dash of the Virginians, CaroUnans, 
Texans, and others, was undoubted; their moral was 
undoubted; Jackson's demands on his men were nobly 
answered; but the finishing touch was just not added. 

Meanwhile the issue of the war was being decided further 
West. President Davis was at fault in attempting to raise 
too many armies to hold too many hues, and did not give 
a wide general power to Lee to superintend the whole war. 
The Confederate strength was "nibbled away" for lack of 
concentration. Too far advanced a position was held in 



VI] THE FIRST TWO YEARS, 1861-62 163 

Kentucky and Tennessee to contest the lines of the various 
tributaries of the Mississippi. The Northerners had a 
strong force of gunboats to support them, and chiefly by 
its help and their superior numbers they had several 
successes, winning the Hne of the Tennessee river and of 
the middle Mississippi in the course of 1862. One of their 
subordinate generals, Ulysses Grant, was now marked out 
as their coming man. 

But the greatest of the Northern successes were at sea, 
on the one side in the mouth of the Mississippi, on the 
other in Chesapeake Bay. Not only the entire United 
States navy was available, but their manufacturing resources 
and skill turned out gunboats and monitors and battleships 
to give them an overwhelming superiority. Admiral 
Farragut, with some wooden ships, gunboats, and a powerful 
flotilla of schooners each carrying a 13-inch mortar, forced 
the defences of the Mississippi; he overpowered the river 
forts and a Confederate squadron, which included some 
hastily devised ironclad rams, and then he had New 
Orleans at his mercy. The great city, no miles from the 
river's mouth, the workshop and rallying point of the 
Confederates in the West, was occupied on May i, 1862. 
Then Baton Rouge fell, and only Vicksburg remained to 
separate Farragut from the victorious Grant upstream. 
On the other side some naval developments were carried 
out which had profound influence on the ship-building of 
the world. The Confederates had the hulk of a United 
States frigate which they cut down nearly to the water- 
line ; on it they placed a wooden casemate strengthened by 
4-inch plates of iron, and they named her the Merrimac ; 
and she rammed one Northern warship, and forced on 
shore and sank another, March 8, 1862. That same night 
arrived from New York the Monitor, 172 feet long, 1000 



i64 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

tons displacement, loj feet draught, carr5dng two ii-inch 
muzzle-loading guns in a solid iron turret; she had been 
designed by Ericsson, a Swede of New York. Her weak 
points were that she could not live in a rough sea — ultimately 
she sank when water poured in at a leak where the turret 
revolved — and that her guns confined in the turret were 
too short, and therefore too weak to stand a heavy charge 
of powder. But for the time she neutraHsed the Merrimac, 
though unable to sink her. In course of time Ericsson 
turned out a whole fleet of improved monitors for coast 
action, known as the "mosquito fleet," and these bombarded 
unsuccessfully the forts of Charleston in 1863. The actual 
services of the monitors in this war, though considerable, 
were after all not so important as the tremendous impetus 
which they gave to the new construction in Britain and 
France. 

In 1863, after his great success at Chancellorsville in 
May, though terribly crippled by the loss of Jackson, lyce 
invaded Maryland for the second time and penetrated into 
Pennsylvania. There he was repulsed at the very critical 
battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3. It was his last offensive 
operation. If he had succeeded it is difficult to see what 
permanent gain he would have secured; he was too weak 
to occupy any part of the North, and he could but have put 
off the evil day for a little time by forcing the withdrawal 
of Northern troops from elsewhere. He would not have 
saved the line of the Mississippi, for on the very next day, 
July 4, Grant received the surrender of Vicksburg. The 
complete success of the Federals in the West was now so 
complete that, holding the Mississippi, they could press in 
on the Confederates in Tennessee and so Hnk up their 
attacks. Some very fierce fighting in eastern Tennessee 
was to a certain extent in the Confederates' favour, but it 



VI] COI,I,APSB OF THE SOUTH, 1863-65 165 

brought Grant and Sherman across from the Mississippi, 
and then the third decisive victory of the year was won by 
Northerners at Chattanooga. 

The year 1864 saw new arrangements. Grant was made 
General-in-chief and took over the direction of the main 
army in Virginia; he gained no success over Lee, but 
reduced him to the defensive. In the meanwhile Sherman 
took command in Tennessee, and thence invaded Georgia, 
first occupying Atlanta and then pushing through to the 
sea at Savannah. Part of Sherman's army, left behind 
in Tennessee under Thomas, won a crushing victory at 
Nashville. Thus when 1865 opened the end was almost 
reached. Sherman swept northwards through the CaroHnas 
towards I^ee's rear, Charleston being occupied in February, 
lyce, surrounded on all sides, abandoned Richmond, and 
capitulated with his last force of only 28,000 men at 
Appomattox Court House on April 9. In the last two years 
since the double disasters at Gettysburg and Vicksburg 
the resistance of the Confederates was being gradually 
and relentlessly worn down. Their coasts blockaded, their 
suppUes running short, their recruiting ground across the 
Mississippi cut off, their lands systematically ravaged, they 
could only fight at ba.y. Yet up to the very last I^ee held 
the capital. 

The story returns to Mexico. Since the war of 1847-48 
the state of this country seemed to go from bad to worse. 
The American army was withdrawn, but the Mexicans 
could not govern themselves. Towards the end of the 
fifties the parties were clerical and anti-clerical, headed 
respectively by Miramon and Juarez. In 1861 Juarez, an 
Indian, won the day ; he attacked the rehgious houses, and 
drove many CathoUcs into exile, who naturally appealed 
for aid to Napoleon and were patronised by his Spanish 



i66 NAPOI.EON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

wife Eugenie; money debts incurred by Miramon were, 
of course, repudiated, and unluckily one of the chief 
creditors was Morny himself. It can be easily imagined 
that Napoleon was ready enough to interfere, persuaded by 
Eugenie of the sacredness of a crusade to repatriate dis- 
tressed CathoHcs, and egged on by Morny, who wanted to 
get his money back. Various European merchants suffered 
by the troubles in Mexico, so that the British and Spanish 
governments were ready to contribute to a joint expedition 
in the winter 1861-62; the United States were too dis- 
tracted to prevent such interference, and in any case the 
Monroe doctrine implies that the United States should keep 
lyatin America in the path of civiHsation, failing which 
European nations have a clear right to act. A joint 
British, French, and Spanish fleet appeared off Vera Cruz. 
Juarez gave such satisfaction as pacified the British and 
Spanish, but refused to pay Miramon's debts for the 
benefit of Morny and other Frenchmen. So a French 
expeditionary force was landed. 

In 1863 the French captured Puebla and Mexico, but 
Juarez continued to carry on guerilla tactics. An Assembly 
of the clerical party offered the crown to Maximilian, 
brother of Francis Joseph, and therefore a Hapsburg and 
akin to the old dynasty of Spain. Persuaded by Napoleon 
and promised a regular French army for at least five years, 
Maximilian accepted and was crowned as Emperor of 
Mexico. He was a mild and cultured man. He had been 
the only Hapsburg that the Itahans of lyombardy had not 
bitterly hated. He had an idea that a policy of material 
progress would reconcile the Mexicans to civilisation and 
the restoration of Catholics, when they saw the advantage 
of railways and had a gay court in their capital. On the 
contrary, Juarez waged his guerilla warfare to the knife ; 



VI] THE FRENCH IN MEXICO, 1862-67 167 

the Americans in 1847-48, on capturing Mexico, demanded 
the cession of land, Texas and Cahfornia, and then departed ; 
the French seemed to have come to stay. Juarez was 
wearing them out; Bazaine, the French genera;!, who had 
risen from the ranks, had no tact and retaHated by executing 
prisoners, and he was credited with a wish to become 
himself Emperor. Napoleon was probably in any case tired 
of his adventure, especially as it locked up thousands of 
French soldiers, who would be much more valuable to him 
in Europe in those critical days. At any rate when the 
United States government, their war finished, ordered him 
to withdraw his men, he had no choice but to obey. For 
the only time in their history they were in a position to 
enforce their demands; if need were, Grant could have 
marched many hundred thousands of war-hardened Federals 
over the frontier, and Farragut could ,have concentrated a 
large fleet against Vera Cruz. Thus, profoundly humiHated, 
the French evacuated Mexico in 1867. Maximihan was at 
once caught and shot by Juarez. Napoleon's crusade ended 
in utter failure. Yet, had the North come out less powerful 
from the Civil War, had a better man than Bazaine been in 
command and a less grasping man than Morny possessed 
Napoleon's ear, the adventure might have been as glorious 
as was hoped. We must never forget that history judges 
Napoleon and Bazaine by the awful catastrophe of 1870, 
and therefore cannot but judge unfairly. Mexico, restored 
to civiUsation at last by the strong dictator Diaz, has in our 
own days fallen off from the ways of decency and is the 
scene once more of absurd faction fights, which the United 
States have not had the courage to stop as their duty to 
civiUsation demands. So one regrets that the French did 
not remain, but with more noble ambition. 

The after-results of the American war affected England 



i68 NAPOIyBON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

also. A distinctly hostile feeling lasted for many years, 
being partly due to sharp criticisms of Yankee methods and 
manners in our press. A definite demand was made for 
compensation for the ravages of the Alabama and other 
privateers on Federal commerce. These ships were built 
in English yards, and being warned of their destination 
our government could have stopped them from leaving our 
coasts ; yet when vast quantities of munitions are made in 
the States and sold to us now, one doubts how a modern 
American can justify to-day the outcry then raised against 
us. At last Gladstone accepted arbitration, and an Inter- 
national Court sitting at Geneva awarded over three milHon 
poimds as damages to the States. 

It may be thought that too much stress has been laid 
on Napoleon's difficulties as caused by his Mexican schemes. 
Certainly when he first interfered in 1862 he could not 
anticipate how weak he would be in 1866-67, ^^^ Juarez 
would not be suppressed, and how strong Prussia would 
become. The mihtary resources of France ought, one 
would have said, to have been adequate for the dispatch 
of an expeditionary corps and yet to allow him to pose as 
the arbiter of Europe. But we have to remember that the 
French army was, Uke our own, a professional army of no 
great size as compared with the modern "nation in arms," 
indeed it was by far less strong relatively to ours than the 
conscript army of July 1914. We know from our own 
experience how small a fraction of a professional army 
remains for an emergency in Europe, when its chief duty in 
peace is to provide drafts to maintain the corps scattered 
throughout the empire. Thus crippled, Napoleon was con- 
fronted by question after question at home, whether forced 
on him by events beyond his control as the Poland and 
Schleswig Holstein questions and the great German crisis 



VI] NAPOIvBON'S WEAKNESS AT HOME 169 

in 1866, or due to his own ambition and increasing need to 
assert himself, as the questions of the Rhine frontier and 
Luxemburg and Belgium. He could not count on Great 
Britain as a certain ally, for the conclusion of the Crimean 
War and the boastings which disturbed us in 1858-59 
showed that he might even turn against us. The whole 
history of Italy showed that nobody could calculate what 
step he would take next. And in the meanwhile Prussia 
was growing ever stronger and stronger ; if we say that 
Napoleon*s poHcy dominated the decade, this must be 
taken in a negative sense, for it was precisely what he did 
not do that was so important, whereas the doing was 
Prussia's, or rather Bismarck's. 

The events of 1848-49 left Prussia humiUated. It was 
the work of Bismarck to create for her a new moral 
ascendancy, but the circumstances were by no means 
favourable. In 1857 Frederick WilHam IV was out of his 
mind, so that his brother WilHam was Prince Regent ; in 
1861 he died, and William I succeeded. Both as Prince 
Regent, and as King at first, he had much trouble, lyiberal- 
ism was very strong, and he formed a ministry of I^iberals 
with the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, his distant 
cousin and head of the Roman CathoUc branch of the 
family, as President. Would Prussia therefore enter on a 
"new era" of parhamentary government and become a 
constitutional nation ? The army question was of absorbing 
interest; by her army alone could Prussia ever hope to 
rise superior to the Federal Diet ; foreign policy and control 
of the army belonged to the Crown, and the Chamber could 
do no more than vote supplies; would the I^iberals, as in 
past EngHsh history, gain through parhamentary control 
of the purse such a position as to make Crown and ministers 
responsible to them, and thus have their say on foreign 



170 NAPOIvBON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

policy and army questions? William I was not going to 
be a mere limited monarch. In 1859 he called Albert von 
Roon to be War Minister to draw up a scheme of army 
reform, which was based on an increase of the number of 
recruits, a service of three years instead of two with the 
colours, and a reorganisation of the reserve of landwehr. 
For a few years the Chamber refused to vote the money, 
yet Roon persisted. In 1862 matters were at such a crisis 
that Wilham had even some idea of abdication. Then, on 
Roon's advice, he called Bismarck to be Minister-President. 
In 1863 there was a Polish rising against Russia^. It 
had been threatened for some Httle time, being due at 
bottom to the new excitement in Russia over the emancipa- 
tion of the serfs, but the immediate cause was that the 
Tsar seized the disaffected for service in the army as con- 
scripts; he "made the conscription of January 1863 an 
engine for seizing upon his supposed enemies." Moreover 
there was a complication because in Poland noble and serf 
were, as ever in their past history, most hostile to each 
other. This rising was one of townsmen and nobles. It was 
entirely of a guerilla type. Earl Russell — for lyord John 
accepted a title and went up to the Peers in 1861 — saw 
that here was a question of nationahty and constitutional 
hberty, as in Italy. But he only offered advice to the 
Tsar ; he counselled an amnesty to the Poles, Hberty under 
a constitution such as Alexander I had intended in 18 15, 
freedom of rehgion, the use of the PoHsh language, etc. 
At the same time he saw the terrible difficulty. "The 
aristocracy of Poland were distrusted: wide in their 
projects, narrow in their notions of government.... The 
democracy of Poland were hostile to the aristocracy : wild 
in their desires, bloody in their means." He could hold 
^ See p. 151. 



VI] PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA, 1863 171 

out no hope of British practical help, and he failed, there- 
fore, to help by S3Tiipathy; Poland was rather like the 
disunited and unready Italy of 1848-49, not Hke the deter- 
mined Italy of 1859-60, which he helped so powerfully by 
"keeping the ring." Napoleon suggested the landing of 
a force from the Western Powers on the Baltic coast. 
Palmerston and RusseU could not agree. If Napoleon had 
been really in earnest in his Russian poHcy, he would not 
have been so ready to make peace in 1856; now forcible 
co-operation with him was unwise, for he might leave us 
in the lurch once more in 1863 as in 1856. Nothing seemed 
possible but words, and Alexander II was not to be moved 
by words and an appeal to what his uncle meant to do. 
Napoleon thought that the British ministers had deserted 
him in refusing to use force. 

On the other hand WilHam I and Bismarck helped him 
very practically ; some Prussian troops were mobihsed, and 
a convention was made by which Prussians and Russians 
might cross the frontier in pursuit of rebels. Prussia had 
no sympathy for Polish nationaUsts, for Hberty at Warsaw 
would suggest a revolt for Hberty at Posen. Bismarck was, 
at the very outset of his poHtical career, determined to 
have Russia as his friend in the background, as his aUy 
if the need should arise. But first the Prussian lyiberals 
had to be brought round. However strange the idea may 
seem to us, there was then a strong feeHng among the 
I^iberals of the "new era," both Prussian and German, in 
favour of Polish nationahty, and in the Chamber it took 
the form of protest against the mihtary convention. 
Bismarck taunted the I^iberals with words which one might 
imagine were really addressed by some high-spirited Con- 
servative in England hurhng reproaches at Gladstone. 
"Enthusiasm for foreign nationaHties was a poUtical 



172 NAPOIvBON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

disease unfortunately limited to Germany. .. .No EngUsh 
House of Commons would have acted as they did." His 
idea was that Prussia must Prussianise her part of Poland, 
and let Russia Russianise her part. The great error of 
Austria was acceptance of Russian aid against Hungary in 
1849, followed by gross ingratitude in 1854. Such a mistake 
he would never make. Of course the upshot was a thorough 
Russian conquest of Poland. 

Meanwhile the domestic crisis in Prussia continued. 
Roon was increasing the army, and the Chamber was 
refusing the money. Bismarck was bent on subduing the 
Chamber, for only by the army could Prussia make herself 
the head of Germany. ResponsibiHty of ministers to 
Parliament rather than to Crown was at the root of the 
I/iberal movement, but that meant sympathy for Poland 
as well as for Holstein, and Bismarck's poHcy was that 
Poland was to be held down, and that Holstein was to be 
annexed to Prussia and not to Germany. His attitude in 
the Chamber was strange in the eyes of Englishmen 
accustomed to our ideals of ministerial responsibility. He 
attended meetings and spoke in debates, not as a member, 
but as an official ; therefore he insisted on saying what he 
had to say regardless of the President, who tried to rule 
him out of order. We are accustomed to think of him as 
Prussianising Germany, but here we see him Prussianising, 
or we might say re-Prussianising, Prussia herself into a 
spirit of meekness that would please -.old Frederick the 
Great, and combating the new nonsensical I^iberaHsm. 
Of course the annexation of Rhineland and part of Saxony 
in 1814 meant that a great many non-Prussians had to be 
brought into line. 

From the Polish and domestic questions he had to 
plunge into the Danish question. It had come up in 1848, 



VI] PRUSSIA AND DENMARK, 1864 173 

but was now once more prominent because of the succession 
to the Danish crown. Frederick VII was the last of the 
direct Hue. There were two collateral branches, those of 
Gliicksburg and Augustenburg, and the trouble was that 
the SaHc lyaw was not in force in Denmark, but was in force 
in Schleswig Holstein. A Congress in lyondon in 1853, to 
which Austria and Prussia were parties, but not the Federal 
Diet of Germany, settled the succession on Christian of 
Gliicksburg. To this the pubUc opinion of Germany was 
hostile, especially as the avowed poUcy of Denmark was to 
make at least Schleswig an integral part of Denmark, while 
Germans wanted at least Holstein for the Federation. Now 
Bismarck's sympathies were at first for Denmark, for, if 
Prussia had the right to her share of Poland, Denmark had 
the right to the Duchies ; his whole pohcy was anti-Federal, 
and he had not yet seen his way to seize the Duchies for 
Prussia. In November 1863 Frederick died. Christian 
succeeded to the Danish throne, and signed the act for the 
incorporation of Schleswig. The Federal Diet promptly 
decreed a Federal occupation of Holstein, to be carried out 
by Hanoverian and Saxon troops. But then the eldest 
son of the Augustenburg candidate put forward his claim, 
regardless of the I^ondon Congress. Of course the sequel 
showed that he was simply used for the time, and then 
thrown aside when to support his candidature was un- 
necessary, and a modern official apology that the war 
against Denmark was undertaken in fairness to his claim 
is preposterous; a German cry as an excuse for German 
interference was all that was wanted. Bismarck's position 
was different. He made his casus belli the November 
incorporation of Schleswig as an infringement of the 
lyondon settlement, and, as Austria and Prussia were 
parties to that settlement, they and not the Federal Diet 



174 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

had the right to act. The wonderful thing is that he per- 
suaded the jealous and suspicious Austrians to act with 
him. The hostiUty of the Prussian Chamber he thwarted 
by a prorogation. Of course the Prussian and Austrian 
armies swept through the country at will, and the Hano- 
verians and Saxons looked on. 

What then could the British do? One argument has 
to be put aside at once ; the recent marriage of the Prince 
of Wales to Alexandra of Denmark was no reason for war. 
The co-operation of Napoleon was not to be expected, as 
he was still sore because Russell had not supported his policy 
towards Poland. His only suggestion was that a plebiscite 
should be taken in the Duchies, as if it were a question of 
nationaUty to be solved, as in Savoy; neither Austria nor 
Prussia could allow policy to be settled by a national 
plebiscite, else what would become of Poland or Venetia? 
A month's armistice was arranged. The neutral Powers 
were summoned by Russell to a Conference in London in 
April 1864. Russell thought that in 1863 "Denmark was 
not a little wrong," but the joint invasion had put Austria 
and Prussia in the wrong. His own suggestion at the 
Conference was that Christian should give up Holstein and 
the German part of Schleswig, and this, coupled with his 
previous language on several occasions, was interpreted by 
Denmark as a promise of real help. But, as the most 
bitter of his opponents put it^, he was too fond of "might" 
or "may" or "probably," words which did not deceive the 
Prussians, but were interpreted by the Danes as stated. 
His own defence, made some years later, was that a section 
of our press. The Times in particular, used very strong 

^ Lord Robert Cecil, the future Marquis of Salisbury and Prime 
Minister. The Conservative of&cial leaders, Lord Derby and 
Disraeli, of course denounced the Liberal ministers very strongly. 



VI] ENGlvAND DOBS NOT HELP DENMARK 175 

language which influenced the Danes beyond the reasonable 
interpretation of ofiicial utterances of ministers. Palmer- 
ston, however, was more explicit than Russell; even if 
taken out of their context such words as "it would not be 
Denmark alone with which they would have to contend" 
were unmistakable, and the context cannot be doubted. 
Thus, apart from the heated language of newspapers or the 
weird excitement of those who imagined that the marriage 
implied political alliance, there was justification for Danish 
expectations. But on the other side Queen Victoria's 
influence was in favour of Germany; our mihtary power 
was insufficient if not supported by the French; a large 
bod 3^ of public opinion here, the opinion of thoughtful and 
serious men, was influenced by the strong pro-German 
writings of Carlyle, whose "spiritual home" was certainly 
Germany, who admired the profundities of German philo- 
sophy, and saw in the steady honest home-loving German 
character the exact opposite of the frivolity and insincerity 
of the French, and whose heroes in history were the men of 
action and strength rather than words; also our leading 
school of historians of that period looked upon Germans 
as our "natural" allies and were looking back, beyond the 
Crimean entente, to the days of our hereditary feud with 
France^. Thus we come back to the central fact, the lack 

^ Freeman's Norman Conquest, Vol. i, came out in 1867. The 
book treats of the war between Saxon and Norman as if part of 
a long natural struggle between England and France. Yet Freeman 
hated the use of the word, as applied to frontiers, etc., for instance 
to the Rhine as France's "natural" boundary. Carlyle wrote later, 
November 18, 1870, in praise of Bismarck, " That pathetic Niobe of 
Denmark, reft violently of her children (which were stolen children, 
and were dreadfully ill-nursed by Niobe-Denmark), is also nearly 
gone, and will go altogether as soon as knowledge of the matter 
is had." 



176 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

of trust in Napoleon. His negative influence, the fear of 
what he might do, or of what he might leave unfinished 
when once he had begun to do it, governed the situation. 

It is perfectly maddening to reflect that neither political 
party made the smallest effort to improve our miHtary 
resources. The Conservatives might accuse Russell of 
alternate bluster and surrender, but they put forward no 
programme of army reform, whether from fear of radical 
resentment or from motives of economy does not appear. 
This fact takes away from the sting of their attacks upon 
him. For several years yet to come the question was not 
tackled boldly. Any one can see that the impotence of 
Britain at each stage of Prussia's advance was due to the 
size of our army. But it was still the period of com- 
merciaHsm, and a strict neutral non-intervention suited 
this idea. The navy indeed was treated better, and even 
Cobden beUeved in a standard of three keels to two as 
against the French. The need of ironclad ships and heavy 
guns^ was so clear after the experience of the Crimean and 
American wars that no poHtical party dared to economise. 
All nations started on a level when wooden ships were 
being scrapped, and rival designs of sea-going ironclads — 
for the American monitors could only be used in-shore — 
were being worked out in both England and France. 

Consequently the Prussians and Austrians, the month 
of armistice over, renewed the war. Both Schleswig and 

1 The sixties were the period of experiment in iron, the seventies 
of development; and it was some considerable time before our 
navy, which at the start was barely equal, won once more a position 
of superiority over the French navy. Steel armour, steel wire- 
wound guns of heavy cahbre, water-tube boilers, turbine engines, 
oil fuel, and all the modem ideas, date from about 1895, when the 
Majesties were being built, down to the Dreadnought and super- 
Dreadnought periods of this century. 



VI] SEIZURE OF THE DUCHIES 177 

Holstein were taken, Christian submitting to the Treaty of 
Vienna, October 1864, and yielding the Duchies to the 
sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. Even then it was fore- 
seen that the possession of ICiel, and the possibiHty of the 
construction of a canal across Holstein, imphed a new 
factor in history, namely the birth of a German navy. 
But was it to be a German navy or a Prussian ? Of course 
the claims of the Prince of Augustenburg to this territory 
were never seriously entertained. He had played his part 
for the benefit of Prussia, and of course was thrown aside 
at once, so that to excuse the war as undertaken in the 
just cause of an aggrieved and wrongfully dispossessed 
claimant is so palpably false as to be farcical. Bismarck 
demanded that if he was made Duke he was to introduce 
into the Duchies Prussian law, conscription, postal and 
railway systems, even an oath of military allegiance to the 
King of Prussia. He was ready even for war immediately 
against Austria and the Federal Diet, for he had but used 
Austria to cover his own direct dcvsigns upon the Duchies. 
However, there was still a party in Prussia unwilUng to go 
to such extremes, and Bismarck was not yet strong enough. 
The Hanoverian and Saxon troops were withdrawn from 
Holstein, the former wilHngly, the latter unwillingly, and 
only after a vote had been given in the Federal Diet by a 
narrow majority. The Holsteiners themselves were actually 
ready to fight, and so was the King of Saxony, in defence 
of an ideal German poUcy. But the Emperor of Austria 
was not ready ; he had been used as a catspaw in the matter 
of the joint invasion, and was now used again as a catspaw 
to persuade the Diet to withdraw the Saxons; then he 
agreed to the Treaty of Gastein, August 1865, by which, 
pending an ultimate settlement, his government was to 
administer Holstein and the Prussians Schleswig ; a third 
M. 12 



178 NAPOIvKON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

Duchy, Lauenburg, was to go to Prussia definitely. It 
was cleverly done, for the Holsteiners, who whole-heartedly 
supported the Prince of Augustenburg, were put under 
Austria as a sop to their feehngs. Meanwhile Bismarck 
was already sounding the ministers of Victor Emmanuel as 
to a possible alliance between Prussia and Italy against 
Austria. 

Two duties were now laid upon Bismarck; to create 
finally in Prussia a strong public opinion that would be 
proof against the insidious hberalism which he had com- 
bated previously, against the tenderness towards the idea 
of national aspirations whether of Holstein or of Poland, 
and against the disHke of increasing the Prussian army; 
and to bUnd Napoleon to his further designs. His first 
object was being attained by the very nature of his success. 
There was opposition from the Crown Prince, who was 
always the supporter of the Augustenburg claimant, who 
was then popular, and against whom it was not yet reckoned 
as a crime that he was married to Queen Victoria's eldest 
daughter, our Princess Royal, or that his ideas of parlia- 
mentary government were in some degree of an English 
type. The Crown Prince's ideal of German unity was 
rather Federal than Prussian, but he was a soldier more than 
a poUtician. The general tendency of liberaUsm against 
methods of ruthlessness Bismarck fought in the Chamber 
and in the press. Napoleon it was not difficult to deceive. 
Bismarck had only to copy the method by which Frederick 
WiUiam had been hoodwinked by Napoleon I in 1805; 
provided that Prussia would remain neutral while he 
crushed the Austrians and held off the Russians, he would 
allow some compensation, Hanover perhaps ; the Austrians 
and Russians once crushed at Ulm and AusterHtz, he 
threw away the mask, scoffed at the idea of Prussia annexing 



VI] BISMARCK GUI.1^ NAPOIyKON 179 

Hanover, goaded Frederick William into war, and annihi- 
lated his army at Jena. How Napoleon III could allow 
himself to be similarly hoodwinked, when he knew how his 
uncle had treated Prussia, is simply beyond comprehension. 
He was taken in by Bismarck's bonhomie and apparent 
guilelessness. He beHeved in the sincerity of Bismarck's 
offer of compensation, if he should stand by neutral while 
Austria was being overwhelmed. Just as he settled 
matters privately at Plombieres and Chambery to help 
Cavour, so he had interviews with Bismarck at Biarritz. He 
had received Savoy and Nice, surely he would receive again 
whatever he bargained for. What was the territory 
offered? Part of Rhineland, or I^uxemburg, or Belgium? 
We can never know, for Bismarck was not so stupid as to 
put an5rthing on paper. It was quite enough to promise 
something, not Prussian territorj^ of course ; the controversy 
of later days makes one think that it was Bavarian Rhine- 
land, part of the old Palatinate, for Bismarck could always 
deny afterwards that he had offered it, and nothing could 
be more fatal to Napoleon than for the Bavarians to be 
offended. RicheHeu, I^ouis XIV, Louis XV, and Napoleon 
I, all of them had paid court to Bavaria, promised increase 
of territory to Bavaria at the expense of Austria, promoted 
the disunion of Germany by alliance with Bavaria — with 
Saxony also and Wurtemberg and Hesse, if it were possible, 
but always with Bavaria in the first place. Therefore even 
to hold out before Napoleon's eyes the bait of the Palatinate 
was a remarkable bit of ctmning, yet it is more remarkable 
that Napoleon seems to have swallowed it. 

The next step was to approach Victor Emmanuel. 
A Treaty of AlUance was made in April 1866. Naturally 
the Austrians were aware that some project of this kind 
was in the air, and as a declaration of war was obviously 

12 — 2 



i8o NAPOIvBON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

coming nearer and nearer, the Austrians made an offer to 
surrender Venetia to Napoleon, for him to hand over to 
Victor Emmanuel. But the Itahan minister, General La 
Marmora, preferred the Prussian aUiance after the treaty 
had been definitely signed, being, it is thought, one of the 
few men of that time who foresaw the mihtary superiority 
of Prussia; Palmerston, for instance, a few years before 
his death, said that Prussian methods and discipUne were 
inferior to those of the French. 

The casus belli was the Austrian administration of 
Holstein followed by Austrian proposals in the Diet. In 
January 1866 a mass meeting was allowed to be held at 
Altona, and there were demands for the summoning of the 
Estates of Holstein. The Austrian ofiicials governed the 
country as if they were agents for the Prince of Augusten- 
burg, even abstaining from taxing the country, and allowing 
liberty to the local press, at the very time when General 
Manteuffel, the Prussian Governor of Schleswig, was 
violently suppressing pubhc opinion there. Then an 
Austrian proposal was made in the Federal Diet to take 
in hand the question of both Duchies and to summon the 
Holstein Estates. This was Bismarck's opportunity, and 
he declared the Treaty of Gastein to have been violated 
thereby, whilst the Prussian army was ordered to march 
into Holstein. Austria persuaded the Diet to mobiHse the 
armies of the Federal States, which Bismarck considered 
a declaration of war. All the States who followed Austria 
in the Diet, even those which tried to be neutral, were 
denounced and considered as the enemies of Prussia; 
Hanover, both Hesses, Nassau, and even Frankfort itself, 
were thus involved, as well as Saxony and Bavaria: only 
the Mecklenburgs and the quite smaller States were pro- 
Prussian. There still existed in Prussia a hberal feeling 



VI] WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA, 1866 181 

against war, against bruderkrieg, against the destruction 
of Federalism and of German Unity. It was Bismarck's 
policy to drown this feeling by joy in a great Prussian 
victory, after which Unity would be possible under Prussian 
headship. 

Time was of the utmost value to Moltke. The Austrians 
had already mobilised several corps in Bohemia, and 
it was vital to strike at them immediately before the 
Bavarians could mobilise. Westwards the Hanoverians 
had to be contained, for which purpose a Prussian corps was 
detached, and here the extreme value of Napoleon's bUnd- 
ness can be seen, for even a limited number of French 
threatening Rhineland would have so distracted the 
Prussians that the great invasion of Bohemia, on which 
Moltke's strategy was based, would have been impossible. 
Bven so an enterprising Austrian commander-in-chief might 
have anticipated him by pouring a force into Silesia. 
But Benedek, a Hungarian, who held that position, was 
as fatally slow as Giulay had been in Piedmont in 1859; 
he allowed Moltke to take the initiative, an enormous 
advantage when promptness can rely on the moral of the 
soldiers to carry out the main plan. It is the old story of 
a daring strategy supported by a steady moral which 
enables the full advantage to be gained by tactics. This 
bold strategy consisted of launching two great Prussian 
armies from two separate bases towards a rendezvous on 
the actual field of battle. It may be foiled by an enemy 
who is ready to divine it and sees his opportunity. If it 
succeeds it gains an overpowering advantage, but it may 
fail in the execution. Napoleon I, trusting to the mar- 
vellous marching power of the French, was thus able to 
bring off many a brilliant coup. "March separately, and 
concentrate at the right point" may be said to be a 



i82 NAPOIvBON Ill's SECOND DECADE [CH. 

Napoleonic maxim. On the other hand, wherever he saw 
an enemy trying to outwit him in that way, he was always 
quick to take up a central position and annihilate separately 
two converging armies. But Benedek was not a Napoleon ; 
not only he delayed to take the offensive, but when on 
the defensive failed to strike strongly at either the one 
or the other of the converging Prussian armies, so as to 
annihilate the one while he held off the other. It must 
be added that the alliance of Victor Emmanuel was of 
great advantage, for 100,000 Austrians were required in 
Venetia. 

The war as against Austria dates from June 12, as against 
the other German States from June 15. The F'irst Prussian 
Army and the Army of the Elbe commenced to cross the 
frontier into Saxony on the i6th. The Saxons withdrew 
into Bohemia so as to fall in on the Austrian left flank, 
and they were thus the only allies ready for battle. The 
Prussian advance into Bohemia across the mountains 
commenced on the 23rd. Prince Frederick Charles, King 
WiUiam's nephew, known as the Red Prince, was in 
command of both armies. In the meanwhile the Second 
Army, under the Crown Prince, was massed in Silesia to 
cross the Giant Mountains into eastern Bohemia. Touch 
was maintained between the two princes by telegraph, and 
Moltke was in touch with both at Berlin, which he and the 
King and Bismarck did not leave till June 30. The total 
of the Prussians and of the joint Austrians and Saxons was 
rather over 270,000 men on each side, a strength of eight 
army corps. It was possible for Benedek to invade Silesia 
by the south-eastern angle, and thus crush the Crown 
Prince as he was beginning to negotiate the mountain 
passes. But he had his head-quarters at Josephstadt, on 
the upper Elbe, at a distance of about 15 to 25 miles from 



VI] MOLTKE'S STRATEGY 183 

the foot of the passes on the Bohemian side, and about 
60 miles from the Saxon frontier. Common sense dictated 
that he should make his main blow in that case at the 
Crown Prince's corps as they were debouching into Bohemia 
and crush them separately, whilst the Saxons and one of 
his own corps watched and delayed the advance of the 
Red Prince. He did exactly the opposite, and massed his 
main force against the Red Prince and watched the Crown 
Prince. Now the Red Prince was marching very slowly, 
much too slowly to suit Moltke, not much more than an 
average of 6 to 7 miles a day; yet Benedek's slowness 
more than compensated for this. On either side the 
Austrians were beginning to be despondent because the new 
breech-loading needle-guns^ of the Prussians, which were 
quite a novelty, and were not so highly thought of by 
other Powers as to be worthy of being copied, were after 
all highly efficient; they were single-action rifles loaded 
with one cartridge at a time and were good for 6 or 7 rounds 
a minute, and the Prussians were severely trained to fire 
steadily to avoid a waste of ammunition, yet even so their 
rate of fire took the Austrians by surprise; of course 
another advantage was that the men could load whilst 
lying down. Thus Benedek, after considerable losses in the 
preHminary skirmishes, fell back to a central position on 
the heights surrounding the village of Sadowa, a few miles 

^ A German from Nassau told me many years ago that he 
remembered seeing, when a boy, a Prussian detachment marching 
through his village with handkerchiefs tied over the locks of their 
rifles to hide the action. The Prussians had needle-guns in 
Schleswig, so that they were not a novelty in one sense in 1866; 
the novelty of this year was their success, which the war of 1864 
did not lead critics to expect. The Austrian muzzle-loader in range 
and accuracy was much superior, but was slow and compelled the 
men to stand to use their ramrods. 



i84 NAPOIvEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

south of Josephstadt, near the Elbe, whilst the road crossed 
the river a Httle to the rear at Koniggratz. 

Benedek taught the Prussians one valuable lesson at 
least; if his rifles were inferior his artillery was quite 
superior to theirs, and he massed his guns very strongly in 
the Sadowa position. On July 3 he accepted battle, having 




Map to illustrate the Campaign of 1866. 



the advantage of numbers as against the Red Prince alone, 
of position, and of a superior artillery. Frederick Charles 
attacked and was held off during all the morning; it was 
a very strong attack and resulted in correspondingly heavy 
losses. But Moltke, exactly as Welhngton had counted on 
Blucher, counted on the arrival of the Crown Prince, who 
was in touch with the Austrian outposts on the right flank 



VI] AUSTRIAN ROUT AT SADOWA 185 

about mid-day; by 3 o'clock he liad four corps well in 
action. The Austrians began to retreat at 4 o'clock and 
broke into considerable disorder as they crossed the Elbe, 
so that retreat became a rout. The Prussians were too 
exhausted to pursue after nightfall. 

Meanwhile the western Prussian army, numbering about 
45,000 men, was in central Germany. The Hanoverians, 
advancing towards Gotha with the object of joining with 
the Bavarians, encountered the Prussian van at Langen- 
salza, not very far from Jena, and beat them off on June 27. 
But the main Prussian army came up and surrounded them, 
and they surrendered on the 29th. The Bavarians, taking 
longer to mobilise, did not fight a main action, and the 
battle of Sadowa had already taken place before they were 
ready to do any service to their allies. 

In Italy the army of La Marmora fought the Austrians 
on the fatal and historic ground of Custozza on June 24. 
This was very galling to the national pride of the Itahans, 
especially as shortly afterwards Admiral Persano with a 
superior and partially ironclad fleet, making a disconnected 
attack upon an Austrian squadron, was badly repulsed off 
the island of lyissa, near the Istrian coast. The Itahans 
had, however, at least the satisfaction of having tied a 
large number of Austrians to Italy. On the other hand 
their Italian victories took off some of the bitterness which 
the Austrians must have felt. 

The Prussian success, being both rapid and decisive, 
was due to many causes. Roon had turned out a highly 
efficient war machine, freely spending money which had not 
been sanctioned by parhament but which was at once voted 
after the success. It could be trusted and had a moral 
high above that of the Austrians, whose Hungarian and 
Italian regiments were backward and unwilling, though the 



i86 NAPOI.BON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

Croats and Tyrolese were as ready as in previous wars. 
Without Roon's services neither Bismarck nor Moltke could 
have carried on their plans. The Prussians fought with 
a purpose, and their officers belonged to a miHtary caste, 
as in Frederick the Great's time, tyrannical enough and 
even brutal as we know them, but terribly efficient in the 
face of the enemy; in 1866 Bismarck indeed boasted that 
there was no plundering and burning, and that they paid 
when they could for what they took; the coarseness, of 
which we have had only too clear a proof in the present 
war, was probably there, but there was no accusation to 
be compared, not only with the bitterly true accusations 
of to-day, but even with what we are told of 1870, for it 
was in war against the French that the traditional hatred 
of the Prussians in revenge for what Prussia suffered after 
1806 was chiefly manifested. Their own military writers 
consider that Moltke is not to be compared with Napoleon, 
but that the efficiency of the regimental and brigade 
officers atoned in action for whatever the high commands 
did amiss. The greatest miHtary authority, Clausewitz, 
had done a great deal to create a good spirit amongst these 
men, and in particular in his study of the Waterloo cam- 
paign he had taught the supreme necessity of marching 
to the sound of the guns, division supporting division, and 
corps supporting corps, so as to bring a decisive superiority 
on one point. Thus even where the strategy was defective 
— and Napoleon would have made Moltke rue it both in 
1866 and 1870 — even when Frederick Charles had had to 
engage his army in a desperate offensive at a great sacrifice, 
it was done for a purpose because the Crown Prince was 
coming; in the. meanwhile he was pinning Benedek to 
a position, and in the end moral and tactical skill triumphed. 
Railways also had, since the Crimean War, come to play 



VI] REASONS OV PRUSSIAN SUCCESS 187 

an important part; two main lines leading from Saxony 
into Bohemia, the one by way of Torgau over the Zittau 
pass, and the other from Dresden up the Elbe, and the 
main line running up Silesia, parallel to the Giant Mount- 
ains, enabled Moltke to plant his two armies on either side 
of the Austrians, so that he could deUver his two convergent 
blows. 

The Prussians were already beginning to pursue towards 
Vienna, when on July 5, the Austrian government appealed 
to Napoleon to mediate, and offered Venetia to him to be 
handed over to Victor Emmanuel. Napoleon proposed 
arbitration to Bismarck in such a way that it was naturally 
assumed that he would join in the war in case of refusal; 
he could at least rally the South Germans, amongst whom 
the Bavarians at least might be dangerous, though the 
Hanoverians had been crushed, whilst there was no knowing 
whether the Tsar might be more frightened than friendly 
to Prussia. Bismarck answered in a conciHatory tone, but 
would not consent to an armistice. He urged Moltke to 
push on for Vienna, which is 140 miles from Sadowa, so 
that while he negotiated with Napoleon the Austrians 
should be reduced to extremities. He played with Bene- 
detti^ as if he was still ready to allow some compensation 
to France in return for neutraHty. As a matter of fact 
Napoleon withdrew from what was really a very strong 
position; he found out that Victor Emmanuel would not 
accept Venetia as a gift from France; he only asked 
that the Prussians would spare Saxony. Bismarck was 
then able to grant an armistice for terms to be discussed at 
Nikolsburg on July 22 2. Three days later the preliminaries 

1 The French ambassador at Berlin. 

2 The Prussian van was then on the historic ground of Wagram- 
Aspem, a few miles out from Vienna. 



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CH. VI] PRUSSIAN ANNEXATIONS 189 

of peace were signed, and the definite Treaty of Prague was 
accomplished August 23. He was deHberately moderate 
towards Austria, excluding her entirely from Germany but 
demanding no cession of territory except Venetia, which 
thus, after all, became ItaHan as the gift of Prussia. He 
spared Saxony, but made that kingdom join in a new 
North German Confederation with her army at the full 
disposal of Prussia. The North German Confederation was 
to include Prussia, Saxony, the Mecklenburgs, Oldenburg, 
and all the small states north of the Main. But Schleswig 
Holstein, Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort, 
were to be annexed definitely to Prussia, a soHd gain of 
4,500,000 souls, Hnking up old Prussia and Brandenburg 
with Westphalia and Prussian Rhineland as settled in 
1814. The next part of the programme was very clever, 
but Bismarck found considerable difiiculty in persuading 
King WilHam to agree ; in fact he had to call in the Crown 
Prince to persuade his father. He was determined not to 
push to extremities the four South German states, so as 
to drive them into Napoleon's arms. For this purpose 
Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse Darmstadt, were 
to lose no territory; they were simply to agree to a secret 
treaty with Prussia as allies, putting their armies at the 
entire disposal of the Prussian king. Such generosity in 
itself was clever. He made it acceptable by letting the 
Bavarians know that Napoleon expected to receive the 
piece of the left bank of the Rhine which belonged to 
Bavaria. The Napoleonic trickery of 1805 had now come 
home to roost. But it is only fair to add that the French 
Emperor this year was desperately ill, and on some occasions 
was so racked by pain that he could not carry on an 
important conversation. Great Britain was negHgible, being 
simply wedded to the extreme form of non-intervention. 



igo NAPOIyKON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

The Austrian Empire, it may be easily imagined, was 
profoundly influenced by the result of 1866. Hungary 
demanded separation and independence, as against sub- 
jection to a centralised Austrian government which was 
estabHshed in 1849; as a matter of fact Austrian severity 
towards Hungary was already being relaxed before 1866, 
though there was still only one Chamber for the whole 
Empire. The leader of the movement was Deak, an 
Hungarian aristocrat and patriot of the pre-1848 school, 
who believed in reform but not in revolution, and who had 
in consequence stood aloof when Kossuth brought about 
war. The constitution of the Dual Monarchy was Deak's 
work and was brought to accompHshment by Beust in 
1867. Francis Joseph was crowned as King of Hungary 
that year. The Austrian Reichsrath and the Hungarian 
Diet were separated; but whereas the Reichsrath is 
practically subordinate to the Emperor, the Diet is con- 
trolled by the Hungarian upper classes; hence it follows 
that the Diet, being able to oppose the Emperor, ultimately 
controls his poHcy. Matters of joint interest concerning 
foreign poHcy, the army and navy, finance, customs, etc., 
are settled in common; local concerns, such as education, 
belong to the separate governments. The most serious 
question has been, and is, the treatment of the Slavs. 
Bohemia and GaHcia are united to Austria. Croatia and 
Slavonia, as well as the Rumanians of Transylvania, are 
united to Hungary ; consequently the men whose ancestors 
boasted that they had saved the Austrian Empire in 
1848-49 are now under the heel of their hereditary enemies, 
the genuine Magyars, who control the Diet; the Magyar 
language is supreme in the army and in schools, and all 
officials are Magyars. Therefore in gaining Hungarian 
loyalty Francis Joseph has lost Slav loyalty. From his 



VI] THE DUAI, MONARCHY CREATED 191 

own point of view it is a gain, for Hungary was led astray 
by anti-Russian feeling in 1914, and, supported by Germany 
and Hungary, the Austrian contempt for the Slavs has so 
far been successful. The leader of the Hungarians in 1867, 
after Deak retired, was Count Andrassy, who in 1849 was 
a rebel and fled into exile to save himself from being hanged ; 
in 1871 he became Austrian Chancellor. 

In 1867 the lyuxemburg question came forward. 
Napoleon was becoming desperate, because all France 
resented the humiHation of the withdrawal from Mexico. 
Opposition to the Empire was growing bolder and bolder, 
and something had to be done to justify the name of 
Napoleon. Benedetti and Bismarck drew up the draft of 
an agreement after the Bavarian fiasco, or rather Bismarck 
dictated it to Benedetti; Napoleon was to recognise the 
North German Confederation, the annexations by Prussia, 
and the freedom of Prussia to make a union with the South 
Germans, and in return the King of Prussia was to help 
him to obtain I^uxemburg from the King of the Nether- 
lands or Belgium. The draft was never extended into a 
definite treaty, for any misunderstanding that there might 
have been between Prussia and Russia disappeared when 
Manteuffel went to Petrograd on a special mission; the 
friendship of Russia secure, Bismarck did not need France. 
In 1870 Bismarck published the draft of these proposals 
for the benefit of neutrals. But in 1867 war was on the 
verge of breaking out on the lyuxemburg question. All 
that Napoleon could obtain was the withdrawal from the 
Duchy of the garrison which the Prussians had the right 
to maintain, the neutrahsation of the country, and the 
dismanthng of the fortifications. The subsequent history 
of lyuxemburg is simple. Its neutrality was scrupulously 
observed in 1870. When the King of the Netherlands died 



192 NAPOLEON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

in 1890, Willielmina could not under the Salic Law succeed 
to Luxemburg, but a very distant cousin became Grand 
Duke, though it is somewhat remarkable that his grand- 
daughter succeeded him in 1905 without comment or 
reference to the SaHc Law; in 1914 of course William II 
violated the neutraHty. The other project of Napoleon, 
the acquisition of Belgium, can hardly be taken seriously; 
that he nibbled at the bait seems clearly estabHshed, but 
one knows of no documentary evidence of details. Bis- 
marck was qtiite capable of playing with him on this subject, 
if only to make the Enghsh angry, and the draft previously 
written by Benedetti at Bismarck's dictation was pubHshed 
in 1870 to impress Englishmen. 

Thoroughly upset by the sight of a triumphant Prussia 
and by the failure of all his efforts to obtain compensation, 
Napoleon made overtures to Austria. There were great 
difficulties in the way. France had always been in the past 
the chief enemy of Austria. The basis of Napoleon's own 
foreign poHcy had been the Hberation of North Italy up 
to the Adriatic, at the expense of Austria. He had been 
the rival of Austria as the champion of the Papacy; 1867 
was the year of Garibaldi's last raid upon Rome, and he 
had been suppressed by French troops and Rome was once 
more garrisoned by French. But on the other hand it was 
natural for Austria to be attracted towards a French 
aUiance, as the only chance of recovering a position in 
Germany, past hostiHties forgotten. The new Chancellor 
of the Austrian Empire, Count Beust, was the late Prime 
Minister of Saxony, who hated the Prussian ascendancy 
and who had been in 1863-64 the strongest adherent of the 
Federal occupation of Schleswig Holstein, and therefore 
most indignant at the way in which Prussia had made use 
of Austria to secure the Duchies, and then had thrown her 



vi] I^RANCB AND AUSTRIA AFTER 1866 193 

aside. On the other hand the feeling in Hungary was 
anti- Russian rather than anti-Prussian; it was no part 
of Hungarian policy to restore Austrian ascendancy in 
Germany. It resulted that many letters passed between 
Napoleon and Francis Joseph, and a sort of vague idea of 
an alHance existed; an Austrian Archduke went to Paris 
early in 1870, and a French general to Vienna. Whatever 
danger there might be to Prussia from a mutual under- 
standing was however countered by Bismarck, who had 
a far more definite understanding with Russia. Bismarck 
could do something that Russia had very much at heart; 
he could consent to stand by and allow Russia to repudiate 
the Treaty of Paris; this was not too high a price to pay 
for Russian support to keep Austria quiet when the inevit- 
able Franco-Prussian war should break out. 

An Italian alliance was also in Napoleon's mind, and 
here too the difficulties were considerable. The memory 
of Mentana, as well as of Napoleon's withdrawal after the 
Treaty of Villafranca, and his generally half-hearted policy 
which had contributed to ItaHan Unity only by holding back 
the Austrians in i860, was quite sufiicient to make the 
ItaHans lukewarm. Victor Emmanuel could make no 
alliance with France if the Italian ParHament and ItaHan 
public opinion were against it, and to the average ItaHan 
Napoleon's papal poHcy was a fatal objection. Yet 
strangely enough ItaHan hatred of Austria was beginning 
to disappear; Count Beust was not responsible for the 
events of 1848-49 or 1859; the gift of Venetia from the 
hands of the Prussians was galHng, and Prussian taunts of 
ItaHan inefficiency and backwardness in 1866 were such 
that this very gift was a burden for which no gratitude 
need be shown. There were negotiations between Austria 
and Italy. Yet nothing definite had been settled by 1870. 

M. 13 



194 NAPOIyKON Ill's SECOND DECADE [ch. 

Everything seemed to show that when France had to fight 
she would fight single-handed. 

At home Napoleon's poHcy offended ahke the extreme 
** left " and the extreme "right." Whatever concessions he 
made did not satisfy the RepubHcans and angered the 
extreme CathoUcs; for instance, a programme of popular 
elementary education, carried out by the anti-clerical Duruy, 
was thoroughly secular, yet did Httle to conciHate the 
opposition. There was a very small but very resolute body 
in the Chamber which demanded "necessary Hberties," for 
instance the right of questioning the Imperial ministers, 
and the withdrawal of official candidates at elections ; this 
group contained both RepubUcans and Orleanists, such as 
Thiers. A new group was being formed, the tiers-parti 
imder an old opponent of the Empire, Emile Olhvier; 
they adopted a new party cry, I'Empire Liberal, and they 
professed to be firmly attached to the dynasty which 
preserved order, but equally attached to Hberty. In 1867 
Napoleon granted the right of questioning ministers, and 
promised a greater freedom to the press. But this was the 
bad year of the withdrawal from Mexico, of Mentana, and 
of the Luxemburg fiasco. "There is not a single mistake 
more that can be committed'' cried Thiers, who saw all his 
old ideals disappearing; there was neither Hberty nor a 
sufficiency of glory. 

In 1868 the RepubHcans grew bolder. Victor Hugo, 
from his home in the Channel Islands, launched at Napoleon 
Les CMtiments. Henri Rochefort brought out La Lanterne, 
which was widely read before it was suppressed. Gambetta, 
under cover of defending some men who were prosecuted 
for raising a subscription to restore the tomb of one of the 
martyrs of December 2, 185 1, deHvered a tremendous oration 
against the Empire; of course a lawyer defending a cHent 



VI] OPPOSITION GROWING STRONGER 195 

was inviolable; law-courts in France have often enough 
been used for poHtical demonstrations. Yet it may be 
doubted whether the Republicans did more harm or good. At 
one moment they applauded Prussia, at another denounced 
Napoleon for being outwitted by Prussia. They opposed 
the scheme of mihtary reorganisation for fear that 
Napoleon would use an increased army to revoke the 
instalment of liberties that he had granted. One sensible 
project Napoleon set on foot, the reorganisation of the 
army; there was to be a modified form of conscription, an 
active army fed by conscripts chosen by lot, with five years 
in the ranks and four years in the reserve, and the young 
men who remained after lots were drawn were to be formed 
into the garde mobile. The scheme was excellent in itself, 
and was very much wanted, for the long-service professional 
army had practically no reserve, and was quite insufiicient 
to face the great numbers which could be placed in the 
field by Prussia plus the North German Confederation, not 
to speak of the alHed South Germans. It was not that 
any French soldiers had even a suspicion that they were 
inferior to the Prussians; they had their breech-loading 
chassepot, which was better than the needle-gun in range 
and Hghtness, they were proud of their rifled artillery and 
of their new mitrailleuse or machine-gun, they had good 
training in Algeria ; but they must have been conscious of 
the drain on men which the Mexican expedition caused. 
But Napoleon was himself unable to superintend the 
execution of any scheme; his war minister. General Niel, 
died, and nobody else seems to have been patriotic enough 
to take the work in hand ; the entourage of the Court cared 
only for self -advancement ; substitutes could be bought, 
and perhaps the money was paid and the substitute not 
forthcoming. It is not only the general accusation of 

13—2 



196 NAPOI.KON Ill's SECOND DECADE [CH. 

Imperial corruption that makes us think this, but the 
terrible unreadiness of 1870 and the lack of men on the 
immediate declaration of war, the lack of suppHes, and the 
lack of organisation. The reserve hardly existed, and the 
garde mobile had not been properly armed. It is a terrible 
indictment. Yet one hardly knows what could be expected 
when a very ordinary man held a position which was too 
hard for him, simply because he was the heir to his uncle's 
reputation, when place-seekers got at his ear, and he was 
dinned with talk about the glory of France, but was too 
weak in character in any case, and too miserably ill in these 
critical years, to carry out any of the necessary details. 

In the elections of 1869 the Imperial candidates, now 
entitled les agreaUes, in place of the hated les officiels, 
obtained in aU 4,600,000 votes, but the opposition received 
3,300,000. Paris elected irreconcileables, Ferry, Simon, 
Favre, Gambetta, and Rochefort; OlHvier, accused of 
having ratted, was rejected, and had to find a seat for a 
provincial department. Napoleon gave way still more ; he 
gave to the Senate and Chamber the right to initiate laws, 
to the Chamber the right to choose its own President. 
I^ate in the year he called upon Ollivier to form a ministry 
agreeable to the programme of the tiers-parti. A new 
Constitution was drawn up and presented by OlHvier in 
April 1870; then it was submitted to the French nation 
by a plebiscite, which gave 7,300,000 votes in support of 
the Empire to 1,500,000 against. Apart from official 
pressure, it is clear that the French peasants at large and 
the bourgeoisie were still sohd for the dynasty ; Paris, the 
journalists and lawyers, the historians and intellectuals of 
all kinds, were the most bitter opponents. Of course the 
I/iberal Empire never had a chance to show what it was 
worth. Eugenie, the ImperiaUsts, the Ultra-Montains, 



VI] THE lylBERAIy EMPIRE 197 

and the loud-talking and overbearing officers whose influence 
was undeniably great, were working towards a war in order 
to revive, after much humiliation at home and abroad, the 
prestige which was so badly tarnished. When we look at 
Napoleon's last few years, we can see nothing that he did 
for the real good of France, except the completion of the 
Suez Canal scheme ; that, indeed, was all French, rendered 
possible by the subscription of French capital, carried out 
by French engineers, and pushed through by Napoleon's 
determination in face of British opposition. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR 

The grand finale to twenty-three years of storm and 
stress was now approaching, after which Europe was fated 
to have forty-three years of peace, until the new Germany 
brought on the present titanic struggle. That France and 
Prussia would try to come to a conclusion was inevitable, 
for temper and character must find some vent. The 
immediate cause was trivial. 

The history of Spain in the 19th century is quite 
uninteresting, as any long tale of faction and civil strife 
must be. In 1869, after a successful rising had exiled 
Queen Isabella, a provisional government offered the 
crown of Spain to the eldest son of the Prince of Hohen- 
zoUern-Sigmaringen, whom we last mentioned as Prince- 
Minister of Prussia; he was a Roman CathoUc, and very 
distantly connected with the reigning HohenzoUerns ; his 
second son was already Prince of Rumania. Both father 
and son were unwilling to accept the offer, nor was the 
King of Prussia ready to consent. But Bismarck manoeuvred 
in favour of the idea. The offer was finally accepted in 
June 1870, but as the Spanish Cortes were not sitting it 
was being kept quiet for the time, for Bismarck wished 
the announcement to appear with the full consent of the 
Spaniards. But the news leaked out. All France was in 



CH. VII] THE SPANISH CANDIDATURE 199 

uproar, for Napoleon had not been consulted and, although 
the prince was not actually a Prussian, his father's services 
in the Prussian ministry and the extreme improbabiHty of 
his acceptance without the consent of the King and Bismarck 
pointed to a deep design to plant a partisan of Prussia on 
France's flank. It was not a question of offering a new 
crown to a harmless German from a petty state such as 
Saxe Coburg. 

The candidature was withdrawn, and the Prussian 
official assurance was that the whole affair was a private 
arrangement between the Spanish ministers and the prince 
and his father. Benedetti was then instructed to demand 
that the offer would never again be considered. The 
French press and pubHc opinion were wildly excited, so 
that Napoleon's ministers had no choice but to try to 
obtain some guarantee after so much secrecy which was 
construed to be an insult to France. Bismarck was away 
from Berhn, and King WilHam was taking the waters at 
Ems. Benedetti went to interview the King, who quite 
informally, on two occasions, once on a pubUc promenade 
and once at the railway station as he was returning to 
Berhn, but also quite courteously, informed him that the 
withdrawal was sufficient and no guarantee could be given. 
A telegram was sent on July 13 from Ems to Bismarck 
who was now at Berhn. He was at dinner with Roon and 
Moltke, and, assured by them that the army was quite 
ready for war, he prepared for pubhcation part of the 
telegram. As altered, the "Ems telegram" was not in 
itself provocative of war, though Bismarck himself in his 
old age boasted that by doctoring it he brought on the 
war ; but many old men like to exaggerate the importance 
of their former actions. Indeed he omitted one phrase, 
namely that the King refused Benedetti's request " somewhat 



200 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch, 

sternly." But the German papers of July 14, possibly at 
a hint from Bismarck, were highly provocative, and the 
French papers — it was the national fete day in France — 
were insulting. On the one side Benedetti was represented 
as intruding on the King's privacy, on the other it was 
asserted that the King had dehberately turned his back 
on Benedetti. Each nation, most unfortunately press- 
ridden, was spoiling for war. The French Chamber on 
July 15 voted supplies for war, and the King returning 
to BerHn by train found excited crowds at the stations 
clamouring for war, though he gave no orders for mobilisa- 
tion until the vote at Paris was known. That Bismarck 
was intriguing and Moltke was hoping for war is certain. 
But to point to any one incident or any one person's action 
as the immediate cause would be wrong. "The story is 
one of national jealousy carefully fanned for four years by 
newspaper editors.... Bismarck's clever shifts to bring about 
a rupture in 1870 would have failed had not the atmosphere 
both at Paris and BerHn been charged with electricity 1." 
He at once pubUshed Benedetti's paper of 1866, with its 
suggestions that France should be allowed with Prussia's 
sanction and help to annex Belgium or I^uxemburg. 

Moltke's general plan of campaign had been drawn up 
already. As in 1866, he would take the offensive ; it might 
be costly in Uves, but if successful would be overwhelming. 
Two things had to be considered; firstly, would Austria 
join in as France's ally, or were the preUminary overtures, 
which Napoleon had made with Italy as well as Austria, 
vague and unlikely to be reaUsed? Secondly, would the 
South German states put their armies entirely at Prussia's 
disposal? As regards the first point, it was unnecessary 
to disarrange the plan of offence, for the whole half-milHon 
^ Holland Rose, The Development of the European Nations, p. 49. 



vn] WAR BEGINS JUI,Y 1870 201 

first line of the army could not be carried to the Rhine at 
once ; three army corps at least had to be mobiHsed in the 
eastern parts of Prussia, and before the railways were clear 
enough for their transport it would be known whether they 
could be safely launched against France, or would be 
required against Austria; very soon it was seen that as 
Austria was not mobiUsing they were not wanted in the 
east, but in the meanwhile there they were in case they 
should be wanted. There can be Uttle doubt that the 
attitude of Russia, to which country Bismarck had always 
respectfully paid court, kept Austria quiet. On the second 
point the fatal error of Napoleon when he tried to get the 
left bank of the Rhine at Bavaria's expense threw her 
into the arms of Prussia; two Bavarian army corps were 
mobiHsed as part of the Crown Prince's army, and their 
conduct in the war was such that never has there been 
any doubt that she would ever fight again as France's ally ; 
Napoleon himself had thrown away any chance of his 
gaining the ally who had been so useful to Louis XIV or 
to his uncle. Similarly the divisions of Wurtemberg, 
Baden, and Hesse Darmstadt, were available. Saxony 
was already in the North German Confederation and 
provided one army corps, but the Saxons were not at aU 
anxious to fight against France. 

Fourteen corps being mobiHsed^, they were concentrated 

^ A Prussian regiment was on mobilisation at once doubled in 
strength from its peace footing by the inclusion of reserves, i.e., the 
men who had comparatively recently been discharged from the 
colours and who were still obliged to do a short annual training. 
The landwehr men were ex-reservists, mostly young married men 
in civil life, who were called up to the lines of communication or to 
the firing line as they were wanted. It was the devotion of the 
landwehr men to the fatherland that so struck Archibald Forbes, 
and he often refers to it. 



202 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

by rail at three points from which they were to converge 
on the frontier of Alsace and I^orraine. For a fortnight 
Germany west of the Rhine was practically defenceless, 
and Napoleon I would certainly have made the first dash 
to enter upon German soil and strike between any two of 
these armies before they converged; Moltke, it is clear, 
counted dehberately upon Napoleon III not being ready, 
for his spies must have made him aware of the French lack 
of organisation. The three points were in the neighbourhood 
of Coblenz, Mainz, and Landau. The First Army, two 
corps of Rhinelanders under General Steinmetz, based on 
Coblenz, was to be ready in case Napoleon should violate 
the neutraUty of Belgium ; when it was seen that he would 
not, it was to march southwards to join in on the right 
flank of the Second Army. Prince Frederick Charles 
commanded the Second Army, composed of the Prussian 
Guard and four other corps and the Saxons, based on Mainz, 
and facing south-westwards to meet the Hue of Steinmetz's 
advance. The Third Army, under the Crown Prince, was 
on the Rhine, in the north of Baden and round Landau 
in the Palatinate, composed of two Prussian, two Bavarian, 
and a mixed corps; his destination was the northern 
frontier of Alsace. 

On the other side the mobiHsation of the French 
depended entirely upon one main line of rail running due 
east from Paris by way of Chalons, to Nancy, thence to 
the frontier at Weissenburg to meet the German railway 
from Landau ; a branch from Nancy ran to Metz, continuing 
thence on the one side to Luxemburg and to Belgium, on the 
other to the frontier at Saarbruck and onwards to Mainz; 
branch Unes also ran from Chalons and Nancy towards 
Belfort in the extreme south of Alsace at the gap between 
the Vosges Mountains and the Jura, thence northwards 



vn] THE GERMAN INITIATIVE 203 

up the middle of Alsace to Strasburg, meeting the main 
line at Weissenburg. Thus the rendezvous of the main 
French army around Metz and Nancy was certain, while 
a second army would be based on Strasburg. Napoleon 
was himself in command at Metz with four corps, roughly 
120,000 men; MacMahon, of MalakoS and Magenta fame, 
had about 50,000 men in north Alsace; the Imperial 
Guard was in the rear at Nancy; a corps, based on the 
strong fortress of Bitsch, connected Napoleon and MacMahon ; 
and another was based on Belf ort far to the south ; reserves 
were being concentrated in a great camp near Chalons. 
It is superfluous to insist further on the unreadiness and 
lack of details of equipment among the French, or on the 
inabihty of Napoleon, still ill and in pain, to handle the 
force. The main point is that they were spread out behind 
the frontier irregularly, the larger army bunched between 
Metz and Saarbruck, the other between Strasburg and 
Weissenburg, with a corps between them which failed to 
keep touch with either, and reduced by want of a common 
plan to wait to receive on the defensive the blows which 
it remained for the enemy to dehver. The lines of the 
German railways running towards Saarbruck and Weissen- 
burg indicated where would be the converging points of 
Steinmetz and the Red Prince, and of the Crown Prince, 
respectively. It must not be supposed that all the German 
arrangements worked with absolute perfection, for both 
the battles of August 6 were brought on prematurely; 
Steinmetz pushed on too fast and his left incommoded the 
Red Prince's right ; a day's delay would have concentrated 
a greater number of men on each of the French advanced 
points, and thus would have prevented heavy losses. But 
the general plan was understood and was carried out, and 
German corps commanders knew that they must support 



204 'THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

each other, whenever they heard the sound of guns, without 
hesitation or jealousy. Within three weeks the Germans 
were mobiHsed, concentrated, and advanced up to and over 
the frontier; about 160,000 came at once into action, 
200,000 were immediately behind them, and another 
100,000 were not far off as they were not required against 
the Austrians. 

On August 2 the advanced brigade of Steinmetz was 
at Saarbruck on German soil; General Frossard's leading 
division engaged it and drove it back, and the Prince 
Imperial received his "baptism of fire." As Steinmetz 
brought up his full army, Frossard fell back into France 
and took up a strong position at the two villages of Forbach 
and Spicheren, with all the advantages of steep slopes 
and woods and garden enclosures in his favour. On 
August 6, a subordinate general, thinking Frossard to be 
in full retreat with only a rearguard at Spicheren, attacked ; 
other divisions of Steinmetz's army advanced to the sound 
of the guns, and Alvensleben's corps of Frederick Charles's 
command struck in on their left. The French easily repulsed 
the first attacks, but late in the day the Germans overlapped 
both flanks and hauled guns up to high ground so as to 
dominate the position. Then Frossard drew off in the 
night, leaving behind him indeed a great store of supplies 
and munitions, yet maintaining tolerable order. Tout 
peut se retahlir ran Napoleon's bulletin, and this was true ; 
for the whole of the German Second Army was not yet 
deployed, and Frossard was able to rally on the two French 
corps behind him, which had remained inactive all day 
though well within the sound of his guns. The French 
fought very gallantly, and their moral was not badly 
shaken. 

On the other side the fighting began within the French 



vn] SPICHBRBN AND WOERTH 205 

frontier at Weissenburg, where on August 4 one Bavarian 
and two Prussian corps of the Third Army surrounded and 
overpowered a single unsupported division of MacMahon's 
army. By August 6 he concentrated his whole available 
force at the villages of Woerth, Froeschweiler, and Blsass- 
hausen, about 50,000 strong, and he too had the great 
advantage of slopes and woods and enclosures. The French 
fought with great spirit and deHvered counter-attacks, but 
the Crown Prince, when once committed prematurely to 
battle by his corps leaders, brought up more and more 
Germans till he had about 80,000 in all. The position was 
surrounded in broad dayUght, and in spite of devoted 
charges of cavalry to certain death to cover the retreat 
the French broke. There was a bad rout. Some rallied 
and fell back to Strasburg, the rest fled across the Vosges 
without any order. German critics accuse the Crown 
Prince of losing touch with the fugitives; but it would 
seem that the tremendous success of the battle, brought 
on a day too soon, but accepted when once he was committed, 
was almost too sudden. He preferred to close up his rear 
for an orderly advance. Meanwhile the French corps, 
under Failly, lay at Bitsch half-way between Woerth and 
Spicheren, and assisted at neither battle; it was left in 
the air, and now fell back on Nancy on the way to Chalons. 
The distance from Woerth to Spicheren is 40 miles. 

The general plan of the renewed German advance was 
dictated by the plain facts that MacMahon's army no longer 
existed, and that all the other French corps were concen- 
trating on Metz. Napoleon handed over the supreme 
command to Bazaine, and himself went to Chalons, where 
MacMahon met him to organise a new army out of the 
reserves and fugitives. Bazaine had now five corps, 
perhaps 170,000 front-Hne men, as the Guard and other 



2o6 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

units came up, and his purpose was to retreat on Verdun 
to make his stand on the Meuse. But confusion still 
reigned, and on August 14 the retreat was only beginning ; 
Bazaine's apology for his delay was that his stores and 
transport were insufficient. By this time the Germans 
were advancing in strength, with at least two new corps 
coming up which had been in neither the First nor the 
Second Army on the 6th. The First Army was approaching 
the eastern face of Metz ; its duty was to hinder the French 
retreat, and one of the generals on his own initiative attacked 
at Colombey for this purpose; Steinmetz pressed in to 
support him, and Bazaine, though beating off the attack 
with considerable loss to the Germans, was delayed for 
a day. Meanwhile the Second Army was advancing on 
a broad front to the south so as to circle round and pin 
Bazaine to Metz; any such encircUng movement requires 
time, hence the value of the action at Colombey which 
seemed to be a French victory. The Third Army was 
advancing on either side of the main railway from the 
northern shoulder of the Vosges towards Nancy ; it occupied 
I/Uneville and found no enemy to dispute the plateau, the 
Grand Couronne de Nancy, where in 1914 General Castelnau 
stopped the German advance. Part of this army the 
Crown Prince detached to lay siege to Strasburg. 

On August 16 Bazaine had no more troops to the east 
of Metz, and his retreat on Verdun was really beginning. 
But by the morning of that day Alvensleben's corps of 
the Second Army, swinging round from west to north, was 
threatening the main road. He immediately went into 
action near Vionville against Frossard's corps, but he had 
practically the whole French army against him. Bazaine 
was so taken by surprise that he seems to have thought 
that he had more than one corps to face, for he could 



vn] GERMANS BEHIND METZ 207 

easily have swept it aside. Alvensleben held on, while 
another corps, swinging round in the same way, but 
further to the west, and therefore having to describe a 
wider concentric circle, came in on his left, while another 
was coming up in his right rear. The result was that, as 
Bazaine did not put in his whole army for fear of losing 
touch with Metz in his rear, towards the end of the day 
nearly equal forces were engaged. Even so, slow as was 
the development of the French counter-attack, the Germans 
were for a time in a position of great danger. Three times 
in the day masses of cavalry had to be sent to charge 
guns and infantry to gain some Uttle delay, which they 
succeeded in doing, especially on the extreme west of the 
field near the village of Mars-la-Tour. But they held their 
ground and stopped the retreat of the French by the high 
road. 

On the 17th, Bazaine fell back to a new position nearer 
to Metz. His left rested on the outworks of the great 
fortress near Gravelotte, and his main Hne ran northwards 
and sUghtly westwards along the slope of a valley, his 
centre at Amanvillers and his right at Saint Privat, a front 
of some seven miles, while behind him ran the Metz-Belgium 
railway. It was quite a strong position, admitting of a good 
defence, and entrenched, but everything depended on the 
possibihty of maintaining a hold upon Saint Privat; four 
corps were in Hne and the Guard in reserve. Moltke took 
advantage of the day, while Bazaine was consolidating 
and entrenching his Hne, to complete the encircHng move- 
ment. Steinmetz coming round on the inner curve nearest 
to Metz, faced Gravelotte; Frederick Charles continued 
the Hne opposite to AmanviUers and Saint Privat, the 
Prussian Guard on his left, the corps that had been most 
engaged on the i6th in reserve, and the Saxons on the 



2o8 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

outside curve coming up to a position beyond Saint Privat. 
The French had their faces, and the Prussians their backs, 
to Paris. 

During the whole day of the i8th the Germans were 
attacking very fiercely. Steinmetz carried Gravelotte, but 
trying to push on across the wooded valley got his army 
crowded in a position where it lost very heavily. Frederick 
Charles could make no impression upon the two villages to 
his front. But Bazaine made no strong counter-attack; 
it is thought that if he had put in the Guard, he could have 
routed Steinmetz and won a position to the south of the 
Germans which would have placed them in a very awkward 
position ; or again, if he had sent the Guard to Saint Privat, 
he could have turned the German left; he did neither. 
Consequently towards nightfall the Saxons arrived, stormed 
Saint Privat, where apparently the French had shot away 
almost all their ammunition, and completely turned their 
right ; the chassepot was yet a new weapon, and the French 
at the period of the previous heavy charges shot very 
rapidly, and it is said with insufficient aim. The Germans 
confessed to a loss of 20,000, but they had won their object ; 
even the headstrong attacks of Steinmetz, for which he 
was deprived of his command, had at least pinned Bazaine's 
left flank to his position and prevented him from reinforcing 
the right flank at Saint Privat. So Bazaine retreated to 
Metz. He had still 200,000, fortress troops included, for 
active resistance, but by accepting defeat and allowing 
himself to be locked up in Metz, he put himself out of a 
position to influence the campaign worthy of his numbers. 
Moltke promptly commenced the siege with the First Army, 
and three corps of the Second, together with reserves, about 
200,000 men. The rest of the Second Army, including the 
Prussian Guard and the Saxons, were formed into a new 



VII] GRAVBI.OTTE, AUGUST i8 209 

command, called the Army of the Meuse, under the Crown 
Prince of Saxony, and sent to support the Crown Prince 
of Prussia's advance on Chalons. 

Meanwhile MacMahon was forming a new army at 
Chalons. He had the -remnants of his own men from 
Woerth, Failly's corps which had retreated from Bitsch 
without fighting, another from Belfort which had been 
too far distant to be in action, and a reserve corps, a total 
of well over 120,000 men. He had before him the alter- 
natives of defending the Hne of the Marne, or of falHng 
back on Paris, for it was too late for him to advance to make 
a stand upon the Meuse between the fortresses of Verdun 
and Toul. The third and worst thing that he could do 
was to try to march round to the north and east to cut his 
way through to Bazaine; it has been condemned by all 
writers, especially as Bazaine could hold out for a long time, 
but poHtical considerations prevailed. Napoleon was with 
MacMahon. He dared not return to Paris, where the 
excitement against him was growing in intensity, and he 
felt that almost any move, however bad, was preferable to 
having to face the mob of Paris. So on August 21 Mac- 
Mahon started from the Chalons camp to make that most 
dangerous of all moves, a flank march across the enemy's 
front. The Crown Prince of Prussia was moving on a wide 
front of about 25 miles on either side of the railway ; Nancy 
had fallen, and Toul was blocked. On the 25th he had 
some information of what MacMahon was doing, but it 
seemed too good to be true. On the 26th, the news being 
confirmed, the whole of the German force, both the Third 
and the Fourth Army, swerved northwards on a new Hne 
down the valleys of the Aisne and the Meuse ; by the 29th 
the leading corps were well upon MacMahon's flank, pressing 
him off his direct Hne towards Metz, and inflicting on him 
M. 14 



210 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

such severe blows on the 30th and 31st that the French 
were driven, in an almost demoraUsed condition, northwards 
to Sedan in the Meuse valley. By the 31st some portion 
of the Germans had crossed the Meuse ; on September ist 
several corps crossed above and below Sedan 1, and fought 
their way to the right and left along the hills curving above 
the town. MacMahon might yet have broken away still 
further northwards, saving his army as an army in spite 
of all his losses, but he was wounded by a spHnter from 
a shell. Both he and Napoleon meant the command to 
devolve on Ducrot. But General de Wimpfen had just 
arrived hot-foot from Algeria, and passing through Paris 
had been given a special commission by the ministry in case 
anything should happen to MacMahon; producing this he 
overbore even the Emperor's wishes. Ducrot's orders to 
retreat to the north-west were countermanded, and Wimpfen 
made his main effort to break out eastwards towards Metz. 
The change of plan meant delay, and this was invaluable 
to the Germans, who now had time to press along the hills 
so as to form full circle and join hands. The French efforts, 
including a fierce charge of all the available cavalry which, 
as at Woerth, led to certain death, were all useless. Panic 

1 It was at Bazeilles near Sedan that some villagers fired into 
the rear of a Bavarian detachment, and the village was deliberately 
set on fire so that men and women aUke were burnt alive. It almost 
seems as if the memory of such revenge were kept alive on purpose, 
in order that brutality might make impossible any return of friendship 
for France but bind Bavaria for ever to Prussia. Some of the foulest 
deeds of 191 4 are on the clearest evidence attributed to Bavarians. 
On the other hand the Saxons both in 1870 and 191 4 began the war 
with no bitterness against France, and their memory of 1870 is an 
entirely honourable one of their great charge at Saint Privat without 
any taint of brutality, and we know that they have been very decent 
towards our own men in the trenches. 



VIl] 



SEDAN, SBPTEMBBR i 



211 




212 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

was setting in; the streets of Sedan were congested, and 
German shells were f alHng there fast ; so in the afternoon 
Napoleon himself ordered the white flag to be run up. 

Unconditional surrender, softened only by an offer to 
accept the parole of officers, was Moltke's sentence. All 
attempts to get better terms, such as would save the French 
the bitterness of extreme humiliation and leave some little 
sense of gratitude, were unavailing. Gratitude does not 
exist in history. It is best to weaken an enemy to exhaus- 
tion so that he may be unable to think of revenge. Thus 
argued Bismarck, leaving to Moltke the last word. He 
refused to let Napoleon meet William face to face lest the 
King should become soft. On September 2 unconditional 
surrender was accepted, and 83,000 French were made 
prisoners, making with those already captured a total of 
over 100,000, including the Emperor and wounded Marshal. 
The horrors of the last day of the fighting, of the suspense 
during the discussion of terms, of the herding and starvation 
of the prisoners for a short time before they could be got 
away, and of the miserable march to Germany, are beyond 
imagination. 

Eugenie fled from Paris helped by her American doctor ; 
we must leave to her a share of blame for her husband's 
collapse, for she always urged him on to high enterprise 
without any consideration as to whether he had the 
resources to carry it out. The Third Republic was pro- 
claimed in Paris on September 4, and was demanded at 
Bordeaux and Lyons before news arrived of what Paris 
had done. Thiers was called to the head, and with him 
were Favre and Grevy; he was a reputed Orleanist, but 
for the time there was no thought of any form of government 
but a RepubHc. The First Republic had beaten back the 
Prussians from Valmy in 1792. Now that the French 



vn] THE THIRD RBPUBIylC 213 

nation had established "it/* they would rise as a nation 
in defence of "it," avenge Sedan, save Metz, and restore 
the honour that the Emperor had damaged. But the cases 
were not similar; the men of 1792 were mostly the old 
trained soldiers that royal France gave to the new RepubUc, 
though their enthusiasm was republican; the enemy in 
1792 was the unenthusiastic army of the Prussian monarchy, 
rusted for want of use, and ht by no flame of devotion for 
the fatherland. Now the French repubUcan levies were 
untrained, however keen would be their devotion, and the 
Germans were burning with new enthusiasm for fatherland 
and for the watch over the Rhine, highly trained men, 
confident of victory, a nation in arms. Behef in a cause 
wins when it has its resources and its power to act. The 
French nation from September 4 onwards was magnificent ; 
it held out for five months after Napoleon had been ruined 
within one ; its devotion was such that from 1871 to 1914 
it had always a memory of noble efforts to counterbalance 
humihation. But it had not the resources to hold back the 
flood of German invasion as J off re held it back in September 
1914, for Joffre's reserves were npt raw or untrained. 

The first thought was whether there would be any 
fighting at all. The Emperor began it, would the RepubHc 
continue it? The Prussian leaders required some security, 
Alsace and lyorraine, or at least some part, for otherwise 
the RepubHc might enjoy a breathing space and then, 
being ready, think of revenge. Favre made his famous 
aUvSwer, ** Not an inch of our soil nor a stone of our fortresses." 
The war, therefore, went on. 

The Germans, held stationary for a time whilst they 
gathered in their prisoners and rearranged their plans, 
proceeded at last towards Paris. They had no formed 
army before them. General Trochu commanded a com- 



214 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

posite mass of a few regulars, a good many sailors who 
manned the forts, and a large number of national guards 
and mobile guards; the two latter bodies were armed 
citizens and country militia respectively, and at either 
extreme we may place the rabid Parisian democrats, 
already communists at heart, and the pious CathoUc 
monarchy-loving Bretons. It was a difficult garrison for 
Trochu to control, and very uneven in quality. The mass 
of armed men, hardly to be called soldiers, outnumbered 
the approaching Germans. But it woiold have been madness 
to take the open field, and Trochu was certainly wise to 
allow Paris to be surrounded. The task before the Germans 
was difficult enough, even when the weakness of the French 
is considered. The army besieging Metz and the army 
closing round Paris had to be fed, and a great part of the 
food had to be brought from Germany, for the area of 
fighting in France was soon exhausted, both by the French 
who swept supplies into Paris, and by the Germans who 
requisitioned, so that war could not entirely support war; 
one writer, indeed, implies that on one occasion provision 
trains destined for the besiegers of Paris were diverted to 
the besiegers of Metz, and that the former were in conse- 
quence nearly forced to retreat. Moreover the long fine 
of railway, Nancy — Toul — Chalons — Paris, by which muni- 
tions and suppUes had to be forwarded, had to be watched, 
principally by reserves of landwehr ; Frenchmen were forced 
to work on the Hne, and had to be guarded ; it was difficult 
to prevent destruction of the rails and bridges at each 
point. Here we have the question of the francs-tireurs ; 
men not in uniform, merely decorated with armlets or 
brassards, which they could wear as soldiers, and slip off 
when they wanted to pass off as civiUans, gave the German 
line infinite trouble by sniping. If the Republican govern- 



vn] THE NEW ARMIES FORMING 215 

ment at Tours could raise and concentrate on the Loire 
a considerable relieving force, and another in the north, 
and if Trochu could time his sorties to co-operate, while 
yet the Germans had trouble with francs-tireurs on the line 
of commimication, then the siege of Paris might turn to 
the advantage of the besieged. Everything seemed to 
depend on the quahty of the new armies and on time. The 
French really seemed to have a chance, and thus we admire 
the way in which they tried to seize it. Communications 
between Paris and outside reHef were carried on by means 
of balloons and pigeons. I^eon Gambetta, the ardent 
anti-imperial lawyer, escaped to Tours in a balloon, and 
was the soul of the great effort ; he was a thorn in the side 
of Thiers, who dubbed him a fou furieux, but he went near 
to success. Aurelle de Paladines was Gambetta's general 
chosen to lead the army of the Loire to the reHef of Paris. 

To help the Germans, a severe bombardment forced 
the surrender of Strasburg, September 27. Toul fell 
September 23. Bitsch far away in the north of Alsace 
was merely blockaded, and did not distract many Germans 
so as to influence the war. Belfort was later besieged by 
the army which had taken Strasburg. There were com- 
paratively few Germans to cover, against the reUeving 
forces, the main army blockading Paris. General von der 
Tann with one Bavarian corps and a Prussian division 
advanced on and entered Orleans on October 11. Then 
at the critical moment Bazaine surrendered Metz on 
October 24. No argument in his defence is worth the least 
consideration; to say that his commission was from the 
Emperor, and therefore that he had no duty towards the 
RepubHc, is nonsense ; a higher loyalty was owed to France. 
He could have held out longer and detained the Red Prince 
before Metz, giving invaluable aid to the newly growing 



2i6 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

army on the lyoire^. By surrendering he freed the Red 
Prince. Verdun was surrendered, after a bombardment, 
on November 5. Aurelle's army of the lyoire, 100,000 
strong, was not ready to advance till November, when he 
drove von der Tann out of Orleans and distinctly defeated 
him at Coulmiers on November 9, in the region where the 
Maid defeated Talbot and Fastolf in 1429. But it was 
only a defeat, and the outnumbered Bavarians drawing 
off without more than ordinary loss fell back on Frederick 
Charles, who was now free to move after the disposal of 
his Metz prisoners. The result was that the so far victorious 
French were quite unable to get near enough to Paris to 
compel the raising of the siege. Whether they could have 
done so, had Bazaine had a little more grit in his character 
and a better power of control over his men, must remain 
uncertain; Moltke was frightened for a moment, but the 
raw French levies, however enthusiastic, were man for man 
no match for the Germans; they might have threatened, 
or even cut, the main Hue of communication, and made 
Moltke detach a considerable force to rally Tann; then 
would have been the moment for Trochu's sortie. But 
all guesswork is vain. 

^ On the other hand the evidence of Archibald Forbes is that 
Metz was in a disgraceful condition from typhoid fever and general 
dirt and demoralisation. Bazaine had no power of leadership, 
many of the officers were of the worst type of boasters and haughty 
and disobedient, and the men discontented to the verge of mutiny ; 
the laxity of the Napoleonic rule, promotion by favour, selfishness, 
etc., had ruined the spirit that ought to exist between officers and 
men. He often speaks of the excessive drinking, especially of 
cognac and absinthe, as the curse of France, and plainly thinks that 
Bazaine was at the end of his tether. He entered Metz very soon 
after the capitulation. The forts round Metz, he says, were 
impregnable. The prisoners were 173,000 from the field army 
and garrison combined. 



VII] FAII.URB TO BREAK THROUGH 217 

Frederick Charles interposed between Orleans and the 
besiegers three fuU army corps, and he had the inner 
position. In the last week of November he was in touch 
with Aurelle; on December i and 2 he drove him back 
on to Orleans, and once more the Germans entered that 
city. Meanwhile the great sortie from Paris, timed to 
take place on November 30, so as to join hands with Aurelle 
from the Loire, was directed to the south-east and east, 
and after four days of heavy fighting the French fell 
back. Gambetta now dismissed Aurelle, and put in his 
place Chanzy and Bourbaki. Chanzy fought hard against 
Frederick Charles December 8 and 10, but could not break 
through. The RepubHcan government was withdrawn 
from Tours to Bordeaux, and Chanzy circled round west- 
wards to I^e Mans to rest his men and organise for yet 
another effort. Bourbaki seemed to disappear out of sight 
southwards. Thus the concerted movement failed, though 
in all some 200,000 French of the new levies were brought 
into action. 

In November also General Faidherbe was collecting an 
army in the north based on Amiens. Manteuffel, released 
from the siege of Metz, with two corps of the old First 
Army, had Uttle trouble in pushing his way through; he 
captured Amiens and Rouen in succession, and overran 
Normandy up to the coast. Another centre of French 
resistance was Dijon in Burgundy. Garibaldi came hither 
to put his services at the disposal of the Republic, but 
he was far from being the old Garibaldi of 1849 and i860 ; 
he lacked energy, and was accused, it may be with some 
truth, of intolerance and even persecution of priests and 
monks. The Germans invested Belfort in November, and 
to cover the siege a corps under General von Werder lay 
between the Vosges and Dijon. 



2i8 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

Thus the main great operation, the siege of Paris, 
was being carried on without a break. As the autumn 
passed away the feeling of many neutrals in Europe began 
to change. Sympathy was felt for France now suffering 
for the sins of Napoleon, and holding out to prevent a loss 
of territory which she did not deserve. The energy of 
Gambetta, the heroism of Aurelle and Chanzy, the presence 
of Garibaldi, the thought of the great city, the intellectual 
and artistic capital of the world, now blockaded and within 
measurable distance of starvation, each made for sympathy. 
Thiers was making a tour through Europe to obtain help 
from neutrals, or to induce the four remaining Powers 
to concert to put pressure on Germany. Bismarck felt 
anxiety. In his own reminiscences pubHshed many years 
later, and in his talk as recorded by his Boswell Busch, he 
both resented the imputation against German Kultur and 
showed scorn of France. It was no crime, he protested, for 
Germans to stamp down resistance after the "not an inch 
of our soil nor a stone of our fortresses" proclamation; 
Paris had no real claim to be the "Mecca of civiHsation," 
the Ville Lumihe of hterature and art, so that it should 
be exempted from the penalties of war; civiUans were 
bound to suffer in all wars, even to the point of starvation, 
and if starvation why not bombardment ? He was scornful 
of Thiers, cringing to foreigners for help, though he certainly 
foresaw trouble if a Concert of Europe should demand the 
relaxation of Germany's grip. What excited him most was 
EngHsh sentimentaHty about the bombardment which had 
not yet begun ; the Crown Prince had an English wife, our 
Princess Royal, who was much influenced by Queen Victoria ; 
the chief of his staff and other high-placed Germans were 
also married to EngHshwomen ; feminine sentimental inter- 
ference, and English feminine interference at that, was 



VII] NEUTRAL SYMPATHY FOR FRANCE 219 

hateful to the serious man of blood and iron. The worst 
of it was that King William himself was influenced. More- 
over there was some tension between Bismarck and the 
miHtary leaders. He writes as if they resented his being 
present at councils of war, and he was certainly vexed that 
they were not hurrying up the heavy siege-guns. Winter 
was near, and it was absolutely necessary to bombard so 
as to force a speedy surrender. 

In November Bismarck found a powerful ally in 
Carlyle. The strong-minded Scot never swerved from his 
admiration for aU things German, and his letter to The 
Times on November 18 was characteristic of him. He began 
by several references to past history to show how France 
had always been the aggressor ; Henri II got Metz, Verdun, 
and Toul, " by fraudulent pawnbroking," and l/ouis XIV got 
Strasburg " by attorneyism...but not so much attomeyism 
and the long sword as the housebreaker's jemmy"; "no 
nation ever had so bad a neighbour as Germany has had 
in France." He honoured France for her First Revolution, 
which was an "Insurrection against Shams," but then she 
stopped short. "The further stage must be under better 
presidency than that of France.... The German race, not 
the GaeHc, are now to be protagonist in the immense 
world-drama.... Considerable misconception as to Herr 
von Bismark is stiU prevalent in England.... Bismark, as 
I read him, is not a person of 'Napoleonic' ideas, but of 
ideas quite superior to Napoleonic; shows no invincible 
'lust of territory,' nor is tormented with 'vulgar ambition,' 
but has aims far beyond that sphere; and in fact seems 
to me to be striving with strong faculty, by patient, grand, 
and successful steps, towards an object beneficial to Germans 
and to all other men. That noble, patient, deep, pious, 
and soHd Germany should be at length welded into a nation 



220 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

and become a Queen of the Continent, instead of vapouring, 
vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and over- 
sensitive France, seems to be the hopefullest public fact 
that has occurred in my time." Archibald Forbes, the 
famous war-correspondent of the Daily News, expressed 
the same thing in different language; the Germans were 
to him hearty and honest comrades, who certainly drank 
good beer and wine, but were not sodden with cognac and 
absinthe; they did not requisition supphes beyond what 
was necessary, and paid for much that they took, nor did 
they loot systematically; their endurance in the bitter 
winter, their steadiness and patriotism, were admirable. 

Were Carlyle and Forbes right? Were the Germans 
justified, or were they as in 1914 inhuman beyond the 
methods of most victors in war? This is the place to 
discuss such questions, because Carlyle's letter, appearing 
before the bombardment, while Thiers was making his 
appeal to neutrals and sympathy was being loudly expressed 
for France, both in England and in other countries, had 
a very great influence. We can hardly imagine that 
Gladstone in any case would have been forced by sympathy 
into war. But not only the pubHc opinion of historians 
and intellectual leaders owed very much to Carlyle; he 
also touched the average man. It is fair to bracket the 
name of Forbes with his, for the practical man who was 
on the spot, watching the siege of Paris, had also an un- 
deniable influence. They have this in common that, each 
in his own way, they followed the lead of Burke in putting 
into the foremost place a consideration of "Temper and 
Character." The present writer remembers very vividly how 
his elders, during and after the war, referred to Carlyle as the 
sage against whom there was no appeal, and quoted Forbes 
as a man of real insight above aU joumaHsts. They were 



VII] CARI^YIvE'S INFlyUBNCB 221 

the two men who counted, and we have to get at contem- 
porary evidence rather than the legend created since 1870. 
After more than forty years we can see the flaw in 
Carlyle's argument. The French seizure of the three 
bishoprics of lyorraine and of Alsace was unjust possibly, 
but possession had been confirmed by several international 
treaties, and finally by the Congress of Vienna ; the happi- 
ness and prosperity of the inhabitants, and their wish to 
remain French, outweigh the wickedness of annexation; 
aU nations have conquered what was not theirs, but very 
few have been the equals of France in winning the affection 
and loyalty of the conquered; Germany's own record in 
Poland, Schleswig, and Alsace, has been consistently bad. 
If France had been a bad neighbour to Germany, Bavaria 
and Prussia have at various periods been very bad neigh- 
bours to Austria^. Moreover the First French RepubHc 

^ We turn naturally to Carlyle's estimate of Frederick the Great. 
If Louis XIV used a burglar's jemmy at Strasburg, how did Frederick 
seize Silesia in 1741 ? Here is the answer in Carlyle's words. "Will 
not Europe, probably, blaze into general War; Pragmatic Sanction 
going to waste sheepskin, and universal scramble ensuing? In which 
he who has 100,000 good soldiers, and can handle them, may be an 
important figure in urging claims, and keeping what he has got hold 
of ! Hear Friedrich himself : 'It was a means of acquiring reputa- 
tion; of increasing the power of the State.' 'Add to these 

reasons,' says the King, with a candour which has not been well 
treated in the History Books, ' Add to these reasons an Army ready 
for acting. Funds, Supplies all found, and perhaps the desire of 
making oneself a name.' 'Desire to make himself a name; how 
shocking ! ' exclaim several Historians. 'Candour of confession that 
he may have had some such desire ; how honest ! ' is what they do 
not exclaim. As to the justice of his Silesian Claims, or even to his 
own belief about their justice, Friedrich affords not the least light 

which can be new to readers here 'Just Rights? What are 

rights, never so just, which you cannot make valid? The world 
is full of such. If you have rights and can assert them into facts, 
do it ; that is worth doing ! ' " 



222 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

did much good to Germany by introducing first to her 
the idea of the rights of man, even though at the bayonet's 
point, and Napoleon I put new Hfe into Saxony and Bavaria 
and his other alHes, even if he spoilt his own work by his 
absurd love of conquest. But the strongest argument is 
that Carlyle could not foresee what would be the German 
ideal of Empire when, after his death, that Empire was 
founded in Africa; the treatment of the Hereros, for 
instance, has been such that where an EngHshman can 
go unarmed a German hardly dared to go with a strong 
fully armed escort; such is our answer to the jeer of the 
modem Germans that they have a right to Empire as 
much as ourselves. The moral deterioration of the "noble, 
patient, deep, pious, solid" Germans of 1870 into "these 
professors of brutality" of 1914 would have been such 
a shock to Carlyle, that he could hardly have been able 
to use any of his favourite phrases. All this simply means 
that we must wrench ourselves away from recent events 
if we wish to understand him and his influence, apxn 
avSpa SeL^€L. Time had not shown to Carlyle how the 
Germans would use their Empire. 

One special thing has to be said about Bismarck; he 
was not in favour of the annexation of French soil. It was 
Moltke, and the German miUtary leaders in general, who 
demanded Metz and Strasburg, so as to form a series of 
impregnable German fortresses over against France. 
Bismarck feared the result of annexing too much land 
where S3mipathies would always be in favour of France, 
partly it may be from fear of incurring odium in other 
countries, partly from a recognition of the difficulty of 
holding the population down with a strong hand. Therefore 
Carlyle was right so far in saying that Bismarck had no 
lust for territory. 



VII] METHODS OF BRUTALITY 223 

The evidence of Forbes, and other evidence of which 
there is a good deal, is to the effect that, though there 
was a great deal of suffering in France at the hands of the 
Germans, it was not beyond bounds. Acts of brutaHty 
certainly occurred, but from what we are told there was 
not the systematic brutaHty as encouraged and even 
ordered by those in authority in the August and September 
of 1914. Requisitions were made, but Forbes distinctly 
states that German officers paid for much of what they 
took, and that the French were wiUing enough to sell. 
He gives instances of houses left untouched when the 
owners awaited the coming of the Germans instead of 
running away. On the other side the shooting of German 
troops by francs-tireurs, the horror felt at the employment 
of Turcos against Europeans, the haughty pride of the 
French Imperial officers at the beginning of the war, and 
the demoralisation of the rank and file in defeat, and in 
particular of the Parisians, must be acknowledged. Against 
this we put the wonderful recovery of the French since 
1870, which is as remarkable as the deterioration of the 
Germans. We can hardly picture the soldiers of Napoleon I 
himself, or of Napoleon III if he had been victorious, 
plundering as systematically, and destroying in a manner 
as barbarous as the modern Huns ; but they plundered in 
1806 after Jena, and probably would have plundered in 1870 
if they had had the chance. Hardly a Prussian family but 
had its tradition of suffering under Napoleon I. We must 
go back to the contemporary judgement on the fire-eating 
and loudly talking French officers of 1870, corrupted as 
they were by the Napoleonic regime, if we wish to try to 
understand German hatred of them, and must get out of 
our minds the honourable and clever generals of the 
regenerated France of to-day. Forbes did not see them; 



224 'I'HB KRANCO-GBRMAN WAR [ch. 

he saw high-minded Germans quite unlike their prosperity- 
corrupted descendants. Lastly, of course all the French 
were not boastful or absinthe-sodden in 1870; but such 
were most in evidence. 

A hideous feature of 1914 has been the wanton fouHng 
of houses and even of churches, done so deHberately as to 
be beyond behef, and more utterly beyond behef because 
the Germans claim to be so artistic and Hterary and musical. 
Centuries ago Puritans defiled churches, partly through 
rehgious mania. But the pecuHar grossness of the Prussian 
dirt-sHnging, in an age when sanitation is a fine art, shows 
a deeper-seated vileness of mind. The evidence is not 
always clear, for people do not write much of such things. 
But an BngHsh ofiicer who marched from Waterloo to 
Paris in the rear of some Prussians says that this horror 
occurred in 1815. Oral evidence says that it occurred in 
1870. Perhaps in neither year was it committed so 
systematically as in 1914, especially on the altars of churches. 
So in 1870 the Germans drank, but no evidence accuses them 
of the orgy of drunkenness such as broke out when they were 
let loose, like weak-minded boys allowed for once to drink 
what is usually forbidden, in the cellars of Champagne in 
1914. In 1870 they shot francs-tireurs and burnt villages 
which sheltered them; the Spaniards of the Peninsular 
War, many of Garibaldi's men, and the Boers, have fought 
without being in uniform, and probably often suffered for 
it; but the awful vengeance for free shooting in 1914, 
inflicted on a neutral country deHberately invaded and 
scorned, inflicted merely on a bare statement of Germans 
themselves who may be lying, has no parallel in 1870. 
The Crown Prince did not wish that Paris should be 
bombarded; his son's heart bled for what he was forced 
to do at Ivouvain! 



vii] IvAST EFI^ORO^S IN MIDWINTER 225 

The bombardment of Paris at last began late in 
December; some of the outer forts were ruined at once, 
though the strong Mont Valerien was not hurt; then 
some sections of the city were laid in ruins. Sorties were 
yet made occasionally. Chanzy made his last efforts 
against Frederick Charles in the neighbourhood of IvC 
Mans south-west of Paris, and his army finally collapsed 
after January 12. Faidherbe came again into the field 
but was forced to give battle at Saint Quentin, and was 
finally beaten on January 19, falHng back to the fortresses 
of Arras, and Lille, and other places on the Belgian border. 
A third move was made by Bourbaki, whose object was 
to raise the siege of Belfort and then push forward into 
South Germany or into Alsace to destroy the German 
depots of supplies, and generally to do as much damage 
as possible. This last of Gambetta's armies was formed 
into four corps and was tolerably well equipped with 
rifles and artillery, but the supply of boots was painfully 
insufficient, and there was no transport train. Manteuffel, 
detached from the north, had three army corps; one 
under Werder was immediately in Une to head off Bourbaki, 
who was supported from Dijon by Garibaldi, and to cover 
Belfort; Manteuffel brought up the other two himself to 
press in when Werder had already held his ground with 
success. Between January 21 and February 2 the much 
smaller force of Germans, well fed and well suppUed, 
turned Bourbaki off his Hue of attack and pressed him on 
to the Swiss frontier. Their object was to surround him 
and bring about a second Sedan. But this was just avoided, 
when on February 2, 80,000 French, starving and miserable, 
almost all without shoes in the bitter frost, straggled over 
the frontier into Switzerland and were there disarmed and 
kindly treated. Indeed the winter was unusually bitter. 
M. 15 



226 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

Wliilst English schoolboys were enjoying a soHd five weeks 
of uninterrupted skating, to the bombardment of Paris and 
the plight of the reHeving armies, which in any case would 
have been wretched, was added the extra misery of frost- 
bite. Hence the heroism of these last armies was lost, 
and Bourbaki's poor fellows crossed the frontier in a hopeless 
state of disorder^. 

Paris was actually surrendered under the terms of an 
armistice on January 28, while Bourbaki was yet fighting 
and Belfort was yet besieged. Of course it could only be 
an armistice at first, for the Germans required some security 
for a regular peace, such as a regularly constituted govern- 
ment could alone give; also the eastern district, where 
Bourbaki was still in arms, was excepted. Trochu indeed 
would have held out longer, and the Parisians themselves 
and the National Guard, who were quite at variance with the 
regular troops and the Hmited number of good mobiles that 
Trochu still commanded, called out for yet another sortie. 
But Favre negotiated the armistice. The forts were handed 
over, but the National Guards were allowed to retain their 
arms. An election was to be held at once. It took place 

^ The fate of Bourbaki's army is the best commentary on the 
wrongheadedness of the historians who created the republican legend 
of 1792. Michelet, who wrote his French Revolution in the fifties, 
was full of enthusiasm for the volontaires of '92 ready to fight for 
France and Republic 600,000 strong; "they only lacked guns and 
shoes and bread 1 " Ultimately these men, sorted out and trained 
with and by the old regulars of Louis XVI, carried everything before 
them on the Meuse and Rhine and Po, but in the first year without 
those regulars they were a mob. Ignorance of war on the part of 
such historians led Frenchmen to believe that republican ardour 
could beat disciplined troops, and France received a bitter lesson 
in 1870-71 when Bourbaki's men "only lacked shoes and bread" 
and training. One wonders what was the state of Michelet's mind 
when he wrote that "only." 



VII] TERMS OF PEACE 227 

on February 8, and the Assembly met at Bordeaux on 
February 12; Legitimists, Orleanists, and Republicans, 
each mustered 200 strong, and there were very few Bona- 
partists. The spirit of France had been cowed, and only 
a comparatively few extremists amongst the RepubUcans 
wished to follow Gambetta in prolonging a hopeless resist- 
ance. It has been noticed that in the Assembly were 
many noblemen and men of substance and few professional 
politicians, for the great number of the peasants and small 
proprietors who settled the election were afraid of Gambetta 
and the violence of his followers. That Alsace and north 
lyorraine would be surrendered was now a foregone conclu- 
sion. Thiers was chosen provisionally to be Head of the 
Executive, and Favre was by him made Foreign Minister. 
In the meanwhile Paris was being revictualled largely by 
help from England. 

Peace was practically settled at Versailles on February 26, 
though it was finally ratified by the Treaty of Frankfort 
next May. The two points on which Thiers and Favre 
held out were the surrender of Belfort and the amount of 
the war indemnity. Bismarck consistently opposed Moltke 
so far as the German mihtary chiefs insisted on the annexa- 
tion of much territory and many fortresses; the Emperor 
himself settled the question by supporting Moltke. But 
France was allowed to retain Nancy, Luneville, Verdun, 
and Toul, and therefore a very considerable portion of 
south lyorraine. After an acute controversy Thiers finally 
held his own and obtained Belfort for France. Also he 
got the Germans to reduce the indemnity from six to 
five milliards of francs; a milliard equals 1000,000,000 
francs, therefore five milliards come to £200,000,000 of 
our money. The German troops were to be withdrawn 
from their positions on the south and west of Paris, and 

15—2 



228 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

their entire withdrawal from French soil would take place 
when all the indemnity was paid. The French prisoners 
would be restored, but in the meanwhile in consideration 
of the cession of Belfort and the reduction of one milliard, 
the Germans were to march 30,000 troops into Paris. 
Certainly France was humiHated, saigne au hlanc, yet the 
jeers of the Germans who found fault with the riotous 
behaviour of a section of the Parisian mob during the days 
of the formal entry of their troops March 1-5, are hardly 
in good taste ; if there is much suffering there is naturally 
much resentment ; they claim credit for not having fired 
upon this mob. Forbes tells how he was badly mauled, 
when he had been seen to shake hands with some German 
officers, and then went to mix with the crowd ; this again 
is a matter of good taste. 

It remains to notice the three chief consequences of 
the great war. " Firstly we take the estabHshment of the 
German Empire ; it would be wrong to say the re-estabHsh- 
ment, for it was utterly unUke the old Holy Roman Empire. 
There were difficulties in the way. William himself wished 
to remain Eling of Prussia, though the Crown Prince was 
in favour of the Empire. The Kings of Bavaria and 
Wurtemberg were strongly opposed to the idea, but the 
Grand Duke of Baden favoured it. So strong was the 
feeHng that Bismarck, however keenly he had been pressing 
on towards his purpose in the past few years, might have 
been unable to realise it if it had not been for the exceptional 
circumstances of the case, the encampment of the German 
army around Paris, and the situation of the royal head- 
quarters at Versailles in the palace of Louis XIV with 
its associations of French animosity against Germany. 
The negotiations were going on at least in December, when 
a deputation from the Prussian Chamber offered the title 



vn] RESULTS OF THE WAR 229 

to their King, or rather expressed their wish that he should 
take the title. How the Bavarian opposition was overcome 
is not known, but probably there was a fear that the minor 
states might take the matter into their own hands, and in 
any case the Bavarians, having had their full share, and 
it may be more than their fair share, in the fighting and 
losses during the war, could hardly turn now against Prussia, 
however angry they were at such a termination of their 
efforts. The ceremony of the proclamation took place 
at Versailles on January 18. 

Secondly, Italy profited by the war. As in 1866 she 
obtained Venice, so in 1870 she obtained Rome. Of course 
the French troops were withdrawn, for they were wanted 
in France ; Napoleon being the prisoner of Germany, there 
was no one left who wished to protect the Pope; Victor 
Emmanuel's soldiers entered Rome on September 20^ after 
a sHght resistance of the papal troops by way of remon- 
strance against force, and after the breaching by cannon 
of part of the old wall. The ItaHan ParHament and the 
Royal Court were ultimately transferred to Rome after 
the usual plebiscite had been taken amongst the inhabitants 
of the patrimony and city. The Pope excommunicated 
Victor Emmanuel and his officers, and by way of dignified 
protest withdrew with his court to the Vatican, his palace 
on the rising ground above the right bank of the Tiber 
adjoining St Peter's, which he never quitted. 

Thirdly, Russia took advantage of the humiliation of 
France to repudiate the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The 
Russians and the Prussians can hardly be said to have been 
on good terms with each other, yet the rulers of each 
country had come to an understanding, and in such matters 
the wishes of monarchs count more than the wishes of 
1 Every Italian town to-day has its Via Venti Settembre. 



230 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR [ch. 

nations. Bismarck was willing to let Russia put forward 
the repudiation, because he wanted Russia's help to keep 
the Austrians from supporting France. On their side the 
Austrians, or at least Count Beust who was bitterly 
anti-Prussian, are credited with having offered their 
support to Russia on this question as the price of an under- 
standing between the two nations to threaten Prussia. 
Gortschakoff, the Russian Chancellor, issued a Circular 
to the effect that it was within the rights of the Tsar 
to repudiate the articles of the Treaty which bound 
him not to maintain warships on the Black Sea, or to 
erect any arsenal or place of arms on the coast. His argu- 
ment was that by the "Convention of the Straits" the 
passage of the Dardanelles was to be closed to ships of 
war only in time of peace, so that by the connivance of the 
Sultan an enemy might send a force to the Black Sea in 
time of war to the detriment of Russia; also Moldavia 
and Wallachia, which by the Treaty ought to have separate 
governments, had been united in 1861 into the Principality 
of Rumania. The Circular was handed in to our Foreign 
Secretary, I/ord Granville, on November 9. The excitement 
here almost counterbalanced excitement over the war in 
France. Earl Russell, who had been three years in retire- 
ment, urged our ministers to resist even at the risk of war ; 
he wrote a very naive letter, suggesting that our small 
standing army could be reinforced by 100,000 miUtia, and 
that the Rothschilds would probably be wilHng to advance 
£100,000,000; it was certainly a strange attitude for the 
minister responsible for the Schleswig fiasco in 1864. 
Gladstone simply let the question sHde; he had the 
Alabama dispute on his hands, and did not feel called upon 
to have trouble with Russia also. It is quite possible 
that, owing to the strong feeling that there was in America 



VII] RUSSIA AND THE BLACK SEA 231 

against the British, of which the Alabama question was 
a symptom, Gladstone had some fear of a Russian- American 
combination against us. Our newspapers took vengeance 
on Russia by a bitter denunciation of the Circular, and that 
was all. Whether Russia would have persisted if faced 
by the possibiHty of war must remain uncertain. In the 
course of the next few years Sebastopol was re-created 
as a place of arms and a new Black Sea fleet was built. 
A reopening of the Eastern Question was foreshadowed, 
though hardly anyone expected this to occur within 
six years. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE EASTERN QUESTION 

The Franco-German War is, after the fall of the first 
Napoleon, the most momentous event of the 19th century. 
The nation which had led European thought was dethroned ; 
would the nation which was now in, the ascendant take 
its place as the leader of thought? Certain national 
aspirations were now realised; would the new "nations" 
prosper and do good to the world? Indeed they were as 
yet incomplete as nations, for the German Empire lacked 
Austria, and Italy was irredenta as long as part of the Adige 
valley and Trieste and the old possessions of Venice on the 
Dalmatian coast were under Austria. But, France being 
humbled, and new Germany requiring time to settle down 
to altered circumstances, to shake herself together, so to 
speak, and to see whether Bavaria and Saxony would be 
satisfied by the Prussian ascendancy, no troubles were 
destined to occur on "national" grounds, except in the 
Balkans, for a long time yet to come. There was no 
national cry indicating yearning after an ideal, now that 
Prussia had her ascendancy and Italy had Rome. Pan- 
Slavism had yet to be formulated. 

Napoleon III overthrown, there was no personal 
disturbing element. The man was gone who might at 
any moment take up a national cause on behalf of a people 



CH. VIII] NEW EUROPEAN PROBI.EMS 233 

under a foreign yoke, abandon the cause when it was half 
won, and yet seek to aggrandise France by claiming non- 
French land. There was nobody to champion a great 
many Poles, a few Danes, and a good many Frenchmen 
and Germans who wished to be Frenchmen, who were all 
forcibly held to be Germans. But a cause there still was 
which depended not on the vagaries of one man, the cause 
of the Roman Church, which prayed for deHverance from 
an excommunicated king, which hoped to have its temporal 
power restored to it by some legitimist king, and which 
claimed the allegiance of its German bishops. The "Ultra- 
Montains " of France, and of Germany likewise, were dis- 
tinctly a disturbing element for some Httle time after 1871. 
The fierce opposition of the RepubHcans, led by Gambetta, 
destroyed their power in France, but at the cost of much 
bad feehng between clericals and anti-clericals; Bismarck 
uncompromisingly opposed them in Germany, the struggle 
being bitter while Pius IX Hved, less bitter afterwards, 
and finally dying out. 

The Concert of Europe was doomed by the events of 
1870-71. Till then it had had influence at intervals, and 
afterwards it seemed to be revived to its full importance 
when the Congress met at BerHn in 1878. But the advance- 
ment of Prussia upset calculations, and the history of 
Europe after this decade is concerned with the formation 
of the Dual and the Triple Alhances; then Europe was 
divided into two armed camps, and at any moment a war 
might have broken out. The seventies, therefore, are the 
period of transition, and in it the questions were. What 
will be the future of France struggHng to raise herself? 
how will Germany use her power? will the distant Power 
ever be able to assert herself as the centre of Pan-Slavism ? 
will the island Power always remain insular? As the 



234 I'HB EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

result, we find the Balance of Power becoming more impor- 
tant than the Concert, until at last, under new conditions 
and under the guidance of new men, Germany bound 
polyglot Austria-Hungary to her and thought herself strong 
enough to defy or overawe aU the others; the decision of 
1 9 14 meant that whatever the Concert had tried to do 
at intervals was of no account, and that in the eyes of 
Germans only Germany counted. War songs are sufficient 
to show us that ; in 1870 Germany was on the defensive to 
keep watch over the Rhine, in 1914 she is over all. 

In the period of transition we start with the possibility 
of French recovery. The Assembly which met at Bordeaux 
in February 1871 had before it the question of the terms 
of peace and of nothing beyond. The deputies were 
largely monarchists, — ^it would be unfair to style them at 
such a crisis reactionaries, — but it was agreed by the 
" Bordeaux Compact " that the future constitution of France, 
whether Monarchy or permanent Repubhc, should be left 
undecided. Thiers was formally accepted as "Head of the 
Executive," and himself insisted on the addition "of the 
RepubUc" to show that the de facto accredited government 
was repubUcan. Of course he was by his past history an 
Orleanist. Yet Favre and Simon were Republicans, and 
Gambetta, whose services he had to accept because of the 
man's superabundant energy, was un fou furieux, one 
might say a rabid Repubhcan. The preHminaries of peace 
were signed at Versailles on February 26. The Assembly 
proceeded to sit at Versailles, when the German head- 
quarters were withdrawn — the temporary German occupa- 
tion of a part of Paris itself lasted only a few days, and then 
the Germans gave up the western and southern forts, 
preserving their hold only on the eastern and northern — on 
March 20. 



vm] CIVIIv WAR IN PARIS 235 

The next question, before even any steps could be taken 
to raise the money for the war indemnity, was that of the 
Commune of Paris. The National Guard, composed of the 
city population, was stiU armed. These men passionately 
resented not only the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, but also the 
German entry into Paris ; they thought that they had been 
despised by Trochu, not being allowed by him to take part 
in the more serious sorties from Paris ; their hatred of the 
Germans was turned into a hatred of those who would not 
let them fight against the Germans Hke the old triumphant 
levies of 1792-93, that is to say honest RepubHcans who 
carried aU before them; they were offended because the 
Assembly sat at monarchical Versailles, the place of memo- 
ries of Louis XIV, and, more recently, of Kaiser William. 
It was such men moreover whom the Germans mostly 
despised, and accused of a rabidness at the time of the 
entry which would have justified them in firing, and whom 
Archibald Forbes especially denounced as noisy absinthe- 
soaked undersized rowdies. Against them the feehng in 
the Assembly was distinctly strong ; they were the Jacobins 
of 1792-94 revived. Now "Commune" has reaUy nothing 
to do with "Communism." These Communards wanted 
to set up a form of city government, or government by 
communities ; Paris would have its own municipal officers 
directly elected and responsible to itself, federated to 
similar communes in the other great cities, in which, not 
the bourgeois and rich, but the working men would be able 
to play the chief part. Of course the main support of the 
Assembly was to be found in the peasants, who always 
suspected the townsfolk as likely to set up "Communism" 
as we know it, the preliminary step to which would be 
confiscation. On March 18 troops sent by the Assembly 
to take the guns which were massed in the suburb of 



236 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Montmartre were opposed by the Communards, and the 
two generals commanding them were shot. Thus civil war 
began. 

The troops available for service under the Assembly 
were prisoners of war released by the Germans with 
MacMahon at their head; from their head-quarters they 
were known as the Versaillais. After a couple of months 
the troops carried one of the gates of Paris on May 21, 
seized the enceinte wall, and proceeded to attack up the 
wide streets. It took them a week to carry all the barricades, 
the churches, such as the Madeleine, which had been con- 
verted into fortresses, and especially the Latin Quarter, 
where many of the rabid students were desperate fighters. 
The horrors of the strife can hardly be exaggerated. It is 
always said that the Communards did not begin to take 
hostages until the Versaillais began to shoot the leaders 
who fell into their hands, and the cruelty was not all on one 
side. When passions were thoroughly roused neither side 
gave quarter. The Communards killed the Archbishop of 
Paris and priests and policemen, and the women earned 
a terrible reputation as petroleuses, sprinkling oil over the 
barricades and public buildings, so as to destroy themselves, 
and the Versaillais, and Paris itself together; it seems 
that rumour absurdly exaggerated the amount of damage 
done by these harpies, though it remains that the Tuileries 
and the Hotel de Ville were burnt out, and it may be that 
their intention was to burn the Louvre. On the other 
hand the ofiicers of the Versaillais, largely old Bonapartists, 
who looked upon the mob as a gang of traitors, and were 
especially sore at the insinuation that they could not fight 
the Germans but took pleasure in killing their own country- 
men, shot their prisoners without trial and without mercy. 
After the Commune had been suppressed large numbers of 



vm] PAYMENT OF THE INDEMNITY 237 

men and women were tried, and many thousands were sent 
to Cayenne or New Caledonia. Amnesty for these was 
not passed till 1879 on the motion of Gambetta, who 
indeed had himself withdrawn from pubUc life during the 
actual civil war. 

The next question was to find the money and so to 
bring about the withdrawal of the German forces from 
French soil. France herself raised the money, though at 
first a good deal of the coin had to be borrowed from 
England; even so France herself very soon was able to 
find food for the starving, though at first most of the sup- 
pHes brought into Paris after the siege was over came 
from England. Europe was profoundly impressed by the 
promptness of the payments after all the miseries and the 
expenses entailed by the war. " The inexhaustible stocking 
of the countryman" solved the problem. It was not only 
that the French peasant was fond of actual hoarding ; the 
agricultural banks founded by Napoleon III also played 
their part. But the peasant's thrift is undeniably the source 
of France's wealth, typified by, and probably often enough 
stored in, his hidden stocking. The government loan of 
June 28 of two milliards was covered twice over, and re- 
sulted in the evacuation of several departments. In June 
1872 a loan of three milliards was covered fourteen times 
over. By July i, 1873 only Verdun remained in German 
occupation, and the last soldier retired across the new 
frontier in September. Then the Assembly voted that 
Thiers, President of the Republic, had deserved well of his 
country. The interest on the loans was not met by income- 
tax, which indeed the French have always dishked. It was 
raised by indirect taxation on matches and stamps, and 
charges for the use of waste ground, as on the sea-shore at 
bathing resorts, and similar means. 



238 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Army reorganisation was of course necessary. It is 
difficult for us with our knowledge of Napoleon I to estimate 
the strength of the French dislike of conscription. It seems 
that the memory of the draining of the manhood of France 
by him endured so strongly that even his nephew relied 
on a long-service professional army ; the attempt to modify 
the system in the later years of Napoleon Ill's reign 
failed through corruption, lack of determination to carry 
it through, and the fatal mistake of allowing substitutes. 
Now was created a national army, with five years in the 
ranks, and four in the reserve, followed by service in the 
territorials ; it was of course the Prussian system extended. 
As it was impossible to train so many men at once, the 
conscripts were divided by lot into two sections, and the 
lucky ones in such numbers as were necessary served only 
six months. Substitutes were strictly forbidden, and there 
is Uttle doubt that this regulation has been honourably 
carried out. Eldest sons of widows, clerics, and teachers 
were entirely exempt. At a later period, also in imitation 
of the Prussian system, educated men with quaHfications 
were quit for one year's service. lyater again, clerical 
students were forced to serve, but might be grouped together 
in the non-combatant branches. The five years were 
reduced to three, then to two, but shortly before 1914 
raised once more to three. 

In spite of his services an opposition was formed against 
Thiers, and he felt it necessary to resign in May 1873. The 
money once raised and France once more returned to the 
ways of peace, he fell between the proverbial two stools. 
The Conservatives were Monarchists, and the Republicans 
were Radicals. It was a monarchical majority which 
passed a resolution which he construed into a vote of 
censure; thus the ex-Orleanist retired from pubHc life in 



vni] WOUI.D MONARCHY BE RESTORED? 239 

defence of Republicanism. Europe certainly expected now 
the restoration of the monarchy. MacMahon was elected 
President for seven years. The work of creating a consti- 
tution was dragged out slowly and deliberately; in the 
meanwhile the choice of mayors of communes, prefects of 
departments, magistrates and officials, university professors 
and so forth, was made a poHtical affair, and reactionaries 
were chosen just on the same lines as when Bourbon or 
Bonaparte was actually on the throne. The Roman 
CathoHc feehng came to a head, and the recovery of Rome 
was openly proclaimed. But it was the obstinacy of 
"Henry V" that ruined the monarchy. He was a no- 
surrender Bourbon, and, as the last male of the senior Hne, 
he refused to be restored except imder the White Flag. 
When he saw that he had ruined his own chances, and 
surrendered his claim to the Count of Paris, grandson of 
l/ouis PhiHppe, it was too late. The only result of his 
obstinacy was to give strength to the Repubhcan war-cry 
as voiced by Gambetta; "le clericahsme, voila Tennemi!" 
If it be thought that the Church and the royal family have 
not received fair-play from the RepubHc, and that various 
laws expelhng princes of the blood, subjecting reHgious 
houses to a state scrutiny of their revenues, and finally ex- 
pelhng monks and nuns and Jesuits, have been vindictive, 
it can be argued on the Repubhcan side that all the power 
and resources of the Church were being devoted to the 
restoration of monarchy and of privilege, not to mention 
the temporal power of the Papacy, and that at a time when 
France simply needed rest. 

The permanent Constitution was very gradually settled 
during MacMahon's presidency. Power is vested in the 
President, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies. 
The President has no responsibiht5^ but cannot govern 



240 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

without the approbation of the Chambers which control 
the ministers chosen by him. He can dissolve the Chamber 
with the consent of the Senate, with a view to obtain the 
will of the nation upon some particular point, but from the 
very first it was decided that never again should a plebiscite, 
with its Napoleonic associations, be put before the nation. 
The Senate is composed of 300 members, 75 of them for 
Hfe, and 225 elected for nine years, of whom 75 resign 
and are re-eUgible every three years; elections are in 
the hands of committees of deputies and of municipal 
and departmental councillors. The Chamber of Deputies 
is elected by manhood suffrage for four years, one deputy 
to each division of a department or of a city. When there 
are many candidates the man at the top of the poll must 
have a proportional majority, or else there must be a second 
ballot, and in that case most of the useless candidates are 
withdrawn. Parties as we know them have never existed 
under the Third RepubHc, but the most soUd section of 
deputies has been the " left centre," repubUcans and hberals, 
yet not entirely extremists ; whenever they unite with the 
sociahsts^ of the "left" they form a strong block to carry 
some particular law, an anti-clerical law usually. Both 
Houses sat at Versailles till 1879, for fear of the influence 
of Paris; their estabhshment in Paris that year, which 
took place about the time when the Communards were 
amnestied, was a blow for the monarchical and conservative 
element ; MacMahon resigned in January that year, Jules 
Grevy was elected President, and Repubhcanism was 
assured under the energetic influence of Gambetta. But 
still, when a President has to be elected, both Houses meet 
together at Versailles, which is the last remaining sign of 
a fear of mob rule; indeed, when at the height of the 
^ In France " coUectivists " is the proper term. 



vin] CONSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 241 

Dreyfus excitement such an election was held, it was very 
lucky that Versailles was the place. 

The Constitution of the German Empire is based on 
the practical control of the executive by the Emperor; 
he is the head of the army and navy, and declares war 
and makes ahiances ; his will alone is responsible for the 
choice of ministers. There is a Federal Council to which 
the special governments of the allied Imperial states 
contribute members ; the sanction of this body is necessary 
to a declaration of war; it appoints the executive bodies 
in control of Imperial matters, army, navy, foreign affairs, 
tariff, commerce, railways, posts and so on. The popular 
House is the Diet or Reichstag, elected by manhood 
suffrage in proportion to the population of each state; 
its chief duty is to legislate on proposals submitted by the 
Emperor and to vote taxes ; it is on this point that in recent 
years the sociaHsts have shown their power, but aU the 
attempts that have been made to hinder the creation of 
a German navy, or the enormous expansion of the German 
army, have failed, when once the spirit of domination, 
which necessitated a monster army and navy, was drilled 
into the populace. But before the sociaUstic party became 
strong, the main opposition against Bismarck came from 
the Roman CathoHcs; the laws of May 1873 decreed civil 
marriages, secular education, and a general control of 
priests and teachers by the Imperial authorities ; Pius IX 
held out against this to his death in 1878 ; his successor 
lyco XIII came to terms with WiUiam I, after writing a 
personal letter to request a reHgious peace, and a compromise 
was arranged. Since then the Roman CathoHc "centre" 
of the Reichstag has been a strong support to the Empire 
against SociaUsm. 

The great problem of the early seventies was the attitude 
M. 16 



242 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

of Germany towards the French recovery. The military 
authorities thought that France had recovered too quickly, 
that the speedy payment of the five milliards was a sign 
of prosperity, and the reorganisation of the army was a 
sign of strength, each of them dangerous as threatening 
a war of revenge. Moltke would have liked to have rushed 
into war and to have bled France really "to the white "^ 
by inflicting this time a fine of ten milliards. The crisis 
arose in 1875, and it is generally acknowledged by historians 
to have been a very real crisis. The British and Russian 
governments, and Queen Victoria herself by a personal 
letter to WilHam, did a great deal towards softening the 
aggressiveness of Germany. From this year it would 
seem that we must date German suspicions of Great Britain 
and Russia alike, being fanned constantly by the idea that 
our poUcy was dictated by jealousy, and Russia's policy 
by mihtary ambition ; a campaign was deliberately started 
against the feminine influence of Victoria and the Crown 
Princess, which came to a height at the time of the Crown 
Prince's illness, when he was attended by a British doctor. 
The suspicions of Russia quite upset Bismarck's foreign 
policy. He had always courted the sympathy of Russia, 
to counterbalance the possibility of an alliance between 
France and Austria; since 1871 he had worked up an 
understanding with the Tsar of Russia and the Emperor of 
Austria to form the Three Emperors' League, which can 
hardly be called a definite alHance, but which was close 
enough to an alliance to assure German ascendancy. 

In 1875 therefore Germany and Russia fell apart, and 
Bismarck began to pay careful court to Austria; he had 

1 Professors taught their classes up to 1914 that next time they 
really would do it, 50 milliards, 500 milliards, and an occupation of 
France till payment of the last coin, etc., etc. 



VIII] BALANCE OF POWER, 1871-75 243 

indeed treated Austria very leniently in 1866, and he now 
encouraged Francis Joseph to look to the Balkans and to 
become the rival of the Tsar, not so much as the champion 
of the distressed Christians, but as claimant to suzerainty. 
It has been no part of German poUcy to weaken the Sultan 
for the benefit of Slavs. Austria has been pushed by 
Germany into Balkan disputes so that she might be the 
opponent of Pan-Slavism, as if the national movement of 
the Slavs were a mere excuse for Russian aggressiveness. 
Indeed this is typically German, to boast loudly of German 
unity and yet deny to Slavs their right to confederate 
under Russia. Austria was the instrument to be used, 
because milhons of Slavs in that empire have to be kept 
down. Here is seen the influence of Hungary in the Dual 
Monarchy. In the seventies the Austrian Chancellor was 
the Hungarian, Count Andrassy, and the power of the 
Hungarian Diet was such as to dictate to Austria and enforce 
an anti-Slav poHcy. Russia has been the arch-enemy; 
Hungarians remembered, Austrians forgot, that the Slavs 
were anti-Magyars in 1848-49. Thus we can see that a 
Russo-Erench alUance would have to come in course of 
time, though it was slow in coming. 

The Balkan problem came to the front in the autumn 
of 1875, but was not alarmingly acute before 1876. Since 
the Crimean War there has been very little to be said 
about Turkey or the Christians of Turkey. In i860 we 
saw before that Napoleon III sent an expedition to save 
the Syrians. In 1862 the Greeks deposed their King Otto 
of Bavaria, profiting by his chance absence from Greece, 
and chose a son of Christian of Denmark, who reigned 
as George I; self-government was introduced amid much 
excitement, as though it would be the commencement of 
a new era of Greek prosperity and self-respect; in 1864 

16 — 2 



244 'I'HB EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Palmerston's government, largely under the influence of 
Gladstone, who was an ardent phil-Hellene, handed over 
the Ionian Islands, which had been under the British 
Protectorate, causing more excitement and self-congratu- 
lation at the recognition of Greece as a civilised power by 
the greatest of the free nations. In Rumania a revolution 
drove out the native prince — Moldavia and Wallachia were 
supposed by the Treaty of Paris to have separate govern- 
ments, and had solved the difficulty of union by both electing 
the same man — and Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmar- 
ingen was elected Prince of a united Rumania. In Serbia 
a prince of the Obrenovich was ruHng, and brought about 
the expulsion of the Turkish garrisons in 1862. He was 
murdered in 1868 by the rival party, but his son Milan, 
though quite a young boy, was chosen to succeed him. 
Serbia, having followed the lead of Rumania in winning 
independence, was imitated in turn by the Bosnians, but 
they were suppressed by the Turks. But more important 
than these facts was the Russian repudiation of the Treaty 
of Paris in the autumn of 1870. It certainly presaged a 
new aggression of Russia in the Balkans, when France was 
not strong enough to interfere, and Britain, wedded to 
insularity under the regime of Gladstone, was not likely 
to interfere alone. Yet the storm-cloud seemed to come 
up with a rapidity that took Europe by surprise. It may 
be that Disraeli foresaw events. Succeeding Gladstone in 
1874 by the usual swing of the pendulum, Conservative 
succeeding Liberal as if by the natural order of things 
when our nation had had enough of peace and reform, he 
began to show a tendency to imperiaUsm by the act which 
made Victoria Empress of India, and by his purchase of 
the Khedive of Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal. 

It was in Bosnia and Herzegovina that revolt first 



vni] RISING AGAINST THE TURKS, 1875 245 

occurred, stirred up possibly by Russian agents in pursuance 
of the new idea of Pan-Slavism, but certainly due in the 
first place to the unbearable heaviness of Turkish rule. 
One can hardly see how it could be considered a crime for 
the Russians to entertain ideas of a union of Slavs, when 
they saw imited Germany and united Italy as estabUshed 
facts; but the insinuation was that the Russians were 
fomenting a revolt to have an excuse to declare war upon 
the Turks. The Chancellors of the three Emperors, still 
connected informally by their league, though suspicious of 
each other, drew up the Andrassy Note demanding Turkish 
reforms in Herzegovina. Disraeh, in a somewhat startHng 
manner, delayed the presentation of the Note as being 
inopportune; it was just then that he purchased the Suez 
Canal shares. Of course he simply followed in the steps 
of Wellington and Palmerston to maintain the integrity of 
the Turkish Empire. But he was more resolute than they, 
and it would seem that he had a personal bitterness against 
Russia, which it is hardly unfair to his memory to attribute 
to his Jewish blood, for the Jews have always been treated 
worse by the Russians than by the other nations — justly 
so, it may be, if the money-lender and the vodka-seUer, 
who is the curse of the village, is usually a Jew against 
whom the peasants are almost powerless. Whatever was 
the cause of Disraeh' s animus against Russia, it was very 
decided. The Note, delayed by Disraeh, was presented 
in February 1876. The Sultan accepted it, but all Europe 
knew that the acceptance by a Sultan meant nothing. The 
rebel Herzegovinans refused conditions; the Serbs and 
Montenegrins were ready to help them. An anti-Christian 
outbreak at Salonica showed what the Turks thought. 

In May 1876 the three Chancellors drew up another 
paper of proposals known as the Berlin Memorandum, in 



246 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

which the use of force against the Turks was definitely- 
threatened. The French and ItaHans accepted it ; Disraeli 
refused; more than that, the British fleet was sent to 
Besika Bay just south of the Dardanelles. The excited 
Mohammedans of Constantinople, especially the young 
students, demanded a change of the Sultan's ministers, 
and next the dethronement of the Sultan himself; he was 
an Oriental despot of a low type, luxurious and selfish, 
and unwilHng to pay his officials, even his soldiers. Abdul 
Hamid took his place. The events at Salonica and Con- 
stantinople indicated that the wild fury of Mohammedan 
excitement, which may occur at any moment, was likely 
to burst out. The same month it had already broken out 
in Bulgaria, where there was a rising in imitation of the 
Herzegovinans. Turkish irregular troops, known as Bashi- 
Bazuks, many of them Circassians, were let loose in southern 
Bulgaria, and there is distinct evidence that Turkish regular 
troops were employed likewise. The horrors were not 
known at first. When the truth was told there was an 
outburst of passionate excitement in England such as is 
extremely rare in our peaceably phlegmatic island. There 
was good reason for it, for our fleet was near the Dardanelles 
all the time giving support to the Turkish government, 
our Prime Minister had gone against the Concert of Europe 
in opposing the Berlin Memorandum, and our ambassador 
at Constantinople approved of force being used by the 
Turks in Bulgaria. 

The Bulgarian atrocities roused party feeling in England 
beyond an3rthing of which later generations have had 
experience, even the Chinese slavery agitation, or lyloyd 
George's Budget proposals, or Home Rule. Disraeli's 
supporters passionately declared that very few Bulgars had 
been killed, and they were open rebels ; the integrity of 



VIII] THE BUIvGARIAN ATROCITIES, 1876 247 

the Turkish Empire was still the key-stone of our policy 
and was necessary to defend our interests; the Liberal 
denunciation of the Sultan was only a poHtical trick to 
discredit DisraeU's ministry. On the other hand the great 
mass of the British were in very genuine anger, not only 
Liberals; our responsibihty for the crimes was painfully 
clear; the heated imagination of some writers may have 
exaggerated the number of the victims up to 30,000, but 
very sober and impartial judges, such as Edwin Pears of 
the Daily News — he is still alive, and recently retired from 
Constantinople with much honour — put it at 15,000; the 
force of the feeling was far more real than any mere political 
outcry could be. Gladstone came out from his retirement 
to put himself at the head of the movement, and expressed 
himself strongly both in pamphlet and in speech. He 
demanded the withdrawal of the Turks, bag and baggage, 
lest, always under cover of DisraeU's moral support, similar 
massacres should occur in Serbia. Whatever be thought 
of Gladstone's poHtical career in other respects, his Home 
Rule bills of a later date in particular, he was a very 
genuinely earnest man. DisraeH's undoubted cleverness 
tould not hide his cynicism, which often showed itself in 
bitterly sarcastic phrases, which have the appearance of 
being designed simply to show his wit, as when he said 
that Gladstone was "a sophistical rhetorician inebriated 
with the exuberance of his own verbosity." That the 
country was not with Disraeli at this crisis is seen in the 
reluctance of his own cabinet to follow him to the bitter 
end; Lord Carnarvon resigned in January, and Lord 
Derby in March 1878, a long time after the Bulgarian 
atrocities it is true, but they had restrained him from 
going to war to help the Turks, and resigned when he seemed 
to be on the point of going to war in spite of them ; Lord 



248 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote stopped short of 
resignation, but were equally against war ; and all this 
means that they considered the Turks guilty of the 
Bulgarian atrocities. At the height of the excitement in 
August 1876, Disraeli went up to the I^ords as the Earl 
of Beaconsfield. 

The Serbians and Montenegrins were up in arms; the 
Russians were deeply excited at the wrongs done to brother 
Slavs, and thousands of them, with a Russian general, 
volunteered help, yet the Turkish forces were too strong, 
and the Tsar was simply forced to intervene when the 
Serbians and Volunteers were being beaten. He compelled 
the Sultan to relax his grip, and told our ambassador that, 
if the European Concert refused to act, he Would have to 
act alone. The British proposed a Conference at Con- 
stantinople; this was to the good, if our Ministers really 
meant to put pressure on the Turks. But DisraeU seemed 
to think that the nation was already forgetting the atrocities, 
or else that the blessed word "exaggeration" was enough 
to prove that the atrocities agitation was a party trick of 
Gladstone, and in November he made a speech which nobody 
could interpret but as a threat to help the Turks ; yet the 
Tsar's words were studiously moderate, simply that the 
Russians must end an intolerable state of affairs but would 
not take Constantinople for themselves. 

The Conference met at Constantinople in December, 
I/ord SaHsbury representing us, and certainly he never 
went the whole way with DisraeH as Turkey's friend. 
Independence was demanded for the northern Balkan 
states, guarantees for the decent government of the southern. 
Then came a proclamation from the Sultan; he would 
grant a Constitution and summon a Parliament on western 
lines, with responsibiUty of ministers and all the proper 



VIII] EVENTS UP TO WAR, 1877 249 

paraphernalia ; farce is the only word that can be applied. 
The Conference broke up, and of it we need say nothing 
except that lyord SaHsbury said and did nothing to justify 
the Sultan in expecting British help. A really honest 
Turk, Midhat Pasha, was summoned to be Grand Vizier, 
and he believed in reform and the possibiHties of a Turkish 
Parliament ; his appointment having helped to delude the 
Powers, the Sultan soon hustled him^ out of Turkey as 
being too honest to play his part in the farce. The Parha- 
ment met in March 1877, only to be dissolved when the 
war began. 

Alexander's hand was forced. No other action but 
war was possible. The Concert had been thwarted by 
Disraeli — ^though not by his cabinet — and fooled by the 
Sultan. The Three Emperors' I^eague was so far a reaHty 
that Austria was satisfied that she would gain something 
ultimately, and Germany stood by, reluctantly it may be, 
yet conscious of being unable at this point to stop Russia. 
It is quite possible that some revolutionary excitement 
might have troubled Alexander at home if he did not 
move. He already had a large force mobihsed. A last 
effort indeed was made ; a Russian envoy went the round 
of the courts of Europe, and one more note was drawn 
up, accepted by all the Powers — even by DisraeH, probably 
on the advice of his cabinet, — and rejected by the Sultan. 
Nothing else could be done; so in April 1877, a military 
convention being concluded with Rumania, the Russian 
army moved. 

The campaign deserves to be studied by civiHans, if 
only to show the difference between Russian and Prussian 
methods. Twice Prussia attacked and carried all before 

^ It would have been dangerous to murder Midhat then. He 
was lured back to Turkey and bowstrung at a later date. 



250 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

her with a rush ; once the enemy soon came to terms, and 
there was no need to call up reserves; once the enemy- 
held out for another five months, reserves had to be called 
up and were adequate; on both occasions Prussia was 
quite ready, and had mihtary bases near to the frontier, 
besides more distant bases Hnked up by railways. Now 
Russia attacked, the Turks meekly surrendering the 
initiative; the attack seemed to be carrying all before it; 
suddenly it was held up, checked, and apparently spent, 
as if it had been based on rashness rather than readiness; 
the tug of war came when reserves were called up, arrived 
by rail from long distances, slowly indeed, but arrived; 
the Turks had no power of counter-attack in the interval, 
but collapsed when the Russian reserves were there. The 
Russian commissariat was badly managed, but that of the 
Turks was worse. On both sides was seen a magnificent 
power of endurance, but at the last pinch the Turks showed 
less stamina. Archibald Forbes, as hot a partisan of the 
Russians as he had been of the Prussians, gave it as his 
deliberate opinion that only one man, an Irishman, can 
approach a Russian in endurance on a few biscuits a day ; 
it was this endurance that enabled the Tsar, in spite of 
mistakes and probable corruption in some departments, to 
pull through. Also it was a war of improvised entrench- 
ments after the first rush was checked; it showed the 
enormous power of the breech-loader in defence, though 
still a single-action rifle and using black gunpowder, and 
not supported by machine guns; the Turks were mar- 
vellously cool under these conditions, but could not last 
out, and their ideas of sanitation were barbaric, so that 
typhoid was rampant and neutraHsed their enduring power. 
The Russians showed higher qualities in the end, fit indeed 
to put against the organised impetus of the Prussians. 



VIII] THE DANUBE CROSSED, JUNE 251 

War being declared in April, the Russians to the number 
of 200,000 moved into Rumania under the Grand Duke 
Nicholas. There was trouble about the co-operation of 
the Rumans, because Prince Charles would not submit 
to subjection to Nicholas. They approached the Danube. 
The Turks made not the smallest effort to forestall them 
by crossing to the north bank; perhaps this was a deep- 
laid plot of Abdul Kerim, their commander-in-chief, so 
that the Russians might lose men in the passage of the 
river and then be brought up against the quadrilateral of 
fortresses, Rustchuk and Silistria on the river, Shumla 
inland, and Varna on the coast. But in 1853 Omar Pasha 
had crossed and greatly inconvenienced the armies of that 
day. All that we know of the Turks points to their slackness 
in beginning, for they always lose their opportunities, unless 
indeed they are led by Germans. In May and June the 
Russians were waiting for the water in the Danube to 
fall; towards the end of June they crossed in two places, 
low down into the Dobrudscha as a movement to distract 
the Turks, and at a point near Sistova in the north centre 
of Bulgaria; it was done successfully and without loss. 
Gradually the main army poured into central Bulgaria, 
while the main Turkish army was on their left flank towards 
the sea. A forward dash was admirably executed by 
Ghurko, one of the smartest Russian generals of the war. 
Mountain warfare has to be studied from the campaigns 
of great men, of Napoleon in 1796-97, or of WelHngton 
and Soult in 1813 ; passes must be watched, but need not 
all be defended in force, for then an enemy will concentrate 
his attack on one pass and the defenders of the others 
will be too far off to come in to help ; above all, the defenders 
must keep their main force at the near foot of the range, 
ready to pounce on the attackers as they descend, or to 



252 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

counter-attack at the particular pass where these have 
concentrated. The Turks neglected all these precautions 
from lack of study. Some of the Russian leaders at least 
understood them. In July Ghurko's command seized a 
rough neglected pass, and proceeded, being covered by 
the Bulgarian peasants who prevented any information 
from leaking through to the Turks, to create a track 
along which at least Ught guns and waggons could go where 
no track existed before. Then a cloud of Cossacks was 
sent southwards to create an impression that an advance 
was contemplated on Adrianople. But the main force 
swung westwards, scattered some Turks, and proceeded 
to estabhsh itself at the southern mouth of the great 
Shipka pass, the main crossing-place in the Balkan chain, 
up to which ran the railway from Adrianople. Another 
Russian force under the other and greatest hero of the war. 
General Skobeleff, faced the Shipka from the north. The 
defending Turks, thus cut off, beat back the first attack, 
for it was difiicult to time accurately the assaults on the 
two faces; but, blockaded and abandoned and in danger 
of starvation, they sHpped away into the mountains. The 
Russians now had their point in the Balkans and their 
base on the Danube, thus holding a triangular area and 
presenting two fronts, eastwards and westwards; but it 
must be added, lest any one should read modern conditions 
into their position, that they were not entrenched along 
the whole of each front, and, being less than 200,000 
strong, had not a fully continuous hue. 

The seizure of the Shipka pass was of enormous im- 
portance, for by it alone were the Russians able to maintain 
themselves when the Turks made their rally. They were 
not in sufficient numbers to hold their triangle, much less 
to advance definitely on Adrianople. The possession of 



VIII] THE SHIPKA PASS SEIZED, JUI.Y 253 

the inner lines, and consequent ability to reinforce any 
point against a Turkish counter-attack, alone enabled them 
to hold on in the critical days now fast approaching. They 
were hardly in a trap; for that would imply that the 
Turks dehberately led them into it, defending the Danube 
badly, scouting badly, and guarding the Balkans badly, 
all of set purpose; also that the Turks, with two months 
for preparation, April to June, dehberately failed to con- 
centrate and keep touch. Moreover a considerable Turkish 
force was being wasted in Montenegro and on the border 
of Serbia. Ivastly, if their strategy was dehberate, it was 
grossly inefficient ; they allowed the key-stone, the Shipka 
pass, to be built into the Russian position. The truth is 
that you never know what the Turks are going to do next. 
When they seem to be on the verge of collapse, they 
suddenly win, and vice versa. This hardly impUes a 
reasoned plan. Rather the individual excellence of their 
infantry, cool and phlegmatic so as to get the utmost value 
out of their breech-loaders, and the clever initiative of 
one man, Osman Pasha, who knew how to seize a position, 
to entrench it quickly, and to get the utmost value out of 
these men, saved the Turks for the time in spite of the 
stupidity of head-quarters. 

On July 19, the very day when SkobelefE and Ghurko 
occupied the Shipka, Osman Pasha seized Plevna on the 
Russian west flank. He had com^ from Widdin, high up 
the Danube at the corner of Serbia, where his army was 
quite wasted in the first two months. The Russian Krtidener 
had made a great mistake in not anticipating him in seizing 
Plevna, as he had plenty of time to do, and indeed he had 
been ordered to do. He advanced on Osman on July 20, 
and was at once repulsed. He gathered up a larger force 
for a more serious attack on July 31. But Osman had 



254 'THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

used his ten days to fortify an amphitheatre of swelling 
hills to the east of Plevna, and the deadly rifle fire of the 
Turks was for the first time understood by all Europe; 
one redoubt the Russians carried only to find themselves 
under a more deadly fire from the next line; it was Uke 
the British capture of the Redan, a position untenable 
because open to and dominated from the rear. A typical 
stolid Turk had known how to repulse trained troops with 
great losses, proving that Turks could yet fight and reversing 
all previous judgements — neither the British nor the French 
had had any opinion of them in the Crimea, nobody had 
expected them now to beat the Russians in pitched battle, 
and the Russian advance of the past month only seemed 
to confirm previous judgements, — but could he follow up 
his success? 

Abdul Kerim was cashiered, and Mohammed Ali was 
put into the chief command with his post on the Russian 
east flank and base at Shumla. Suleiman was brought 
round from Montenegro, and with his army was carried 
by rail to the south foot of the Shipka. Osman had his 
rear open to Sofia by way of the Orkhanie pass, by which 
he obtained for the time plenty of supphes and reinforce- 
ments, most of whom however were only redifs or second- 
line militiamen; he also had a strong post at Ivovtcha 
between himself and the Shipka. Ever)rthing now depended 
on a vigorous offensive upon the dismayed Russians, directed 
by one master-mind, and timed in such a way as to prevent 
any reinforcement of a weak point, by means of the pos- 
session of the interior Unes, from one less threatened. 
Meanwhile the Russian reserves were coming up by rail 
from long distances, and an immediate reHef was at once 
given by Prince Charles and 50,000 Rumans whom the 
Tsar in his anxiety could not afford to offend by putting 



vin] 



PIvBVNA AND THE SHIPKA 



255 



under the Grand Duke's command; in fact Charles took 
over the chief command against Plevna. But the Turks 
once again had no notion of strategy. Even Osman's 
excellence stopped short at a brilHant conception of defensive 
tactics. The only Turk who tried to attack was Suleiman, 
and he attacked madly and bhndly in the worst place and 
in the worst manner, though as a matter of fact he was at 
one moment within an ace of success. 



U M 




Nicopoli 
Pl&vna o ^ ^, 



Sistova 



SOFIA "SI/a.^ 



^ > \ # -^ 



^ 



Shumla 



Tu>k£ 



Varna 

^X, lll'/.^^M/..^\);^^l^li^^"/•ii. { 



4 <p ^ 



*'<'a:-. 



EASTERN RUMELIA 
**o.f^hilippopolis 



(Campaign 

of 1912) 
Adrianople 




Shipka Pass. 

Suleiman might have brought up his force by rail to 
Sofia, and thence through the Orkhanie pass to Lovtcha, 
thus isolating the defenders of the Shipka while a smaller 
body blocked them to the south; or he could have used 
a pass further to the east, thus joining Mohammed's left 
flank and bursting in by Tirnova. In either case he could 



256 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

have helped to break in the head of the Russian triangle 
and thus drive a wedge into the Russian centre. But he 
simply hurled his men straight up from the south at the 
main position on the Shipka. Quite a small force of 
Russians were defending, but they held firm, and were 
reinforced in time by hght infantry brought up at full 
speed on horseback behind Cossacks. The position was 
saved, by a very narrow margin, but saved, August 24^. 
Next on September 3 Skobeleff seized the connecting 
position at lyovtcha with considerable losses to the Turks. 
It now seemed time for a third and final assault on Plevna, 
for no counter-attack had come from this side, and Moham- 
med dehvered but a series of most feeble blows from the 
east. The Russians and Rumanians mustered 75,000 strong 
on September 11. The attack upon the north of Osman's 
semicircle of redoubts and trenches failed utterly; on the 
east a joint Russian and Rumanian attack carried one 
redoubt only ; to the south-east the Russians were thrown 
back with fearful losses ; on the south only was an impression 
made, for there Skobelefi was in command and he knew 
how to bring on his lines in a series of waves instead of in 
one great mass, besides that he knew how to appeal to his 
men and get the most out of them by sheer force of character 
and sympathy. But even the position won by Skobeleff 
was lost next day by Osman's counter-attack with men 
drawn from his other flank, where they were not wanted. 
The Russians were quite right to attack all along the line, 
so as to keep the whole of Osman's army busy ; where they 

^ It was reported in London that the Pass had actually been 
carried, and the revulsion of feeling next day, when the news was 
contradicted, was extreme. The despatches of Forbes to the Daily 
News were as greedily awaited as in 1870; he was as then by far 
the cleverest and most trustworthy of the correspondents. 



vin] THE GREAT REPULSE, SEPTEMBER 257 

failed was in not having a strong reserve to break through 
at the one selected point when once successful there, so as 
to neutraHse the Turkish efforts elsewhere and turn the 
whole position from the rear. It was an early period in 
the history of breech-loaders and entrenchments. Only 
Skobeleff had thought the problem out, and he had been 
left without a strong reserve to drive home his blow at 
the right point. 

Once more the Tsar was in despair, and the Grand Duke 
proposed a retirement into Rumania, leaving only a fortified 
position on the south bank of the Danube. Ivuckily other 
advice was pressed on the Tsar. It was pointed out to 
him that neither Osman himself nor Mohammed had made 
a strong push between July 31 and September 11, and that 
they were not likely to make such a push now. Meanwhile 
the Shipka was safe, for Suleiman stuck to his mad poHcy 
of hurhng attack after attack up-hill, simply dashing his 
head against a wall and losing his men. The great Russian 
reinforcements were yet arriving and would soon be available. 
Thus retreat was rejected. But the Tsar determined not 
to waste more Hves by assault, but to call up the veteran 
Todleben to undertake a regular siege of Plevna. This 
news was received in London with much excitement; 
it seemed to show that the Crimean War of 23 years before 
was not so much ancient history as might have been thought 
in spite of the military developments which seemed to 
make Crimean tactics antediluvian. It has been thought 
that the Russian strategy was wrong, that it would have 
been better to have contained Osman and Suleiman, and 
to have dehvered the main blow against Mohammed. Yet 
the decision to invest Plevna at least pinned down the Turks 
to a defensive ; henceforward their main object was to feed 
Osman by way of Sofia and Orkhanie; Mohammed and 

lii. 17 



258 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Suleiman could be safely left to show their incapacity, each 
in his own way. The Sultan indeed deposed Mohammed 
and put Suleiman in his place. The latter did nothing 
worthy of mention, except that he once made a point 
towards Tirnova; but he did not press the blow home, 
but dug himself in, passing from the extreme of a mad 
offensive to a stupid defensive, as if digging in was likely 
to stop the inflow of Russians in an opposite direction. 

Todleben, with a force amounting to 120,000 Russians 
and Rumanians, gradually spread round Osman and shut 
him in by the end of October; here the phlegmatic Turk 
was seen at his worst, though the commander at Sofia 
did his best up to the end to send up food and reinforce- 
ments. Osman's own wish was to fall back on Orkhanie 
and Sofia, where he would still have had a strong position 
on the Russian flank. But the Sultan interfered and forbad 
retreat. The siege lasted about seven weeks. Typhoid 
broke out and damped the spirits of the defenders. Osman 
made a big effort on December 10 to break out to the 
south-west, failed to cut his way through, and capitulated 
at last with over 40,000 men, gaunt and hollow-cheeked 
with fever and starvation. 

In less than a month the Russian armies were shaken 
up and reorganised for their advance, defying the winter 
weather. The moral result of the fall of Plevna was very 
great. Suleiman came round from the eastern flank to 
contest the passage of the Balkans. His plans were as 
badly devised as ever, and he scattered his forces in an 
attempt to hold all the passes at once. Early in January 
Ghurko dashed through the western Balkans, secured 
Sofia, and got well in on Suleiman's left rear. Simul- 
taneously two Russian forces pushed through two side 
passes to right and left of the Shipka, and enclosed the 



viii] FAIvIy OF PIvBVNA, DECEMBER 259 

whole of the Turkish army blocking the south of that 
pass. The avalanche burst through the mountains with 
so overwhelming an onslaught, that the Turks simply 
broke and fled as best they could to the sea-coast. Ghurko 
actually entered Adrianople on January 20. 

The campaign in Asia was of secondary importance, 
and was carried on with very similar fortunes. The 
Russian general Melikoff had pushed through from the 
Caucasus, and actually laid siege to Kars. Then the Turks 
ralHed under Mukhtar Pasha, and drove the besiegers back 
on the frontier. In their turn the Russians ralhed, routed 
the Turks, laid siege again to Kars, and captured it in 
November. Then they advanced on Erzerum, but had 
not captured it when the armistice was concluded for 
Europe, which by implication included Asia, on January 31. 

The Turks having collapsed the period of diplomacy 
began. Disraeh was obviously on the look-out to stop the 
Russian advance, but the completeness and suddenness of 
the overthrow was such that he had no time, even if his 
cabinet had given him a free hand, to interfere by force 
of arms. Of course troops could not be procured in a 
moment ; even if they had been at hand, they could have 
done Uttle more than rally a certain number of the scattered 
Turks who, clustered round them as a nucleus, might hold 
the Unes covering Constantinople between the Black Sea and 
the Sea of Marmora. Obviously the terms of the Russians 
would not be the same now that they were victorious, as 
they had been a year earher when the Tsar was still trying 
to bring about a peaceful solution only to be thwarted by 
Disraeh. The Tsar himself was now in Petrograd, whence 
he gave orders to stop the advance and grant an armistice. 
The Grand Duke and the miHtary leaders in general wanted 
to advance, as was only natural after what they had endured 

17—2 



26o THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

and done. Of the strength of public opinion in England 
it is impossible to state anything with any degree of 
confidence. There was an excited cry that "the Russians 
shall not take Constantinople," the base of which was an 
ostentatious and exaggerated claim that we had "fought 
the bear before " ; these are words from a music-hall song, 
and betray the subUme ignorance of the uneducated, or 
worse still the half -educated, author and audience, who had 
not the remotest notion that we had fought the bear in 
alliance with France, and that the most important part 
of the fighting had fallen upon the French. As the poet 
of this doggerel appealed to "jingo" in confirmation of his 
statement, any wild shriek for war with or without excuse 
has been called jingoism, and the ignorant shriekers are 
called jingoes. Apparently the Bulgarian atrocities were 
forgotten; the only thought in some quarters was that 
at all hazards, even if we had actually to fight in defence 
of the blood-stained Turks, the interests of our country in 
the Mediterranean and in India demanded that on no 
account should the Russians reach the Dardanelles. On 
the other hand the historian Freeman uttered his celebrated 
phrase " Perish India" ; common fairness demands that the 
sense of the context should be added, "rather than that 
our possession of India and our interests in the Suez Canal 
should bind us to fight for a barbarous power." But, an 
unstable public opinion notwithstanding, it is very doubtful 
if DisraeH had much of a following in his own cabinet. 
On January 23 our fleet was once more ordered to the 
Dardanelles. At once lyord Carnarvon resigned. Then the 
order was changed, and it was not to advance into the 
Dardanelles. Meanwhile six millions were voted in parHa- 
ment for military expenses. Terms were being discussed 
after the armistice of January 31 ; during the discussion 



VIII] WAE FEELING IN ENGLAND 261 

the Russians held the Marmora-Black Sea line ; our fleet 
came through into the Sea of Marmora, yet did not enter 
into the Bosporus. All the other populations of the 
Balkans were at extreme tension, Greeks, Serbs, and 
Montenegrins. The Russians and Bulgarian insurgents 
were inflicting on Mohammedans the same misery which 
the Turks had, at intervals during many centuries, 
inflicted when they had the power; it is even said that 
these new atrocities rivalled those of eighteen months 
back. The Austrians were certainly alarmed, and were 
taking up the same situation which they had taken 
in 1854. 

Now it is reasonably certain that the Russians were 
hardly in a position to undertake a new campaign in case 
Austria declared war, or in case DisraeU, set free by his 
previous opponents in his cabinet, should proceed to ex- 
tremes though he only had a fleet on which to rely to back 
up threats. Russian administration and organisation always 
had a knack of breaking down just at the wrong moment, 
partly through corruption and selfishness in high places, 
partly through inabihty to carry out war far from home. 
In all probability Tsar Alexander understood this. Early 
in February Austria proposed a Conference; almost 
immediately a second proposal suggested a Congress to 
be held at BerHn; Bismarck, to use his own words, put 
himself forward as an "honest broker" to settle between 
his neighbours business matters which did not concern 
himself. Bismarck indeed rather over-acted his part, 
especially when he declared that the whole Eastern Ques- 
tion was not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. 
But it was a fine thing that the Concert of Europe should 
be revived, though it would have been a finer if it had been 
effected before the war. The alteration of Conference into 



262 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

Congress meant that Chancellors and Prime Ministers 
would attend in place of Ambassadors. 

But before the Concert could meet, the terms of the 
Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey were 
made known. An independent Bulgaria was created to 
include all the debatable land of the middle Balkans, 
where Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks, and Mohammedans Hved in 
inextricable confusion, in some districts one nationaHty 
having the larger population, and in other districts another 
nationality; it was to extend from the Black Sea to the 
Aegean and to embrace Adrianople, Kavalla, Salonica, 
and Monastir. Serbia and Montenegro were to have full 
independence and some increase of territory; Rumania 
was to receive the Dobrudscha, but to give up her north- 
eastern district of Bessarabia to the Russians ; Russia 
herself claimed only part of Asiatic Turkey to include 
Batum on the coast, and Kars inland. The Treaty did 
not show much cleverness on the part of the Russians. 
Certainly Greece had no reason to cry out, because the war 
had nothing to do with her, and, apart from the large 
number in the coast-towns, there were comparatively few 
of her language and nationaHty Uving in Macedonia. But 
Rumania received very shabby treatment in return for 
her services at Plevna, and Serbia and Montenegro for their 
services in helping the original revolt in Herzegovina, when 
they had engaged the Turks in war whilst Russia was 
preparing. Bulgaria alone was to have the profit, and yet 
the Bulgars had had, of all the Balkan races, the least ex- 
perience of self-government ; it would only mean that Russia 
would govern a very large portion of the Balkans through 
one favoured race which could not govern itself. But the 
worst of it was that the Treaty was published just after 
the sitting of the Congress had been arranged. Therefore 



VIII] THE BBRI.IN CONGRESS, 1878 263 

it seemed to be a defiance of the Concert, tlie Great Powers 
having nothing further to do than accept the Russian 
rearrangement of territory. There was danger of actual 
war in April, when Disraeli, finally reheved of opposition 
by Lord Derby's resignation, called out reserves and miHtia 
and ordered some troops from India to Malta. 

The Congress finally met in June, and the protagonists 
were Bismarck, Gortschakoff, Andrassy, Disraeh supported 
by his new Foreign Secretary I^ord SaHsbury, M. Waddington 
representing France, and Signor Corti Italy. The chief 
questions were, the size and status of Bulgaria, the inde- 
pendence of Rumania and Serbia, and the amount of 
compensation to be given to Austria. Between the dan- 
gerous period when there had nearly been war and the 
first sitting of the Congress, DisraeH had practically settled 
matters in private with the Russians, for Salisbury was not 
only more in accord with him than Derby had been, but 
also more definite in putting before the Tsar's government 
what he could or could not accept. Moreover whether 
there was an understanding between him and Andrassy or 
not, at least British diplomacy reckoned on an anti-Russian 
feehng on the part of Austria. The final settlement was 
that Bulgaria should be practically independent between 
the Balkans and the Danube, together with a piece jutting 
to the south-west to include Sofia, to be subject to the 
suzerainty of the Sultan, yet self-governed under a Christian 
prince who was to be chosen by the people and confirmed 
by the Sultan with the consent of the Great Powers ; but 
Eastern RumeHa lying south of the Balkans, with its 
population almost entirely Bulgarian, was to be still an 
integral part of the Turkish Empire under a Christian 
Governor, and this was a point for which Disraeli strove 
his hardest, so that the Balkan passes might be under the 



264 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

control of the Turks in case of a new war. Rumania was 
to have complete independence, to give up Bessarabia, 
but receive the Dobrudscha as settled at San Stefano. 
Serbia was to have complete independence and a rather 
larger accession of territory than previously allowed. 
Montenegro was to have less, but access to the sea at 
Antivari. But the most important condition was that the 
control of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be entrusted to 
Austria. Greece received no present gain. The surrender 
of the piece of Asiatic Turkey to the Russians, including 
Batum and Kars, was confirmed. 

The obvious criticism that first occurs to our minds is 
that these arrangements of the Concert did not, and indeed 
could not, last. As at San Stefano, so at Berhn, the Russians 
made the great mistake of not showing a warm enough 
sympathy towards Rumania and Serbia, and the concession 
made to the Austrians, which gave them practical control, 
converted thirty years later into absolute sovereignty, of 
a great wedge of territory between Serbia and the sea, 
was in very truth the thin end of the wedge which has 
been driven home so as to cause the present troubles. 
The changes have been chiefly these. The boundary Hue 
between Greece and Turkey was drawn by an unsatisfactory 
arrangement, so as to give to Greece most of Thessaly but 
not Epirus ; in 1897 the Greeks, profoundly angry because 
of new Turkish atrocities in Crete and the utterly unintel- 
ligible action of the Powers in supporting the Turks, made 
war and were badly beaten. In 1885 a widespread popular 
movement in Eastern Rumelia suddenly expelled the 
Turkish ofiicials and declared for incorporation with 
Bulgaria; Prince Alexander of Battenberg, who had been 
elected after the Congress, accepted the Union though he had 
not intrigued to bring it about ; Milan, King of Serbia — he 



VIII] THE BALKANS IN AND AFTER 1878 265 

had changed his title from Prince to King in 1882 — promptly 
attacked the new Bulgaria, and was badly beaten ; but the 
Power mostly offended was Russia, for, playing his cards 
it must be confessed most unskilfully. Tsar Alexander III 
always domineered over Prince Alexander, treated Bulgaria 
as almost a Russian province, sanctioned in 1886 a plot 
to kidnap him, and finally forced him in self-defence to 
resign ; another thing that surprises us in connection with 
Bulgaria is the easy way in which Salisbury approved of 
the union although Disraeli had striven successfully to 
prevent it ; the new Prince of Bulgaria was Ferdinand of 
Saxe Coburg, who is now King or Tsar, and we know what 
sort of a man he is. The Austrian proclamation of full 
sovereignty over Bosnia dates from 1908, coming imme- 
diately after the Revolution of the Young Turks, who 
overthrew the Sultan and seemed Hkely to put new vigour 
into the still unreformed Empire. Indeed the saddest part 
of the sequel to the work of the Congress is that none of 
the Great Powers have ever made a move to insist upon 
reform. There have been Armenian atrocities, which 
roused Gladstone to wrath in his extreme old age, but 
hardly anybody in England or the rest of Europe seemed 
to care; perhaps "atrocities" were rather out of date as 
a war-cry, and people suspected that they were being used 
as a political trick. Disraeli had made with the Sultan 
just before the sitting of the Congress a secret Convention, 
by which he took Cyprus under British protection, as a 
counterbalance to the Russian acquisition of Kars and 
Batum; it was under this Convention that the Stdtan 
definitely promised to reform his administration, and to 
protect his remaining Christian subjects. Each Russian 
Tsar held severely aloof on the question of Armenia, and 
naturally so after every previous Russian move had been 



266 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

interpreted as a piece of selfish interference for the purpose 
of weakening Turkey to Russia's profit. Each party in 
Great Britain refrained from pressing reform in spite of 
the Cyprus Convention. William II saw his opportunity, 
and posed as the friend of Turkey both before and after 
the coup d'etat of the Young Turks. 

As for recent Balkan events, we cannot too much 
admire the abihty of Venezelos, who first gave to Greece 
an administration worthy of her democratic form of 
government, infused a new spirit of patriotism, and combined 
with her the other Balkan Powers into a league which was 
almost ideal in its inception, but who did not make enough 
allowance for the jealousy inherent in human nature. It is 
enough to say here that the forces of Greece, Serbia, and 
Bulgaria, completely routed the Turks in 1912, upsetting 
all calculations based on previous defeats of both Greeks 
and Serbs; the Young Turks, it was seen, had learnt 
nothing, and let their armies be routed by the Bulgars 
through sheer starvation. The first division of Turkish 
territory by the victors was a not unsatisfactory com- 
promise. The Greeks took Salonica. But the Bulgars 
were not satisfied in obtaining only Adrianople and 
Kavalla; the importance of Kavalla is that around it is 
the most valuable tobacco-raising country. Their ambition 
was to obtain Salonica also, as if the Greeks had filched 
it from them whilst they were fighting the hardest battles 
against the strongest Turkish force up to and around 
Adrianople. Hence arose the second Balkan war; the 
Bulgars suddenly attacked both Serbs and Greeks, were 
everywhere beaten, were threatened from Rumania across 
the river, and lost Kavalla and a good deal of other territory, 
let alone the fact that the Turks regained Adrianople. 
The Germans were clever enough to turn Bulgarian dis- 



VIII] THE BAI^KAN WARS, 1912-13 267 

appointment to their own favour. Finally we still marvel 
how Venezelos, after all his services, should not have had 
sufficient influence to consummate the policy which was 
so near consummation in 1915 ; but King, German Queen, 
court, staff, upper classes, were hypnotised by German 
influence, and doubtless looked upon him as a Cretan 
upstart who could be overthrown. Meanwhile the problem 
still remains that the mixture of populations in Macedonia 
has always prevented a peaceful solution of the difficulty 
as to how to apportion that part of the ex-Turkish Empire. 
European developments since 1878 have been chiefly 
caused by the Franco-German question. No one can 
deny the patience and self-restraint of France; she may 
have had her scandals and her struggles at home between 
clericals and anti-clericals and between capital and labour ; 
but she has never given to Germany any excuse to attempt 
to bleed her again to the white. The interesting thing for 
us is the growth of that feehng which led to the Entente 
Cordiale, and which the Germans have in so barefaced 
a manner interpreted as the true reason of the present 
war. It was a long time before the seeds of the Entente 
were sown. Right up to the Boer War French feeling was 
entirely against us. It certainly seems as if Bismarck 
deliberately meant to encourage France towards Colonial 
expansion on purpose to cause rivalry between us. In 1881 
the French occupied Tunis. In 1882 an outburst of 
Mohammedan fury in Egypt forced us to interfere and take 
the country under our protection. In 1885 we drew back 
from the work of stamping out a similar Mohammedan 
flame in the Sudan; in 1897-98, the government of 
Egypt being well organised to the credit of our adminis- 
tration, an advance was made into the Sudan, savagery 
was tamed, and Khartum was occupied. Meanwhile the 



268 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. 

French had at intervals extended their Empire into the 
heart of north-west Africa, and Marchand's expedition 
from the interior to the Upper Nile reached Fashoda at 
the very time Kitchener reached Khartum. There were 
other points where French and British interests clashed, 
notably in Siam, But the occupation of Fashoda was 
critical. War however was averted. 

On the other hand Russian bitterness against British 
opposition was very natural. Thwarted in her Balkan 
ambitions, she turned her attention to central Asia, where 
she conquered Turkestan and laid down the Trans-Caspian 
railway. But there were the Nihilist troubles at home, 
and in spite of the strong wish of Skobeleff and the Russian 
military party to trouble us in India, and to create a Russian 
supremacy over Afghanistan as a preliminary, Disraeli 
forestalled them; our two Afghan wars, which first made 
the mass of Englishmen familiar with the name of Frederick 
Roberts, were fought to a conclusion and resulted in the 
appointment as Amir of Abdur Rahman, who remained our 
staunch friend. Then the Russians turned their attention 
to the far East, and laid down the Trans-Siberian railway, 
which brought them into collision with that wonderful 
new power Japan. I^ord Salisbury made no effort to stop 
the Russian advance, and allowed the occupation of Port 
Arthur ; there was a general feeling that he knew Httle and 
cared little about the problems of the far East, but there 
is an alternative explanation of his policy, that he deliber- 
ately allowed this so as to embroil the Russians with the 
Japanese. A defensive Treaty between Japan and ourselves 
in 1902 provided that, if one of the allies was engaged in 
war and a third Power intervened on the side of the enemy, 
the other Power would join in automatically. 

Now during these very years when the British rather 



VIII] GROWTH OF THE ENTENTE 269 

than the Germans seemed to be the chief objects of French 
hatred, and when our opposition to Russia was taken to 
be a matter of course, these two Powers drew nearer to 
each other. Bismarck, towards the end of his career, 
cared less to conciHate Russia, and the Russians on their 
side, placing their loans in France rather than in Germany, 
built their Siberian railway on French capital. The Dual 
AlHance was formally created in 1895 as an answer to the 
Triple AlUance of Germany with Austria and Italy. The 
result was a sort of European stale-mate. During our 
Boer War each European Power, with the honourable 
exception of Italy, wished ill to us, but the division of 
Europe into the Dual and Triple prevented any armed 
help being given to the Boers; indeed, one can hardly 
conceive of even an understanding between the French 
and Germans and Russians to damage the Power which 
might be so useful to either combination. Very probably 
Nicholas II suggested the meeting of a Peace Conference 
for the purpose of restoring the Concert of Europe, because 
he saw the absurdity of rival armaments in consequence 
of the stale-mate. The joint expedition of all the Powers 
of Europe, and the United States and Japan, for the relief 
of the Embassies in Pekin,when the Boxers were in rebelUon 
in 1900, seemed to show that a mutual understanding was 
possible. 

No sooner did Edward VII come to the throne in 1901 
than under his auspices our ministers began to draw near 
to France, the Entente Cordiale was set on foot, and the 
two nations agreed to recognise each other's sphere of 
imperial activity, France at last acknowledging the benefit 
of our rule to Egypt, and our ministers giving to them a 
free hand in north-west Africa. Then WilUam II played 
what seems now to have been nothing but an underhand 



270 THE EASTERN QUESTION [ch. vni 

game; he encouraged Nicholas to champion European 
civiHsation against the "Yellow Peril," that is to say 
against Japan, for whatever might happen it seemed clear 
that Germany would get the profit. But France did not 
help Russia, therefore we were not forced to help Japan, 
and so the Entente Cordiale was not spoilt. When the 
Japanese War turned to the disadvantage of the Russians, 
he at once turned against France on the question of Morocco ; 
obviously, Russia being weakened for the time as the result 
of his own prompting, he thought that he could adopt a 
hectoring tone towards France. Probably he did not push 
matters to extremes because the Entente was soHd, and his 
navy was not yet large enough to have even the sHghtest 
chance of success against ours. From the moment when 
he brutally demanded the resignation of Monsieur Delcasse, 
who was then Foreign Secretary at Paris, it was finally 
clear that his aggressiveness, based on the support of the 
Germans after a generation of constant teaching that it 
was their right to dominate Europe, would take action 
some day. We gradually saw how our persistent hostility 
to Russia was out of place, how we had done wrong in 
applauding the Japanese so loudly, and how Russia was 
necessary to the Franco-British Entente. Yet not a single 
act of the Entente Powers can be quoted to justify the 
German claim that they were the aggressors in 1914. 



INDEX 



Aachen- (Aix-la-Chapelle), 21, 29 
Abd-el-Kader, 70, 71 
Abdul Kerim, 251, 254 
Abdur Rahman, 268 
Aberdeen, Lord, 113-4, 118 
Acre, 72, 74 
Adige, II, 88, 90, 232 
Adrianople, 51, 57, 252, 255, 259, 

262, 266 : see Treaties 
Adriatic coast, 7, 11, 12, 42-4 
Afghanistan, 268 
Alabama, state, 152, 157 ; ship, 

160, 168, 231 
Albania, 43, 55 
Aleppo, 72 

Alessandria, 129, 130, 132 
Alexander I, Tsar, 4, 6, 18-21, 

25. 29, 51, ^^, 65, 113, 170 
Alexander II, 118, 150-1, 170-1, 

249, 257, 261 
Alexander III, 265 
Alexander of Battenberg, 264-5 
Alexandria, 35, 45, 74 
Alfonso, 27 

Algeria, Algiers, 32, 68-71, 116 
Ali Pasha, 43, 48, 52 
Alma, 1x6, 119 
Alsace, 6, 71, 202-3, 213, 221, 

225, 227 
Alvensleben, 204, 206 
America, South, 24-6, 153-4 
Amiens, 217 
Anatolia, 35, 55, 75 
Ancona, 66, 132, 139, 142 
Andrassy, 191, 243, 245, 263 
Antietam, 162 
Antonelli, Cardinal, 105 
Antwerp, 8-10, 64-5 



Armenia, 265 
Artois, see Charles X 
Athens, 52, 54 
Augustenburg, 173, 177-8 
Aurelle de Paladines, 215-7 

Baden, 16, 22, 100, 189, 201, 228 

Balaclava, 11 7-9 

Barricades, 32, 77, 83-4 

Batthyany, 94, 104 

Batum, 262, 264-5 

Bavaria, Bavarians, 7, 11, 15-16, 
99, 104, 179-80, 185, 189, 201, 
210, 215, 228-9 

Bazaine, 167, 205-9, 215-6 

Bazeilles, 210 

Belfort, 202-3, 211, 217, 225-7 

Belgium, 7-9, 62-5, 169, 179, 
191-2, 200, 202 

Belgrad, 39 

Benedek, 129, 181-4 

Benedetti, 187, 191-2, 199, 200 

Berlin Congress, 261-2 ; Memo- 
randum, 245-6 

Bernadotte, 4, 18 

Berry, Due de, 30-1 

Bessarabia, 40, 262, 264 

Beust, 192-3, 230 

Biarritz, 179 

Bismarck, 108, 169-73, 177-80, 
186-9, 191-2, 198-201, 212, 
218-9, 222, 227, 233, 241-2, 
261, 263, 267 

Bitsch, 203, 215 

Blanc, Louis, 78, 80, 82, 83 

Boer War, 224, 269 

Bohemia, 13, 93, 181 etc. 

Bologna, 12, 66, 89, 132-3 



272 



INDEX 



Bordeaux, no, 212, 217, 227, 234 
Bosnia, 42-3, 244, 264-5 
Boulogne, 85 
Bourbaki, 217, 225-6 
Bourbons, French, 4, 5,30, 239; 

Spanish and Italian, 12, 23-4, 

65, 103, 145 
Bourmont, 69 
Boxers, 269 
Brazil, 27, 89 
Brenner Pass, 11, 132 
Brown, John, 156 
Brussels, 63 
Buda-Pesth, 92, 104 
Bukovina, 40 
Bulgaria, Bulgars, 37, 40-1, 246- 

8, 255, 261-6 
Bull Run, 261-2 
Burke, quoted, 78, 156, 220 
Byron, 49 

Cadiz, 25 

Calatafimi, 136 

California, 155-6, 167 

Canning, 25-7, 55-7, 124 

Canrobert, 70, 117, 119, 129 

Capodistrias, 50, 58 

Caprera, 144 

Capua, 139, 141-2, 144 

Carbonari, 23, 65, 85 

Carlos, Don, 26, 30 

Carlyle, 126, 175, 219 and foil. 

Carnarvon, Lord, 247, 260 

Carolina, 158, 162, 165 

Casale, 130, 132 

Caserta, 141-2 

Castelfidardo, 14 1-2 

Castlereagh, 18, 22-5, 51, 55 

Cattaro, 12, 44 

Cavaignac, 70, 83-4, 91, 107 

Cavour, 126-9, i33-40» 143-5. 

179 
Chalons, 202-3, 205, 209-11 
Chambery, 132, 140, 179 
Chancellorsville, 162 
Chanzy, 217-8, 225 
Charles Albert, 85-91, 100, 102 
Charles X, 29-32, 56, 68-9 
Charleston, 164-5 
Charter, of Louis XVIII, 29, 

32-3 ; People's, 78 



Chattanooga, 165 

Chesapeake Bay, 161, 163 

China, 126, 149, 269 

Chios, 46, 53, 58 

Christian IX, 173-4 

Christina, 26 

Church, Sir Richard, 54 

Cialdini, 140 

Clausel, 69, 70 

Clausewitz, 186 

Clay, 155 

Cobden, in, 176 

Coblentz, 202 

Codrington, 56 

Cologne, archbishopric, 14 

Colombey, 206 

Commune of Paris, 235-6, 240 

Concert of Europe, i, 23, 25, 73, 

123, 173, 218, 233, 247-9, 

261-4, 269 
Confederates, U.S.A., 157-65 
Conscription, 168, 195, 238 
Constantine, 70 
Constantinople, 35-7, 41-2, 45-6, 

49-51. 55. 113. 246, 248, 259- 

60 
Coulmiers, 216 
Coup d'etat, 107 
Crete, 46, 53-4, 58, 264, 267 
Crimea, 112, 116-20 
Croatia, 42, 92, 94-5, 103, 186, 

190 
Crown Prince of Prussia, 182-4, 

189, 201-9, 218, 224 
Crusaders, 140 
Custozza, 90-1, 131-2, 185 
Cyprus, 265-6 

Dantzig, 8, 15 

Danube, 92, 115, 121, 251 

Dardanelles, 37, 58, 72, 75, 115, 

230, 246, 260 
Davis, Jefferson, 158, 162 
De4k, 1 90-1 
Democrats, U.S.A., 154 
Denmark, 8, 16, 18, 97, 173-5 
Derby, Lord, 247, 263 
Diaz, 167 
Dijon, 217, 225 
Disraeli, 62, 149, 160, 174, 244-9. 

259-65 



INDEX 



273 



Dual Alliance, 233, 269; Mon- 
archy, 190, 243 
Ducrot, 210 

Edict, the Unitary, 96, 99, 104 

Edward VII, 269 

Egypt, 53. 71-5, 267, 269 

Eisenach, 20, 188 

Eisleben, 20, 188 

EmiUa, 133, 135 

Ems, 199 

Enfantin, 79 

Entente, 114, 125, 159, 175, 267, 

269-70 
Erzerum, 57, 259 
Eugenie, no, 166, 196, 212 
Exhibitions, in, 115, 123 
Exmouth, Lord, 69 

Faidherbe, 217, 225 

Failly, 147, 205 

Farragut, 163, 167 

Fashoda, 268 

Favre, iii, 126, 196, 212-3, 227, 

234 
Ferdinand of Naples, 30, 90, 103, 

135; of Bulgaria, 64, 265; of 

Spain, 24-5, 30 
Ferry, 196 
Forbach, 204 

Forbes, 216, 220, 223, 235, 250,256 
Francis II of Naples, 135-6 
Francis Joseph, 95, 98, 128, 131, 

134, 190, 193, 243 
Francs-tireurs, 214-5, 223-4 
Frankfort, 16, 66, 96-9, 180, 

188-9 
Frederick, the Great, 221; of 

Denmark, 173 
Frederick Charles, 182-4, 202- 

4, 207, 215-7, 225 
Frederick William, 96, 99, 105, 

169 
Fredericksburg, 162 
Free Trade, 80, in 
Freeman, 175, 260 
Frossard, 204, 206 

Gaeta, 14 1-2, 144 
Cambetta, 194, 196, 215-8, 234, 
237-40 



M, 



Garibaldi, 11, 89, 101-2, 128, 

135-44. 192. 217-8, 225 
Genoa, 10-12, 46, 68, 87, 129, 135 
George I of Greece, 243 
Gerard, 64 
German Empire, 228, 241-3, 

269-70 
German Legion, 120 
Germany, 2, 7-8, 13-17, 22-3, 

66-7, 96-100, 104-5, 172-80, 

188-9 
Gettysburg, 164-5 
Ghurko, 251, 258 
Giulay, 129-30, 181 
Gladstone, 103, 114, 149, 168, 

220, 230-1, 244, 247, 265 
Gorgei, 104 
Gortschakoff, 230, 263 
Grant, Ulysses, 159, 163-5, 1^7 
Gravelotte, 207, 211 
Greece, Greeks, 34-7, 44-55, 58, 

262, 264, 266-7 
Grevy, 84, 212, 240 
Guizot, 62, 74, 76-8 

Hamburg, 16 

Hanover, 15, 66, 99, 104, 173, 

177, 185, 188-9 
Hapsburgs, 11-12, 65, 95, 98 
Haussmann, iii 
Haynau, 104 
Henri V, 30, 239 
Herzegovina, 42, 244-6 
Hesse Cassel, 16, 22, 66, 104-5, 

188-9; Darmstadt, 14, 16, 

104, 188-9, 201 
HohenzoUern, 13-15, 22, 96-7; 

Sigmaringen, 121, 169, 198 
Holland, 7, 9, 16, 63—4 
Holstein, 16, 97, 105, 149, 172-8, 

188-9 
Holy Alhance, 19-20, 23 
Hungary, Hungarians, 11, 38-42, 

91-6, 103-4, 113, 185, 190-1, 

243 
Hydria, 46, 53, 58 
Hypsilanti, 50-1 

Ibrahim, 53-8, 71-2 
India, 114, 125, 260, 268 
Inkerman, 117, 119 

18 



274 



INDEX 



Innsbruck, 93 

Ionian Islands, 12, 44, 46, 49, 54, 

69, 244 
Ironclads, 122, 163-4, 176, 185 
Isabella of Spain, 26, 76, 198 
Italy. 7, 10-13, 23-4, 65-6, 85- 

91, 102-3, 126-48, 187, 193, 

229, 269 

Jackson, Stonewall, 157-8, 16 1-2 

Janissaries, 37-8, 55, 71 

Japan, 268-70 

Jellacic, 94-5 

Jena, 20; battle, 14, 179, 223 

Jerome, 7, 128 

Jerusalem, 75, 113 

John, Archduke, 98-100 

Josephstadt, 182, 184 

Juarez, 165-7 

Kabyles, 69-70 

Kamiesh Bay, 117, 119 

Kanaris, 53-4 

Kara George, 42-3 

Kars, 57, 259, 262, 264-5 

Kavalla, 262, 266 

Khartum, 72, 267-8 

Kiel, 177 

Kitchener, 268 

Kolokotrones, 52-3 

Konieh (Iconium), 35-6, 72 

Koniggratz, 184 

Kossuth, 92, 94-5, 104, 190 

Lacaita, 138 

Lafayette, 32 

Laibach, 24, 50 

La Marmora, 180, 185 

Lamartine, 80, 82, 84 

Lamorici^re, 140, 142 

Langensalza, 185 

Latin races, 152 

Lee, Robert, 157-8, 161-5 

Legations, papal, 12, 66, 127, 

132-3 
Legitimists, 4-5, 60, 107, 140, 

227, 239 
Le Mans, 217, 225 
Leopold I of Belgium, 58, 63-4, 

68 
Lesseps, 102 



Lincoln, Abraham, 156, 158, 162 

Lissa, 185 

Lombardy, 7, 24, 89-91, loi, 

127-8, 1 3 1-3. 145 
Lorraine, 6-7, 98, 213, 227 
Louis XIV, 6, 39, 69, 71, 179, 

201, 219, 228; XVI, I, 32-3; 

Xyill, 4, 21, 25, 28-32 
Louis Bonaparte, 7, 9, 84 
Louis Philippe, 32, 60-2, 68, 71, 

74, 76-7, 82 
Louisiana, 152-3 
Lovtcha, 254-5 
Lubeck, 7, 16 
Lucca, 12, 132 
Luneville, 206, 227 
Luxemburg, 16, 64, 169, 179, 

188, 191-, 194, 200, 202 
Lyons, 79, no, 212 

McClellan, 16 1-2 

MacMahon, 70, 120, 130, 203, 

205, 209-10, 236, 239-40 
Magdeburg, 14, 188 
Magenta, 130, 132, 203 
Mahmud, 50, 55, 71-3 
Mainz (Mayence), 14, 16, 202, 211 
Malakoff, 118-20, 123 
Malta, 12, 203 
Mamelukes, 71 
Manin, 89, 103, 127 
Manteuffel, 180, 191, 217, 225 
Mantua, 88, 90, 13 1-2 
Marchand, 268 

Marches, papal, 12, 139-40, 144 
Maria of Portugal, 27-8 
Mars-la-Tour, 207, 211 
Mavrocordato, 49, 51 
Maximilian, 166-7 
Mazzini, 11, 85-6, loi, 137 
Mecklenburg, 16, 180, 188-9 
Mediterranean, 55, 68-9, 113, 

147 
Mentana, 141, 147, 193-4 
Merrimac, 163-4 
Messina, 136-8 
Metternich, 20-3, 39, 49, 67, 86, 

88 
Metz, 6, 202-8, 214-6 
Mexico, 26, 153-6, 165-7, ^9^> 

194 



INDEX 



275 



Midhat, 249 

Mignet, 32, 84 

Miguel, 27, 68 

Milan, 24, 83, 86-8, 91, 130, 

132-3 
Milan of Serbia, 244, 264 
Milazzo, 136, 141 
Mincio, 88-91, 13 1-2 
Mississippi, 152-3, 158-9, 163-5 
Missolonglii, 51-2, 54, 58 
Missouri, 155 

Modena, 12, 66, 89, 98, 132-3 
Mohammed Ali, 43, 48, 53, 71-5; 

254 
Moldavia, 40, 47, 121, 230, 244 
Moltke, 1 8 1-4, 186-7, 199-200, 

212, 216, 242 
Monitor, 163-4 
Monroe, 153, 156, 160, 166 
Mont Cenis, 129, 132 
Montenegro, 42, 44, 245, 248, 

253 
Morea, 50, 54, 57 
Morny, no, 166-7 
Moscow, 112, 114 
Mukhtar, 259 

Nancy, 202-3, 205-6, 211, 227 

Napier, Admiral, 74-5 

Naples, 7, 12, 23-4, 87, 89, 90, 

100, 103, 137-45 
Napoleon I, 2-9, 14, 15, 32, 65, 

84, 97, 109, 129-31, 152, 178- 

9, 181-2, 186, 201, 222-3 
Napoleon III, 60, 84, 91, 101-2, 

and chapters v and vi 
Napoleon (Prince), 128, 140 
Nashville, U.S.A., 165 
Nassau, 180, 188-9 
National Guard, 62, 77, 82-3, 

93, 214, 226, 235 
Navarino, 52, 54, 56-7, 72 
New Orleans, 158, 163 
Ney, 28-9 
Nice, lo-ii, 128, 132, 134, 143, 

179 
Nicholas I, 55, 65, 112-5, 118, 125 
Nicholas II, 269 
Nicholas, Grand Duke, 251, 255, 

257 
Nihilists, 151, 268 



Nikolsburg, 187 

North German Confederation, 

189, 191, 201 
Norway, 1 8 
Novara, 100, 132 

Obrenovich, 42-3, 244 
Odessa, 47-8 
Ollivier, no, 194, 196 
Olmiitz, 105, 184, 188 
Orkhanie, 254-5, 257-8 
Orleans, 215-7: see under 'Louis 

Philippe 
Orsini, 126-7, ^34 
Orthodox Greek Church, 41-2, 

45. 48, 51 
Osman Pasha, 253-8 
Otto of Greece, 58, 243 
Ottomans, 36-8, 41, 45-9 
Oudinot, 1 01-2 

Palatinate, Bavarian, 16, 179, 

188-9 
Palermo, 103, 136, 141 
Palmerston, 27, 65, 67-8, 73, 

75-6, 102, 109, 1 1 2-3, 118, 

127, 134, 149, 160, 175, 245 
Papacy, 12, 65-6, 87, 103, 131, 

140, 147, 229, 241 
Paris, 32, 77, iio-i, 123, 200, 

209, 212-8, 226, 235-7 
Paris, Count of, 239 
Parma, 12, 66, 89, 132-3 
Pavia, 129-30, 132 
Peasants, 4, 6, 79, 83-4, in, 

150, 196, 237 
Pekin, 150, 269 
Pelissier, 70, 119-20, 123 
Persano, 135, 137-40, 185 
Peter, of Portugal, 27 
Phanariots, 47-51 
Piedmont, 10, 132, 145: see 

under Sardinia and Savoy 
Pius IX, 87, 89-90, 103, 229, 

233. 241 
Plebiscite, 107-8, 112, 133-4, 

144, 196, 229 
Plevna, 253-8 

Plombieres, 127-8, 133, 179 
Poland, 2, 7, 15, 18, 65, 113, 149, 

151, 171-2, 221 



276 



INDEX 



Port Arthur, 268 
Portugal, 18, 27-8, 68 
Prague, 93-4, 97, 184, 189 
Prince Imperial, 112, 123, 204 
Psara, 46, 53-4 
Puebla, 155, 166 

Quadrilateral, Italy, 88, 90, 131- 

3; Balkans, 251, 255 
Quadruple Alliance, 73 

Radetzky, 88-91, loo-i, 129 
Raglan, 116, 118, 120 
Ragusa, 12, 43-4 
Railways, 87, 122, 132, 142, 184, 

186-7, 202, 209, 214, 250, 254, 

268-9 
Redan, 119-20 
Reform Bill, 19, 67, 78 
Reggio, 138, 141 
Republic, First, 1-3, 18-20, 108- 

9, 113, 212-3, 221, 226; 

Second, 77, 82-5, loi, 106-7; 

Third, 212-3, 234, 238-40; 

Roman, 100-2, 106; Venetian, 

108 
Republicans, French, iio-i, 194 

-6; Italian, 108, 127; U.S.A., 

154. 157 
Revolution, First, 219; July, 32, 

60; 1848, 77 
Rhine, 2, 7, 14-17. 74, 172, 179, 

189, 202 
Richelieu, Duke, 28, 31 
Richmond, U.S.A., 161, 165 
Rifles, 116, 122, 147, 159, 183, 

195, 208, 250, 253 
Right to work, 78-80, 82-3 
Rochefort, 194, 196 
Roman Catholics, 15, 17, 31, 42, 

63, 84, loi, 106, 113, 134, 233, 

241 
Rome, 100-3, 137, 139, 143, 

146-7, 229 
Roon, 170, 172, 186, 199 
Rouen, 217 
Rum, 35-6, 45 
Rumania, 40, 47, 50, 57, 91, 113, 

115, 121, 190, 230, 244, 249, 

254-6, 262, 264, 266 
Rumelia, 255, 263-4 



Russell, 134, 138, 145-6, 170, 

174-5, 230 
Rustchuk, 251, 255 

Saarbruck, 202, 204 

Sadowa, 183-4 

Saint Arnaud, 11 6-7 

Saint Privat, 207-8, 211 

Saint Quentin, 225 

Saint Simon, 79 

SaUsbury, Lord, 174, 248, 263, 

265, 268 
Salonica, 46, 48, 51, 58, 246, 262, 

266 
Sardinia, 10, 86, 118, 126-7 
Savoy, 7, 10, 86, 128, 131-5, 179 
Saxe Coburg, 16, 63-4, 265 
Saxe Weimar, 16, 20, 22 
Saxony, 2, 7, 14-17, 20, 22, 66, 99, 

104, 172-3, 177, 180-4, 187-9, 

201-2, 208, 210 
Scheldt, 8, 65 

Schleswig, 97, 105, 149, 188-9 
Schwarzenberg, 95, 99, 104 
Scott, Winfield, 155 
Sebastopol, 116-24 
Sedan, 162, 210-2 
Senegal, 71 
Serbia, 40-4, 121, 244, 247-8, 

262-4, 266 
Shelley, 49, 86 
Shenandoah Valley, 157, 161 
Sherman, 165 
Shipka Pass, 252-8 
Shumla, 57, 251, 254-5 
Sicily, 12, 23-4, 100, 103, 135-7, 

144-5 
Silesia, 8, 182, 187-8, 221 
Sihstria, 57, 115, 251, 255 
Simon, 196, 234 
Simpson, 120, 124 
Sinope, 115 
Sismondi, 86—7 
Skobelefif, 252-3, 256—7, 268 
Slave Trade, 18 
Slavery, 152 etc. 
Slavs, II, 13-14, 37, 40-4, 190, 

232-3, 243-5 
Socialism, 79-81, 83, 241 
Sofia, 254-5, 257-8 
Solferino, 13 1-2 



INDEX 



277 



Spain, 2, 18, 23-7, 38, 85, 153, 

198-9 
Spicheren, 204, 211 
Spielberg, 24 

Steinmetz, 202, 204, 206-8 
Strasburg, 6, 85, 203, 205, 21 1-2, 

215 
Stratford de Redcliffe, 112, 

1 14-5 
Sudan, 267 

Suez Canal, 79, iii, 197, 244 
Suleiman Pasha, 254-8 
Sweden, 4, 18 
Switzerland, 18, 225 
Syria, 72-5, 150, 243 
Szechenyi, 92 

Talleyrand, 5, 28 

Tann, 215-6 

Taormina, 138, 141 

Tchernaya, 117-20, 123 

Tennessee, 152, 163-4 

Texas, 154, 162, 167 

Thiers, 32, 60-1, 74, 84, 107, 109, 

III, 194, 212, 218, 227, 234, 

238 
Three Emperors' League, 242, 

245. 249 
Ticino, 88, 100, 129-30, 132 
Todleben, 117-20, 257-8 
Toul, 6, 209, 211, 215 
Tours, 215, 217 
Transylvania, 91, 190 
Treaties, of Adrianople, 57, 113; 

Frankfort, 227; Gastein, 177; 

Kainardji, 39,47, 113 ; London, 

56-8, 64; Paris, 121, 193, 229- 

31, 244; Paris (1763), 152; 

Prague, 189; Rastadt, 6, 39; 

San Stefano, 262; Tilsit, 19, 

39; Unkiar Skelessi, 72, 75; 

Utrecht, 39; Vienna, 177; 

Westphalia, 6 
Trieste, 8, 44, 232 
Triple Alliance, 147, 233, 269 
Tripolitza, 50, 52, 54 
Trochu, 213-6, 226, 235 
Troppau, 23 
Tsechs, 93 
Tuileries, 236 
Tunis, 68-9, 267 



Tunnels, 87, 132 

Turin, 87, 91, 132-3 

Tiirr, 137, 139 

Tuscany, 6, 12, 98, loo-i, 132-3, 

135 
Tyrol, Tyrolese, 2, 7, 95, 186 

Ukase (serfdom), 150 
Ultramontains, 29, 196, 233 
United States, 27, 152-68, 230-1, 

269 
Universal suffrage, 82, 107 

Valmy, i, 21 1-2 

Varna, 57, 11 5-6, 251, 255 

Venezelos, 266-7 

Venice, Venetia, 5, 8, 11-12, 38, 

43-4, 46, 68, 87-90, 103, 127, 

131-2, 147, 180, 182, 187, 189, 

193, 229 
Vera Cruz, 155, 166-7 
Verdun, 6, 206, 211, 216, 237 
Verona, 25, 88, 90, 132 
Versailles, 227-8, 234-6, 240-1 
Vicksburg, 163-5 
Victor Emmanuel, 100, 118, 126- 

33. 178-9, 182, 187, 193, 229 
Victor Hugo, 109, 194 
Victoria, Queen, 68, 76, 109, 175, 

218, 242, 244 
Vienna, 38-9, 88, 91, 93-7, 103; 

Congress, i, 3, 49, 221 
Villafranca, 90, 13 1-2, 193 
Vionville, 206, 211 
Virginia, 156-8, 161-2, 165 
Volturno, 140-3 

Wallachia, 40, 47, 121, 230 
Warsaw, 15, 65, 105, 145, 151 
Wartburg, 20-1 
Washington, city, 161; George, 

156 
Waterloo, i, 74, 112, 114 
Weissenburg, 202, 205 
WelUngton, 5-6, 25, 27, 55, 67, 

75, 89, 113, 116, 184, 245 
Werder, 217, 225 
Westphalia, 7, 14-15 
Wilhelmina, 192 
William I, 151, 169-71, 199, 200, 

212, 228, 241-2 



278 



INDEX 



William II, 147, 192, 269-70 
Wimpfen, 210 
Windischgratz, 94-5, 104 
Woerth, 205, 211 
Wurtemberg, 7, 15, 99, 104, I79. 
188-9, 201, 228 



Yannina, 43, 52 

Young Italy, 85, 102, 105 

Young Turks, 265-6 

Zemstvos, 151 
ZoUverein, 67 



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The Growth of English Industry and Commerce 

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The Life of Thomas Pitt. By Sir Cornelius Neale 

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Military History, By the Hon. J. W. Fortescue. Cloth, 

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History of the Life and Reign of Richard III^ to 

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China and the Manchus. By Prof. H. A, Giles, LL.D» 

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Annals of Politics and Culture, 1492 — 1899. By 

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The Evolution of New Japan. By Prof. J. H. Long- 
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Bannockburn. By John E. Morris, D.Litt. Fcap. 4to. 

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The Constitutional History of England. A Course 

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The Early History of the House of Savoy, 1000-1233. 

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Ancient India from the Earliest Times to the First Century 
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The Origins of the War. By J. Holland Rose, Litt.D. 

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The Growth of British Policy. An Historical Essay. 

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The Puritans in Power. By G. B. Tatham, M.A. 

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Personal and Party Government. A Chapter in the 

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Lord Chatham and the Whig^ Opposition. By D. A. 

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The Reign of Henry the Fifth. By J. H. VVylie, M.A., 

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